Intel interrrogation Sept-1992

INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATION

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
magoniioraty (ANR-PL) ARN: Military DocumentsSection Room 1A518, Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-6050
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution Is unlimited.
*FM34-52
FIELD MANUAL 34-52 Headquarters Department of the Anny Washington. DC. 28 September 1992
INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION
Table of Contents
Page
PREFACE ........................................................iv

CHAPTER 1 .MILITARY INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS AND ........................1.1
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Warfighting Doctrine .......................................1.1
The Intelligence Cycle .......................................1.1
Intelligence Disciplines ......................................1.2
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations ........................1-3
Mission. Enemy. Troops. Terrain. and Time Available Factors ...............1-5
Definition of Interrogation ....................................1.6
Definition of Prisoner of War and Enemy Prisoner of War ..................1.9
Pertinent Articles of Geneva Conventions ...........................1.10
Types of Sources ..........................................1.10
Personal Qualities .........................................1.12
Special Areas of Knowledge ...................................1.14
Interrogator Capabilities and Limitations ............................1-15
Conflicts ...............................................1.16
Interrogation Missions ......................................1.17
Drug and Law Enforcement Agency Operations ........................1.17

CHAPTER 2 .COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE ..............................2.1
Tactical Operations Center ....................................2.1
Interrogation Below Division ...................................2.2
Division Interrogation Assets ...................................2.3
Corps Interrogation Assets and Organization .........................2.6
Echelons Above Corps Interrogation Assets and Organization ...............2.7
Enemy Prisoner of War and Interrogation Facilities .....................2.9

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited .
*This publication supersedes FM 34.52. 8 May 1987.
Page
Corps Facilities ...........................................2.10
Echelons Above Corps Facilities .................................2.12
Medical Company Interrogations ................................2.12
Interrogation at Brigade and Below ...............................2.12
Special Forces ............................................2.14
Amphibious Operations ......................................2.14
Airborne Operations ....................................... 2.15
Interrogator Supported Operations ...............................2.18
Theater Interrogation Facility ..................................2.22
Support Relationships .......................................2.24

CHAPTER 3 .THE INTERROGATION PROCESS ...............................3.1
Collection Priority ......................................... 3.1
Screening ..............................................3.2
Planning and Preparation .....................................3.7
Approach Phase ..........................................3.10
Questioning Phase ......................................... 3.20
Termination Phase .........................................3.26
Reporting Information .................... ;.................3.28
Interrogation with an Interpreter ................................3.29
Strategic Interrogations and Debriefings ............................3.31

CHAPTER 4 .PROCESSING AND EXPLOITING CAPTURED ENEMY ..................4.1
DOCUMENTS
Document Categories ....................................... 4.2
Document Handling ........................................4.4
Document Exploitation ......................................4.7
Translating ............................................. 4.9
Evacuation Procedures ...................................... 4.12

APPENDIX A .UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE EXTRACT .................A-1

APPENDIX B .QUESTIONING GUIDES ....................................B-1

APPENDIX C .S2 TACTICAL QUESTIONING GUIDE AND BATTLEFIELD EXPLOITATION ..C-1 OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT APPENDIX D .PROTECTED PERSONS RIGHTS VERSUS SECURITY NEEDS ............D-1 APPENDIX E .REPORTS ..............................................E-1
APPENDIX F.COMMAND LANGUAGE PROGRAM ............................F-1

APPENDIX G .INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING ......................G-1

Page GLOSSARY ................................................... Glossary-1 REFERENCES ............................................... References-1 INDEX ....................................................... Index-1
Preface
Preface - cont.
Chapter 1
Chapter 1 - cont.
Chapter 1 - cont.
Figure 1-2. Intelligence cycle using IPB.
SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Situation development confirms or denies the enemy COAs predicted in IPB. It confirms predicted centers of gravity and decisive points and identifies enemy strengths and vulnerabilities. This enables the com- mander to make timely decisions and effectively apply his combat power.
TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND TARGET
ACQUISITION

Target development and target acquisition provide targets and targeting data for attacks by fire, maneuver, and electronic means. They identify and locate those targets that will have the greatest impact on the campaign's decisive engagements. These include deep operational reserves, strategic and operational level command, control, and communications (c3) nodes, key lines of communication, and air and naval staging facilities throughout the enemy's depth that contribute to his combat potential.
At the tactical level, they address those HVTs that directly contribute to the application of combat power at decisive points on the battlefield.
BAlTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA)
BDA provides the commander with the effect of friendly operations on the enemy. It focuses on the enemy's remaining military capabilities and potential. At the operational level, it also considers the campaign's effects on the enemy's economy and opera- tional infrastructure as well as his military force struc- ture.
BDA is focused on providing effects of particular strikes and attacks, or a series of them. BDA is per- formed by the same collection assets used to satisfy the commander's intelligence and targeting priorities; therefore, BDA cannot be performed continuously without degradation of other capabilities, such as situa- tion development and targeting. The commander must prioritize the BDA effort, identifying what he must know and when he must know it, just as he does for his PIR and targeting priorities.
FORCE PROTECTION
Force protection identifies friendly vulnerabilities and the enemy's efforts to exploit them. At the opera- tional level, it includes the early identification of sig- nificant improvements in weapon lethality, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the conflict, or the commitment of terrorist or other uncon- ventional forces into friendly rear areas.
Force protection goes beyond countering enemy in- telligence and includes the protection of all forces that contribute to our combat power. At the tactical level, it emphasizes measures to counter the enemy's intel-ligence collection capabilities and to protect the force from enemy action.
MISSION, ENEMY, TROOPS, TERRAIN,AND TIME AVAILABLE FACTORS

The MElT-T factors are important to the com-mander when planning interrogation operations. MElT-T determines how the commander will use inter- rogation assets. The effect of ME=-T on interrogation missions is discussed below.
MISSION SUPPORT
The supported force's mission bears directly on how the interrogation element will be employed. In cordon and search operations, commanders may determine in- terrogators are best suited to screen the populace in order to identify insurgents and their supporters. In counter-drug operations, commanders may use inter- rogators to exploit documents and to train US and foreign agents in interrogation techniques. In all con- flicts, the focus will be on EPW interrogation and CED exploitation.
The mission influences interrogation operations in other ways. For example, if the force's mission is offen- sive, interrogation elements must be highly mobile, with secure communications to the supported G2 or S2. They must be constantly prepared to move forward with the element they are supporting. This limits time avail- able for exploitation and dissemination.
On the other hand, if the mission is defensive, inter- rogation elements have more time to exploit individual sources. They may also have more flexibility to exploit EPWs or detainees and CEDs, to fulfill the commander's intent to construct operational graphics.
Collection requirements vary according to echelon. Strategic echelon requirements reflect the wide scope of interest of the theater and national command authority (NCA); whereas, tactical PIR and IR--and resultant SIR--reflect the immediate, more narrowly focused in- telligence interest of the maneuver commander.
ENEMY
The enemy, and our knowledge of the enemy, can in- fluence interrogator assignments and the complexity of the exploitation process. One factor which affects inter- rogation operations is the type of opposing enemy force. The techniques and procedures used to collect from in- surgents in a LIC may differ from those used to collect from regular enemy forces in a MIC to HIC.
For example, an EPW from a regular forces unit may have undergone political indoctrination, but his com- mitment to his unit may not be as strong as that of the insurgent who is passionately committed to an ideal. Thus, interrogators may have more difficulty persuading the insurgent to talk.
Another factor affecting interrogation operations is our current intelligence holdings on the enemy force and the interrogator's understanding of the threat. Our intelligence holdings on the composition of a newly formed insurgent organization usually will not be as complete as holdings on the composition of a regular enemy force. Thus, the focus of interrogation efforts in the early stages of a LIC may be on enemy force com- position; whereas, the focus in a MIC or HIC may be on enemv force missions or intentions.
Cultural aspects also affect interrogation missions. The employment of some basic interrogation techniques will differ based on the ethnic and cultural background of the enemy, and our failure to understand and adapt to this could ham~er the collection effort.
TROOPS
The number, experience level, and language proficiency of interrogators affect the tactical employ- ment of interrogation elements. Due to the limited number of interrogators at any echelon, interrogation element commanders have to pick from available inter- rogators. They must manage personnel to ensure the most experienced are used to the best advantage (for ex- ample, to exploit complex enemy documents) and select EPWs most likely to answer SIR.
Interrogation element commanders often have to contend with a mismatch between language-qualified personnel assigned to the unit and languages needed to perform the mission. They overcome the mismatch by acquiring local national (LN) interpreter support through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel). They can also augment their interrogators by requesting other available linguists within the supported command to serve as interpreters:
Another troop-related factor which affects interroga- tion operations is the training of all soldiers on EPW handling and evacuation. EPW treatment during the early stages of capture is critical to the success of sub- sequent interrogations. The availability of military police (MP) support at brigade and above can enhance interrogation activities. Interrogation operations are more effective in a controlled environment where EPWs are adequately guarded.
TERRAIN
Terrain and weather are relevant to interrogator operations an& affect site deployments, communica- tions, and mobility. MP must ensure proper shelter and security for the EPW facility if it is collocated or imme- diately adjacent to the EPW collecting point or intern- ment facility.
TIME AVAILABLE
Information collected through interrogation opera- tions is valuable only if it is reported in a timely manner. Exploitation procedures may need to be adjusted to make the most use of time available. At the tactical level, interrogations will be brief, PIR driven, and reported in concise formats such as size, activity, loca- tion, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE).
At the operational and strategic levels, time will generally allow for a more expanded interrogation effort and flexible reporting format, such as the intelligence information report (IIR).
The challenge is for interrogators to be proficient lin- guists and skilled members of a highly organized collec- tion activity. This ensures the acquisition of the maximum amount of pertinent information regardless of time available.
Like other intelligence assets, interrogators must serve the commander. Interrogation operations are of no value unless they contribute to the accomplishment of the supported commander's mission. To understand the interrogator's role in mission accomplishment, one must understand the interrogation process.

DEFINITION OF INTERROGATION
Interrogation is the process of questioning a source to The goal of any interrogation is to obtain reliable infor- obtain the maximum amount of usable information. mation in a lawful manner, in a minimum amount of
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Chapter 2
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Chapter 2 - cont.
ORGANIZATION (AIRBORNE OR AIR ASSAULT ORGANIZATION (ACR AND SEPARATE BRIGADE)
DIVISION) In an ACR or separate brigade, interrogators are as-
In an airborne Or air assault division, inter-signed to the operations support platoon of the MI rogators are assigned to the I&S Company, MI company. Figure 2-4 shows this organization. Battalion. Figure 2-3shows this structure.
Figure 2-3. I&S Company, MI Battalion, Airborne or Air Assault Division.
Figure 2-4. MI Company Operations Support Platoon for ACR and Separate Brigade.
SPECIAL FORCES GROUP Interrogation teams may be combined with the CI sec- a special Group (Airborne) (SFGA), inter-tion when not conducting interrogation operations.
rogators are assigned to the Military Intelligence Detachment (MID). Figure 2-5 shows this structure.
LEGEND: * ASPS and CMO sections are consolidated on TOE. * * All SlGlNT MOSS are consolidated under the ASPS per the 31 803L000 TOE.
Figure 2-5. Organization, MI Detachment, Support Company, Special Forces Group.

CORPS INTERROGATION ASSETS AND ORGANIZATION
At corps, interrogators are assigned to the MI Bat-of a company headquarters, IPW and CI operation sec- talion (Tactical Exploitation) (TE). Figure 2-6 shows tions, CI and interrogation platoons, and a maintenance this structure. The CI interrogation company consists section.
Figure 2-6. MI Battalion (TE).
The CI platoon has nine teams and the interrogation platoon normally has eight teams. Interrogators can be hlaced in a DS role to divisions to augment division in- terrogation assets.
The corps also has a Reserve Components (RC) MI Battalion (TE), which has a subordinate CI in- terrogation comp a ny . Figure 2-7 shows this s t r u c t u r e.
There are also linguist battalions which augment and support Active Component (AC) units in time of hos- tilities.
Figure 2-7. RC MI Battalion (TE) Corps.

ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS INTERROGATION ASSETS AND ORGANIZATION
The MI Battalion (Collection and Exploitation headquarters company (HHC), MI Company (CI), and [C&E]),as shown at Figure 2-8, has a headquarters and MI Company (Interrogation and Exploitation) [I&E]).
Figure 2-8. MI Battalion (C&E), MI Brigade (EAC).
The MI Battalion (ME), as shown at Figure 2-9, has an HHC and three MI companies (ME), of which one is GS. 7b0 MI companies-(ME) (INTG) operate the theater, joint, or combined interrogation facilities, while the (GS) is for OSto and below (ECB).
The MI Company (Interrogation) of the MI Battalion (C&E) and (I&E), as shown at Figure 2-10, has a com- pany headquarters, operations section, communications section, food service section, and an I&E platoon, con- sisting of two sections.
The MI company (ME) (GS), MI Battalion (ME), has a headquarters section, an operations section, and three interrogation platoons, each with a platoon head- quarters and eight sections. Figure 2-11 shows this structure.
Figure 2-9. MI Battalion (I&E), MI Brigade (EAC).
Figure 2-10. MI Company (INTG),MI Battalion (C&E) and (I&E).
Figure 2-11. MI Company (ME) (GS), MI Battalion (ME).
ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR AND INTERROGATION FACILITIES

There are significant differences in EPW and inter- rogation facilities at each echelon; this is due to the numbers of EPWs, the missions of the various echelons, and the size of the interrogation elements.
EVACUATION AND GUARDING EPW
Initially, the capturing unit is responsible for evacuat- ing and guarding EPWs. In brigade-size operations, battalions evacuate prisoners to brigade collecting points as the situation permits. In most cases, EPWs are evacuated rapidly using backhaul transportation from brigade collecting points to departure areas be- cause they require food and guards, both of which are in short supply at brigade. EPW collecting points should be located close to supply routes to speed evacuation.
BRIGADE AND LOWER ECHELONS
At brigade level, EPWs can be detained in open fields, courtyards, gardens, jungle clearings, or similar sites if they are hidden from enemy observation. If necessary, these areas can be enclosed with barbed wire for more efficient EPW handling. Because EPWs sel- dom remain at a forward collecting point for more than a few hours, EPWs are not usually kept in a building or other shelter.
Interrogation facilities at battalion and brigade are kept to a minimum. Brigade interrogation personnel should be located adjacent to the brigade forward EPW collecting point in the BSA. The collecting point
should be out of sight and sound of other BSA activities. It should be close to normal evacuation routes.
The distance between the collecting point and CP is important. When possible, the collecting point and in- terrogation site should be within walking distance or a few minute's driving distance of the CP.
Interrogators with battalions or brigades should have vehicles equipped with radios for rapid communication with their respective intelligence officers and other in- telligence agencies.
DIVISION FACILITIES
The principal EPW tactical interrogation takes place at division. While the procedure is similar to that used at brigade, the interrogation scope is broader.
Previous interrogation reports received from brigade are reviewed. This information is expanded by further interrogations for tactical information to include all OB elements.
The interrogators at division level will prepare and disseminate summary interrogation reports. As dictated by the tactical situation, the interrogation facility at division may be augmented by corps interrogation per- sonnel-
The division's central EPW collecting point is operated by division Mp under the supervision of the division provost marshal. The interrogation section should be located immediately adjacent to the division's
central EPW collecting point, normally along the main supply route (MSR) within or near the division support command (DISCOM).
The distance between the interrogation facility and G2 section (rear) is not as critical as at brigade level. Personal liaison between the interrogation and intel- ligence sections, although important, may not be re- quired as frequently as at brigade.
At division, the G2 directs interrogation section col- lection efforts in conjunction with the CM&D section and the MI battalion commander, who serves as one of his principal assistants.
Compared to brigade facilities, division interrogation facilities are expanded. This is because the division in- terrogation section handles and interrogates more cap- tured personnel, and interrogations are conducted in greater detail. When practicable, interrogations at division should be conducted in improvised interroga- tion rooms in buildings adjacent to the division collect- ing point. If possible, separate rooms should be available to permit several interrogations at once.

CORPS FACILITIES

The corps EPW holding area is established and operated by MP under the supervision of the corps provost marshal. The Corps Interrogation Facility (CIF) will usually be a more permanent type facility than at echelons below corps. It should consist of operations and interrogation areas with separate, enclosed interrogation booths or rooms. If possible, there should be a separate DOCEX area. Figure 2-12 shows a sample CIF.
Figure 2-12. Sample Corps Interrogation facility (CIF).
2-10
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
ported battalion S2. This will ensure interrogators are fully oriented to the battalion's collection mission.
In other instances, interrogators may be placed at brigade in an "on-calln status, from which they can proceed to any of the subordinate battalions as cir- cumstances warrant. Upon completion of a low-level, immediate-type interrogation, they can return to brigade and again become available for immediate employment.
Commanders and S2s below brigade level who are un- able to obtain interrogator support from higher echelons should include provisions in unit and staff standing operating procedures (SOPS) for the "tactical questioning" (not interrogation) of EPWs or detainees. They should identify assigned personnel for language capability.
Interrogation personnel should provide training in the area of tactical questioning to designated S2 person- nel. The potential for abuse of the EPW is greatest at the initial capture and tactical questioning phase. With the excitement and stress of the battlefield, it may be- come easy for unskilled personnel to resort to illegal techniques to elicit critical information.
Your instruction must stress the importance of the proper treatment of EPWs. Emphasize that the abuse of an EPW at the initial stage of contact often renders future interrogation futile.
If you are engaged in, or supervising the tactical ques- tioning of EPWs, you are responsible for ensuring that EPWs are treated in accordance with the requirements of international and US law. Any tactical questioning conducted must be in response to the supported commander's PIR. Appendix C discusses S2 tactical questioning.
At this level the brigade S2 must maintain secure communication with interrogation personnel to ensure requirements are answered. Except under extreme weather conditions, and MP availability, it is not neces- sary to keep EPWs within the confines of a building or other shelter at battalion level since they will not remain for more than a few hours before being evacuated.
The capturing unit escorts or transports EPWs or detainees to the nearest collecting point, and turns them over to the MP. Interrogators in DS of the brigade will screen and categorize all EPWs or detainees, question them, and report information obtained in response to brigade PIR, IR, and SIR. They will do this under time constraints, as all EPWs or detainees must be evacuated without delay.
In spite of the temporary nature of the forward EPW collecting point, interrogators should maintain enough space between the collecting point and the interrogation site to ensure the privacy of interrogations. EPWs or detainees should not be able to observe or hear inter- rogations in progress.
INTERROGATIONS IN OTHER OPERATIONS
The functions and basic operational techniques employed by the interrogation element attached to the infantry division apply to interrogation elements sup- porting armored, amphibious, and airborne operations in any terrain or climate.
Differences arise primarily in the planning stages and interrogation objectives. These differences normally result from the inherent characteristics of each type of unit and terrain and climate involved.
For example, the interrogator engaging in airborne and amphibious operations will be dependent upon in- telligence support from higher agencies during the plan- ning stage. This is necessary because the unit does not have actual contact with the enemy until a specific operation begins.
Once H-hour arrives, the interrogator will be faced with a rapidly developing and changing tactical situa- tion. At this time, the degree of success correlates to the preparations made during the planning stage.
Consequently, the interrogator must make a con-certed effort to learn everything possible about the ob- jective area-terrain, enemy, and weather-and relate these factors to the mission of the unit supported. Only by taking these steps will the interrogator be able to en- sure success, and be prepared to begin interrogations as soon as possible after contact with the enemy is estab- lished. Interrogation objectives depend upon the mis- sion assigned and type of unit supported.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
one brigade, there must be corps augmentation. FM 71-101describes air assault operations.
Security of aircraft enroute to landing zones (LZs) is a major concern. Friendly aircraft and air defense sup- port must ensure air routes are free of enemy aircraft and air defense systems.
When remotely monitored battlefield sensor systems (REMBASS) are available, friendly ground assets emplace REMBASS along likely enemy ground ap- proach routes in the LZ to detect and report ground movement. Ground surveillance radar (GSR) is employed to warn of enemy movement on friendly flanks.
Air assault operations require extensive HUMINT support in operation planning. CI analysis is critical to ensure OPSEC measures are taken to prevent divulging critical information, such as-
8 Date and time of operation.
8 Size of force to be employed.
8 Air routes to and from planned LZs.
8 Planned LZ locations.
CI must also support staging area actions to prevent espionage, sabotage, and acts of terrorism which could adversely affect the operation.
Interrogation is a primary source of information for air assault operations IPB. Interrogation support of ini- tial stages of the operation may be critical to its success.
The assault force commander needs immediate and current enemy intelligence. Lack of immediate ques- tioning of EPWs captured in securing the LZs or in fol- low-up actions may cause failure of the operation.
Planners must consider the difficulty in getting EPWs back to a support area during the early stages of an air assault operation. Interrogators should support the air assault elements as soon as possible. This may mean an interrogation team is included in the air assault force to operate at a forward EPW collecting point established in the vicinity of the LZ.
Normally, one interrogation team should support each air assault battalion during the assault phase. If the air assault battalion is using more than one LZ, the team may be split to support each LZ.
After assault units have established a ground link-up, some or all of the interrogators may be returned to the echelon of command from which they were detached.
Interrogators supporting the early stages of an air as- sault operation must be provided with the SIR, which are critical to the operation's success. Interrogators must plan ahead on how to question EPWs to satisfy immediate collection requirements.
ARMORED AND MECHANIZED JNFANTRY
OPERATIONS

Armored units normally operate on extensive fronts, with deep zones of action and dispersed formations. Be- cause of the mobility and wide range of action of ar- mored units, interrogation normally is not as detailed as in other divisions. Interrogators must remain mobile, operate with minimum facilities, and be alert for sudden changes in the tactical situation.
Planning and Operation
With a few exceptions, the planning and preparation necessary for interrogators supporting armored units is the same as for those supporting regular infantry units. Since radio is the normal means of communication, all interrogation team members must be familiar with voice radio procedures and know how to operate radio equip- ment common to armored units.
Interrogator Employment
Interrogator personnel who support armored or mechanized units will come under OPCON of the 52, G2, or S2 of the supported unit. Interrogators at all levels of armored or mechanized units must be able to operate during fluid situations, and remain mobile at all times. Because of this mobility, liaison with the 52, G2, or S2 will not be as frequent as in other units.
Interrogators must operate with maximum efficiency on the basis of radio communications, messages, and written reports. As in other type units, interrogation personnel remain OPCON to the G2 until operations begin. At that time, the division MI battalion will at- tach interrogation personnel to subordinate units. After an operation is completed, interrogation person- nel will revert to division control, pending a future mis- sion.
Normally, interrogations within armored units will be limited to interrogating EPWs for location and deploy- ment of antitank weapons and defenses, enemy roadblocks, and presence of enemy armor. In fast
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Chapter 3
Chapter 3 - cont.
DETAINEE PERSONNEL RECORD
For us0 of thl8 form. uAR 1808.the proponant agency Is OOZSPER.
PART I-TO BE COMPLETED AT TIME OF MOCESSINC
See Item 28.
26 WON
36. REMARKS None. 37. PUOTO
PHOTO (Front Vkw) PHOTO (Rllhl PmlUr)
38. PREPARED BY Ilndiuldual and unit) SFC D.C. SMITH, 17th MP Co. Lg DATE PREPAAEO 41. PLACE 8 Oct 99 '29thINF DIV REAR INTERNMENT FACILITY 39. SIGNA DA FORM 4237.R. Aug 85 EDITION OF MAV 81 IS OBSOLETE n d A A
Figure 3-1. DA Form 4237-R (Detainee Personnel Record) (front).


FM 34-52
h
A-
PART I1 -TO RE MAINTAINFD BY UNIT HAVINC CUSTnDV
.-
41. LASl NAME D FIRS1 NAMES
CH'OE HNN-SIK
43. INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER
US-1501-23176

44. MEDICAL RECORD
r. IMMUNIZATION IVacclnollonr and lnnoculal~on. with D~IPSJ
Smallpox -15 APR 98
b. MAJOR ILLNESSES AN0 PHYSICAL DEFECTS (Wlth IJafrrJ c. BLOOD GFIOUP
NONE. B POS

45. INTERNMENT EMPLOYMENT (IUALIFICATIDNS

FARMER

46. SERIOUS OFFENSES. PUNISHMENTS. AND ESCAPES (Wtth Uafrrl

NONE.

40. FINANCLAL STATUS AT TIME OF "HST INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER I. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO EPW (Amount in unontr~ b AMT IN IICURES
C. LOCATION d DATC
60. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF SECOND lNTt RNATIONAL TRANSFER I. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUE0 TO EPW l~mount ~n ~~.orA,j b AMT IN f IGuRES
C. LOCATION -61. r. REASON REPATRIATION d DATE
b. MODE c. DATE
I?. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIMC OF REPAiRIATION r. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUFD TO EPW IAma,unl ~nwords) b. AMT IN FlCURtS
c. LOCATION ' d DATE
RRVFYdC Of' !IA PI)PY .?.?I R, A1.Y: Rq
Figure 3-1. DA Form 4237-R (Detainee Personnel Record) (reverse).


Chapter 3 - cont.
MP NUMBER: EVACUATION DATE:
LNAME (P): /f//dA/~ c DATE: 7h9 99
LNAME (M): A TIME: /4/7

E
FNAME: HAITHAM P PLACE: ZA lJ13956
R
s MNAME: A&%LL)H u CAP UNIT: /6/</3/4AXGT
0 SVC/ID NO: /234srb7 R CIRCUMSTANCE&: AF7&R
DOB: 24 0~7-80 E f/RE F/GH7

A
L IANGUAGES: ARAB~C~ D DOCUMENTS: &dE

MARITAL STATUS: M S W A
&)= Military c = civilian T WPNSIEQUIP: A$-47
***
STATUS: p = Paramilitary ? = Other A
BRANCH: AF @CG MC NV PHYSICAL CONDITION: SEX: @ F RNK WOUNDED: Y @M
1 FULL UNIT DSG: s 2/47 3c0 A REMARKS:
L S
S,

:DUmPSN: BUT]/aAD/sH E
MENTAL CONDITION: A JOB: R~fLGrn~hj EDUCATION= 8 YRS STATION: M INTELLIGENCE: AVG + AVG @Y SKILLS: s~ARP'H~~TER E MENTALSTATE: ~/ERI/OLLS
EXPERIENCE: ~f'f 7 flus-N
. T
SCREENER: Sfc ~~YCE
C JOB: JTUD#f I D DATE: TIME: V ORG: A COOPERATION: @(~i~h) 2 3 (low)I DUTIES: KNOWLEDGE: A (High) @ C (low)
L A
I BGW LIST: Y @ BGW CODE.
A SKILLS: dod&-SOURCE CATEGORY: A I3 @ D

N APPROACH: DI @C.j; Tdc& 7-1d&
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIREMENT CODES:
P I R 84 I R R E M A R K S - -

Figure 3-2.Screening report format.


Chapter 3 - cont.
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bal and emotional ruses in applying pressure to the EPW's or detainee's dominant emotions.
One major advantage of this technique is it is ver- satile and allows the interrogator to use the same basic situation positively and negatively.
For example, this technique can be used on the EPW who has a great love for his unit and fellow soldiers. The interrogator may take advantage of this by telling the EPW that by providing pertinent information, he may shorten the war or battle in progress and save many of his comrades' lives, but his refusal to talk may cause their deaths. This places the burden on the EPW or detainee and may motivate him to seek relief through cooperation.
Conversely, this technique can also be used on the EPW or detainee who hates his unit because it withdrew and left him to be captured, or who feels he was unfairly treated in his unit. In such cases, the interrogator can point out that if the EPW cooperates and specifies the unit's location, the unit can be destroyed, thus giving the EPW an opportunity for revenge. The interrogator proceeds with this method in a very formal manner.
This approach is likely to be effective with the imma- ture and timid EPW.
Emotional Love Amroach. For the emotional love approach to be successful, the interrogator must focus on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstan- ces in which he finds himself. The interrogator must direct the love the source feels toward the appropriate object: family, homeland, or comrades. If the inter- rogator can show the source what the source himself can do to alter or improve his situation, the approach has a chance of success.
This approach usually involves some incentive such as communication with the source's family or a quicker end to the war to save his comrades' lives. A good inter- rogator will usually orchestrate some futility with an emotional love approach to hasten the source's reaching the breaking point.
Sincerity and conviction are critical in a successful at- tempt at an emotional love approach as the interrogator must show genuine concern for the source, and for the object at which the interrogator is directing the source's emotion.
If the interrogator ascertains the source has great love for his unit and fellow soldiers, the interrogator can ef- fectively exploit the situation. This places a burden on the source and may motivate him to seek relief through cooperation with the interrogator.
Hate Approach. The emotional hate ap- proach focuses on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire for revenge, the source may feel. The interrogator must ascertain exactly what it is the source may hate so the emotion can be exploited to override the source's ra- tional side. The source may have negative feelings about his country's regime, immediate superiors, of- ficers in general, or fellow soldiers.
This approach is usually most effective on members of racial or religious minorities who have suffered dis- crimination in military and civilian life. If a source feels he has been treated unfairly in his unit, the interrogator can point out that, if the source cooperates and divulges the location of that unit, the unit can be destroyed, thus affording the source revenge.
By using a conspiratorial tone of voice, the inter- rogator can enhance the value of this technique. Phrases, such as "You owe them no loyalty for the way they treated you," when used appropriately, can expedite the success of this technique.
Do not immediately begin to berate a certain facet of the source's background or life until your assessment in- dicates the source feels a negative emotion toward it.
The emotional hate approach can be used more effec- tively by drawing out the source's negative emotions with questions that elicit a thought-provoking response. For example, "Why do you think they allowed you to be captured?" or "Why do you think they left you to die?" Do not berate the source's forces or homeland unless certain negative emotions surface.
Many sources may have great love for their country, but may hate the regime in control. The emotional hate approach is most effective with the immature or timid source who may have no opportunity up to this point for revenge, or never had the courage to voice his feel- ings.
Fear-Up Approach
The fear-up approach is the exploitation of a source's preexisting fear during the period of capture and inter- rogation. The approach works best with young, inex- perienced sources, or sources who exhibit a greater than normal amount of fear or nervousness. A source's fear may be justified or unjustified. For example, a source who has committed a war crime may justifiably fear prosecution and punishment. By contrast, a source who has been indoctrinated by enemy propaganda may un- justifiably fear that he will suffer torture or death in our hands if captured.
This approach has the greatest potential to violate the law of war. Great care must be taken to avoid threatening or coercing a source which is in violation of the GPW, Article 17.
It is critical the interrogator distinguish what the source fears in order to exploit that fear. The way in which the interrogator exploits the source's fear depends on whether the source's fear is justified or un- justified.
Fear-Up (Harsh). In this approach, the interrogator behaves in an overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice. The interrogator may even feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the source's implanted feelings of fear. Great care must be taken when doing this so any actions would not violate the prohibition on coercion and threats contained in the GPW, Article 17.
This technique is to convince the source he does in- deed have something to fear; that he has no option but to cooperate. A good interrogator will implant in the source's mind that the interrogator himself is not the object to be feared, but is a possible way out of the trap.
Use the confirmation of fear only on sources whose fear is justified. During this approach, confirm to the source that he does indeed have a legitimate fear. Then convince the source that you are the source's best or only hope in avoiding or mitigating the object of his fear, such as punishment for his crimes.
You must take great care to avoid promising actions that are not in your power to grant. For example, if the source has committed a war crime, inform the source that the crime has been reported to the appropriate authorities and that action is pending. Next inform the source that, if he cooperates and tells the truth, you will report that he cooperated and told the truth to the ap- propriate authorities. You may add that you will also report his lack of cooperation. You may not promise that the charges against him will be dismissed because you have no authority to dismiss the charges.
Fear-Up (u.
This approach is better suited to the strong, confident type of interrogator; there is generally no need to raise the voice or resort to heavy-handed, table-banging.
For example, capture may be a result of coin-ciden-the soldier was caught on the wrong side of the border before hostilities actually commenced (he was armed, he could be a terrorist)--or as a result of his actions (he surrendered contrary to his military oath and is now a traitor to his country, and his forces will take care of the disciplinary action).
The fear-up (mild) approach must be credible. It usually involves some logical incentive.
In most cases, a loud voice is not necessary. The ac- tual fear is increased by helping the source realize the unpleasant consequences the facts may cause and by presenting an alternative, which, of course, can be brought about by answering some simple questions.
The fear-up (harsh) approach is usually a dead end, and a wise interrogator may want to keep it in reserve as a trump card. After working to increase the source's fear, it would be difficult to convince him everything will be all right if the approach is not successful.
Fear-Down Approach
This technique is nothing more than calming the source and convincing him he will be properly and humanely treated, or telling him the war for him is mer- cifully over and he need not go into combat again. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rapport and usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate.
While calming the source, it is a good idea to stay ini- tially with nonpertinent conversation and to avoid the subject which has caused the source's fear. This works quickly in developing rapport and communication, as the source will readily respond to kindness.
When using this approach, it is important the inter- rogator relate to the source at his perspective level and not expect the source to come up to the interrogator's level.
If the EPW or detainee is so frightened he has withdrawn into a shell or regressed to a less threatening state of mind, the interrogator must break through to him. The interrogator can do this by putting himself on the same physical level as the source; this may require some physical contact. As the source relaxes and begins to respond to kindness, the interrogator can begin asking pertinent questions.
This approach technique may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing the source he has nothing to fear, he may cease to be afraid and may feel secure
to resist the interrogator's pertinent question. If this occurs, reverting to a harsher approach technique usually will bring the desired result quickly.
The fear-down approach works best if the source's fear is unjustified. During this approach, take specific actions to reduce the source's unjustified fear. For ex- ample, if the source believes that he will be abused while in your custody, make extra efforts to ensure that the source is well cared for, fed, and appropriately treated.
Once the source is convinced that he has no legitimate reason to fear you, he will be more inclined to cooperate. The interrogator is under no duty to reduce a source's unjustified fear. The only prohibition is that the interrogator may not say or do anything that directly or indirectly communicates to the source that he will be harmed unless he provides the requested in- formation.
These applications of the fear approach may be com- bined to achieve the desired effect. For example, if a source has justified and unjustified fears, you may ini- tially reduce the source's unfounded fears, then confirm his legitimate fears. Again, the source should be con- vinced the interrogator is his best or only hope in avoid- ing or mitigating the object of his fear.
Pride and Ego Approach
The strategy of this approach is to trick the source into revealing desired information by goading or flatter- ing him. It is effective with sources who have displayed weakness or feelings of inferiority. A real or imaginary deficiency voiced about the source, loyalty to his or- ganization, or any other feature can provide a basis for this technique.
The interrogator accuses the source of weakness or implies he is unable to do a certain thing. This type of source is also prone to excuses and reasons why he did or did not do a certain thing, often shifting the blame to others. An example is opening the interrogation with the question, "Why did you surrender so easily when you could have escaped by crossing the nearby ford in the river?"
The source is likely to provide a basis for further questions or to reveal significant intelligence informa- tion if he attempts to explain his surrender in order to vindicate himself. He may give an answer such as, "No one could cross the ford because it is mined."
This technique can also be employed in another man- ner--by flattering the source into admitting certain in- formation in order to gain credit. For example, while interrogating a suspected saboteur, the interrogator states: "This was a smooth operation. I have seen many previous attempts fail. I bet you planned this. Who else but a clever person like you would have planned it? When did you first decide to do the job?"
This technique is especially effective with the source who has been looked down upon by his superiors. The source has the opportunity to show someone he is intel- ligent.
A problem with the pride and ego approach is it relies on trickery. The source will eventually realize he has been tricked and may refuse to cooperate further. If this occurs, the interrogator can easily move into a fear-up approach and convince the source the questions he has already answered have committed him, and it would be useless to resist further.
The interrogator can mention it will be reported to the source's forces that he has cooperated fully with the enemy, will be considered a traitor, and has much to fear if he is returned to his forces.
This may even offer the interrogator the option to go into a love-of-family approach where the source must protect his family by preventing his forces from learning of his duplicity or collaboration. Telling the source you will not report that he talked or that he was a severe dis- cipline problem is an incentive that may enhance the ef- fectiveness of the approach.
Pride and EEO-UD A roach. This appioach is most effective on sources with little or no intelligence, or on those who have been looked down upon for a long time. It is very effective on low-ranking enlisted personnel and junior grade officers, as it allows the source to final- ly show someone he does indeed have some "brains."
The source is constantly flattered into providing cer- tain information in order to gain credit. The inter- rogator must take care to use a flattering somewhat-in-awe tone of voice, and speak highly of the source throughout this approach. This quickly produces positive feelings on the source's part, as he has probably been looking for this type of recognition all of his life.
The interrogator may blow things out of proportion using items from the source's background and making them seem noteworthy or important. As everyone is eager to hear praise, the source will eventually reveal led to believe all of his forces had run out of food. If the source is hinging on cooperating, it may aid the inter- rogation effort if he is told all the other source's have cooperated.
Chapter 3 - cont.
The futility approach must be orchestrated with other approach techniques (for example, love of comrades). A source who may want to help save his comrades' lives may be convinced the battlefield situation is hopeless and they will die without his assistance.
The futility approach is used to paint a bleak picture for the prisoner, but it is not effective in and of itself in gaining the source's cooperation.
We Know All
This approach may be employed in conjunction with the "file and dossier" technique (discussed below) or by itself. If used alone, the interrogator must first become thoroughly familiar with available data concerning the source. To begin the interrogation, the interrogator asks questions based on this known data. When the source hesitates, refuses to answer, or provides an incor- rect or incomplete reply, the interrogator provides the detailed answer.
When the source begins to give accurate and com- plete information, the interrogator interjects questions designed to gain the needed information. Questions to which answers are already known are also asked to test the source's truthfulness and to maintain the deception that the information is already known. By repeating this procedure, the interrogator convinces the source that resistance is useless as everything is already known.
After gaining the source's cooperation, the inter- rogator still tests the extent of cooperation by peri- odically using questions to which he has the answers; this is very necessary. If the interrogator does not chal- lenge the source when he is lying, the source will know everything is not known, and he has been tricked. He may then provide incorrect answers to the interrogator's questions.
There are some inherent problems with the use of the "we know all" approach. The interrogator is required to prepare everything in detail, which is time consuming. He must commit much of the information to memory, as working from notes may show the limits of the infor- mation actually known.
File and Dossier
The file and dossier approach is used when the inter- rogator prepares a dossier containing all available infor- mation obtained from documents concerning the source or his organization. Careful arrangement of the material within the file may give the illusion it contains more data than actually there. The file may be padded with extra paper, if necessary. Index tabs with titles such as education, employment, criminal record, military ser- vice, and others are particularly effective.
The interrogator confronts the source with the dos- siers at the beginning of the interrogation and explains intelligence has provided a complete record of every sig- nificant happening in the source's life; therefore, it would be useless to resist. The interrogator may read a few selected bits of known data to further impress the source.
If the technique is successful, the source will be in- timidated by the size of the file, conclude everything is known, and resign himself to complete cooperation. The success of this technique is largely dependent on the naivete of the source, volume of data on the subject, and skill of the interrogator in convincing the source.
Establish Your Identity
This approach is especially adaptable to interroga- tion. The interrogator insists the source has been cor- rectly identified as an infamous individual wanted by higher authorities on serious charges, and he is not the person he purports to be. In an effort to clear himself of this allegation, the source makes a genuine and detailed effort to establish or substantiate his true identity. In so doing, he may provide the interrogator with information and leads for further development.
The "establish your identity" approach was effective in Viet Nam with the Viet Cong and in OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.
This approach can be used at tactical echelons. The interrogator must be aware if it is used in conjunction with the file and dossier approach, as it may exceed the tactical interrogator's preparation resources.
The interrogator should initially refuse to believe the source and insist he is the criminal wanted by the am- biguous higher authorities. This will force the source to give even more detailed information about his unit in order to convince the interrogator he is who he says he is. This approach works well when combined with the "futility" or "we know all" approach.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
FM 34-52
....
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Rm-of DA Form 2662.R. May 82
REVERSE
Figure 3-6. DA Form 2662-R (United States ArmyEPW Identification Card).
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 - cont.
EPWs OR SOURCES
Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
UNIT: /b zfl DII/(4)

FILE RECEIVED DOCUMENT INCOMING TRANS- FORWARDING RECEIVED BY TIME AND PLACE NUMBER DTG SERIAL NUMBER MISSION NUMBER UNIT OF CAPTURE (DTG)
I
ope/ ///9/02MS-AR-/q/0./ NA 4% 80yce i/07tfzdc 123YSg9 0002 1/14/72 ~S-~'KHIAI/~dfi /sz&5&-%~ES ///3/fc%&C 654321
CAPTURING UNIT SCREENING DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT OUTGOING REMARKS
CATEGORY TRANSM17TAL

@///2/3 c P~USO~YAL o//.17 A~O~JS
L~T~A




A 0pu'U 0/9../3
Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
(CLASSIFICATION)
TRANSLATION REPORT
TO: G2,23d Inf Div (MECH) DATE: 291 130ZAUG99
FROM:IPW Sec, I&S Co,231st MI Bn REPORT NUMBER: 08-0356
PART I. CONTROL DATA:
1. DOCUMENT NUMBER: US-WAIBVO-03093.

2.
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Personal letter, 1page, handwritten.

3.
DOCUMENT'S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: Russian.

4.
DATE AND TIME RECEIVED: 290510ZAUG99.

5.
DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: 290120ZAUG99.

6.
PLACE OF CAPTURE: vic NB146122.

7.
CAPTURING UNIT: Co.A, 2d Bn, 1st Inf Bde, 23d Inf Div.

8.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: During ambush.

9.
TRANSLATOR: SGT Royce.

10.
TRANSLATION TYPE: Full.


PART 11. TRANSLATION TEXT:
My dear Serezhen'ka:
It has been a long time since I received a letter from you. How are you and where are you? The last time you wrote that fighting was going on around you all the time, and this worries me a lot. Take care of yourself. There have been many changes at home. Your mother, despite her age, had to go to work in the factory. They make tanks there, but the sign over the entrance says this is a sugar plant. I don't know why they do this. At the school where I work, we were also told to go and work at the same plant. They are going to close the school. Everyone has to go to the front or work in the war industry. I would be more at ease if I knew you are alive and well. Please write as soon as you can.
Your KATHY.
PART 111: REMARKS: None. (CLASSIFICATION)
Figure 4-5. Sample translation report.
Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
will be provided the source. See AR 190-8for proce- dures on handling personal effects.
Returned
Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature, taken only for inspection and information of interest, and im- mediately given back to the source. Personal documents belonging to a source will be returned to the source after examination in accordance with the GPW.Copies of such papers may be made and forwarded if considered appropriate. An identification document must be returned to the source.
RECOGNITION AND EVACUATION OF
DOCUMENTS

In a fast-moving tactical situation, it is possible docu- ments captured with sources will not be handled ex- peditiously. Final disposition of these documents may not be made until the source is evacuated at least as far as the corps holding area.
Some documents captured with a source will aid in the interrogation of the source. Others, particularly Category A, should be copied and evacuated separately.
One copy can remain with the source to aid in the inter- rogation, and the other can be translated and exploited separately.
It is essential that the capturing unit correctly identify the documents captured with the source. This is more easily done when the interrogation element, rather than the MP element, signs for the documents captured with sources.
EVACUATION OF SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS
To efficiently exploit CEDs and sources, documents captured with a source are normally evacuated with the source. A document of great significance may be evacuated ahead of the source, but a reproduction should be kept with the source. If reproduction is not possible, note on the captured document tag where the document was sent.
Significant documents such as Categories A and B, TECHDOCs, maps, charts, AIRDOG, and NAVDOCs are evacuated directly.
APPENDIX A
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE EXTRACT

Article 78, Accessory after the fact
Text of the offense: Any person subject to this chap- ter who, knowing that an -offense punishable by this chapter has been committed, receives, comforts, or as- sists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his ap- prehension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a court-martial shall direct.
Article 80. Attempts
Text of the offense:
(a)
An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt' to commit that of- fense.

(b)
Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to commit any offense punishable by this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, unless other- wise specifically prescribed.

(c)
Any person subject to this chapter may be con- victed of an attempt to commit an offense although it appears on the trial that the offense was consummated.



Article 81? Conspiracv
Text of the offense: Any person subject to this chap- ter who conspires with any other person to commit an offense under this chapter shall, if one or more of the conspirators does an act to effect the object of the con- spiracy, be punished as a court- martial may direct.
Article 93: Cruelty and maltreatment
Elements of the offense:
(1) That a certain person was subject to the or- ders of the accused; and
(2) That the accused was cruel toward, or op-
pressed, or maltreated that person. (The cruelty, op- pression, or maltreatment, -although not necessarily physical, must be measured by an objective standard.)
Article 118. Murder
Text of the offense: Any person subject to this chap- ter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he-
(1)
has a premeditated design to kill;

(2)
intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm;


. . -
(3)
is engaged in an act that is inherently dangerous to others and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or

(4)
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a burglary, sodomy, rape, robbery, or ag- gravated arson;


is guilty of murder, and shall suffer punishment as a court-martial shall direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), he shall suffer death or im- prisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.
Article 119. Manslauphter
Text of the offense:
(a)
Any person subject to this chapter who, with an intent to inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of sudden passion caused by adequate provocation is guilty of voluntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b)
Any person subject to this chapter who, without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being-

(1) by culpable negligence; or

(2)
while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an offense, other than those named in clause (4) of Ar-ticle 118, directly affecting the person; is guilty of in- voluntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.



Article 124, Maiming
Text of the offense: Any person subject to this chap- ter who, with intent to injure, disfigure, or disable, &-flicts upon the person of another an injury which-
(1)
seriously disfigures his person by any mutila- tion thereof;

(2)
destroys or disables any member or organ of his body; or

(3)
seriously diminishes the physical vigor by the injury of any member or organ;


is guilty of maiming and shall be punished as a court- martial may direct.
Article 127. Extortion
Text of the offense: Any person subject to this chap- ter who communicates threats to another person with the intention thereby to obtain anything of value or any acquittance, or immunity is guilty of extortion and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Article 128,Assatllt
Text of the offense:
(a)
Any person subject to this chapter who attempts or offers with unlawf~ll force or violence to do bodily harm to another person, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b)
Any person subject to this chapter who-

(1)
commits an assa~llt with a dangcrous weapon or other means or force likely ro produce death or grievous bodily harm; or

(2)
commits an assault and intentionally inflicts grievous bodily harm with or without a weapon;


is guilty of aggravated assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

Article 134, Homicide, negligent
Elements of the offense:
(1)
That a certain person is dead;

(2)
That this death resulted from the act or failure to act of the accused;

(3)
That the killing by the accused was unlawful;

(4)
That the act or failure to act of the accused which caused the death amounred to simple negligence; and

(5)
That, under the circumsrances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and dis- cipline in the armed forces or was of a nalure to bring discredit upon the armed forces.


AA
Elements of the offense:
(1)
That a certain serious offense was committed by a certain person;

(2)
That the accused knew that the said person had committed the serious offense;

(3)
That thereafter, the accused concealed the serious offense and failed to make it known to civilian or military authorities as soon as possible;

(4) That the concealing was wrongful; and

(5)
That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and dis- cipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.



Article 134, Soliciting another to commit an offense
Elements of the offense:
(1)
That the accused solicited a certain person or persons to commit a certain offense under the code other than one of the four offenses named in Article 82;

(2)
That the accused did so with the intent that the offense actually be committed; and

(3)
That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and dis- cipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.



Article 134, Threat? communicating
Elements of the offense:
(1)
That the accused communicated certain lan- guage expressing a present determination or intent to wrongfully injure the person, property, or reputation of another person, presently or in the future;

(2)
That the communication was made known to that person or a third person;

(3) That the communication was wrongful; and

(4)
That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and dis- cipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.


Appendix B
Appendix B - cont.
Appendix B - cont.
Appendix B - cont.
Appendix B - cont.
Appendix B - cont.
Appendix B - cont.
Appendix B - cont.
Appendix B - cont.
Appendix B - cont.
FM 3452

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
I. NBC WEAPONS.
1.
Are NBC weapons present in any of the brigade sectors?

2.
When will these NBC weapons be used?

3.
Where will these NBC weapons be used?

4.
How many of these NBC weapons will be used against each target?

5.
What systems will deliver these NBC weapons?


II . ENEMY A'ITACK.
1.
When will the enemy attack?

2.
Where will the enemy attack?

3.
What is the attack's main objective?

4.
What units will conduct the attack?

5.
What is the combat effectiveness of attack units?

6.
What artillery groups, regimental or divisional, will support the attack?

7.
Where are these artillery groups located?


111. ENEMY DEFENSE.
1.Where will the enemy establish lines of defense?
2.
What enemy units have been assigned to each defensive belt?

3.
What is the combat effectiveness of the units assigned to each defensive belt?

4.
What types of antitank weapons have been assigned to each defensive belt?

5.
What obstacles have been emplaced in each defensive belt?

6.
What minefields have been emplaced in each defensive belt?

7.
What enemy units comprise the reaction force to counter friendly armor or heliborne assaults?

8.
What types of artillery are assigned to support the defense?

9.
Where is this artillery located?


IV. ENEMY RETREAT.
1.
What units will take part in the retreat?

2.
What are the current positions of the retreating units?

3.
When will each of the retreating units begin its movement?

4.
What routes will be taken by the retreating units?

5.
What units have been designated the rear guard for the retreat?


Figure B-1. Sample overall objective statement.
6.
What units have been designated the covering force for the retreat?

7.
Where will each of the retreating units establish new positions?

8.
What types of artillery have been assigned to support the retreat?

9.
What deception efforts will be made to conceal the retreat?


V . ENEMY REINFORCEMENT.
1.
What units comprise the enemy's second echelon?

2.
What is the combat effectiveness of the units in the enemy's second echelon?

3.
What is the direction of travel for each unit in the enemy's second echelon?

4.
How soon will units in the enemy's second echelon begin to enter each brigade's AO?

5.
What units within the enemy's first echelon will receive reinforcements of perso~elor equipment?

6.
To what extent will these units be reinforced?

7.
How soon will these reinforcements arrive?

8.
By what routes will these reinforcements arrive?


INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
I. SUPPLY POINTS.
1.What types of ammunition is the enemy stockpiling?
2.
What are the types of POL the enemy is stockpiling?

3.
Where are these supply points located?

4.
What units are serviced by these supply points?

5.
How much materiel is currently stockpiled at these locations?


11. WLNERABILITIES.
1.
What malfunctions are occurring with the enemy's--

a.
Weapons?

b.
Vehicles?

c.
Communications?

d.
Ammunition?


2.
What are the enemy's major supply routes?

3.
How often are supplies transported over these routes?

4.
What transportation priority has the enemy assigned to each category of supplies?

5.
What choke points has the enemy identified along his own lines of communications?


Figure B-1. Sample overall objective statement (continued).
FM3452
I. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT.
1. Are NBC weapons present in any of the brigade sectors?
a.
Have any tracked, self-propelled rocket launchers been sighted within any of the brigade sectors?

b.
Have any small convoys been sighted traveling under unusually heavy security within any of the brigade sectors?

c.
Have light aircraft been sighted circling over convoys moving in any of the brigade sectors?

d.
Have any noncommunications emitters normally associated with NBC weapons been identified in any brigade sector?

e.
Have any installations with unusually heavy security been identified within any of the brigade sectors?

f.
Have any tall, slender objects (such as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees) suddenly appeared in any of the brigade sectors?


2. When will these NBC weapons be used?
a.
Have contingency orders been received by any enemy units in any of the brigade sectors which indicate circumstances under which NBC weapons will be used?

b.
Have code words been disseminated to alert enemy troops that NBC weapons will be used in any of the brigade sectors?

c.
What procedures are to be followed by enemy troops in any brigade sector immediately following receipt of alert codes?

d.
Have any front-line enemy troops in any brigade sector inexplicably slowed or halted their advance?

e.
Has any very heavy artillery been moved to within supporting distance of front-line enemy troops within any brigade sector?

f.
Has random firing of very heavy artillery occurred within any of the brigade sectors?


3. Where will these NBC weapons be used?
a.
Have all known enemy agents suddenly disappeared from any areas within any of the brigade sectors?

b.
Has enemy air activity suddenly increased in any areas within any of the brigade sectors?

c.
Is unusual enemy air activity taking place in any areas within any of the brigade sectors?

d.
Is smoke being used or planned for use as cover for any front-line enemy troops in any of the brigade sectors?

e.
Have specific areas within any brigade sector been identified as targets for NBC weapons?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEWtasks).
FM 34-52
f. Have orders been received by any enemy units in any brigade sector which indicate that NBC weapons might be used in support of their activities?
4. How many of these NBC weapons will be used against each target?
a.
How many very heavy artillery dispositions have been identified within each brigade sector?

b.
How many noncommunications emitters associated with NBC weapons have been identified within each brigade sector?

c.
How many transporter-erector-launchers(TELs) have been sighted within each brigade sector?

d.
How many enemy units within each brigade sector have been notified that NBC weapons might be used to support them?

e.
How many front-line enemy units within each brigade sector have inexplicably slowed or stopped their advance?


5. What types of systems will be used to deliver these NBC weapons?
a.
What calibers of very heavy artillery have been identified within each of the brigade sectors?

b.
What types of TELs have been identified within each brigade sector?

c.
What types of chemical agents have been identified within each brigade sector?

d.
What types of biological agents have been identified within each brigade sector?

e.
What types of noncommunications emitters have been identified within each brigade sector?


6. When will the enemy attack?
a.
Have any enemy units in any of the brigade sectors received orders to conduct assault operations?

b.
Is the enemy massing mechanized infantry units in any of the brigade sectors?

c.
Is the enemy massing armor units in any of the brigade sectors?

d.
Is the enemy massing artillery units in any of the brigade sectors?

e.
Are front-line enemy troops disposed along relatively narrow fronts in any areas within any of the brigade sectors?

f.
What rumors indicating future offensive operations are circulating within enemy units in each brigade sector?


7. Where will the enemy attack?
a.
What avenues of approach will be used by specific enemy units within each brigade sector?

b.
How many enemy units will use each avenue of approach within each brigade sector?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
-
c.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of mechanized infantry units within each brigade sector?

d.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of armor units within each brigade sector?

e.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of artillery units within each brigade sector?


8. What is the attack's main objective?
a.
What objectives have been assigned to specific enemy units in each brigade sector for their offensive operations?

b.
How many objectives have been assigned to specific enemy units in each brigade sector for their offensive operations?

c.
How many enemy units within each brigade sector have been assigned the same objectives?


9. What units have been assigned to conduct the attack?
a.
What enemy units in any of the brigade sectors have received orders to conduct assault operations?

b.
What enemy units are rumored to be preparing to conduct offensive operations within any of the brigade sectors?

c.
What enemy units have been assigned to use specific avenues of approach within each brigade sector?

d.
What specific enemy units have been assigned the same objectives within each brigade sector?


10. What is the combat effectiveness of the units assigned to conduct the attack?
a.
How many personnel are currently fit for duty within the specific enemy units assigned to conduct offensive operations in any of the brigade sectors?

b.
How many vehicles are currently operational within the specific enemy units assigned to conduct offensive operations in any of the brigade sectors?

c.
How many weapon systems are currently operational within the specific enemy units assigned to conduct offensive operations in any of the brigade sectors?

d.
What is the morale of the personnel assigned to the specific enemy units assigned to conduct offensive operations in any of the brigade sectors?


11. What artillery groups, regimental or divisional, have been assigned to support
the attack?

a.
What artillery units have been ordered to support the enemy regiments or divisions assigned to conduct offensive operations in each of the brigade sectors?

b.
What artillery assets have been identified within supporting distance of the enemy regiments or divisions assigned to conduct offensive operations?

c.
What types of noncommunications emitters associated with regimental or divisional artillery groups have been identified within each of the brigade sectors?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM3452
12. Where will the enemy establish lines of defense?
a.
Where are enemy units preparing extensive field fortifications within each brigade sector?

b.
Where are enemy units establishing antitank strong points within each brigade sector?

c.
To which front-line enemy units within each brigade sector are antitank units being attached?

d.
Where are alternate artillery positions being prepared within each brigade sector?

e.
Where are obstacles being emplaced within each brigade sector?

f.
Where are mines being emplaced within each brigade sector?


13. What enemy units have been assigned to each defensive belt?
a.
What specific enemy units are preparing extensive field fortifications within each brigade sector?

b.
What specific enemy units are establishing antitank strong points within each brigade sector?

c.
What specific enemy units within each brigade sector are receiving attached antitank units?

d.
What specific enemy units within each brigade sector are preparing alternate artillery positions?

e.
What specific enemy units are emplacing obstacles within each brigade sector?

f.
What specific enemy units are emplacing mines within each brigade sector?


14. What is the combat effectiveness of the units assigned to each defensive belt?
a.
How many personnel are currently fit for duty within the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts in each brigade sector?

b.
How many vehicles are currently operational within the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts in each brigade sector?

c.
How many weapons systems are currently operational within the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts in each brigade sector?

d.
What is the morale of the personnel assigned to the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts in each brigade sector?


15. What types of antitank weapons have been assigned to each defensive belt?
a.
What types of antitank weapons are possessed by the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts in each brigade sector?

b.
What types of antitank units have been attached to specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts in each brigade sector?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52
16. What obstacles have been emplaced in each defensive belt?
a.
What natural obstacles have been incorporated into the defensive belts in each brigade sector?

b.
What manmade antipersonnel obstacles have been emplaced by the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts within each brigade sector?

c.
What manmade anti-vehicular obstacles have been emplaced by the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts within each brigade sector?


17. What minefields have been emplaced in each defensive belt?
a.
What types of antipersonnel mines are being emplaced by the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts in each brigade sector?

b.
What types of antitank mines are being emplaced by the specific enemy units assigned to the defensive belts in each brigade sector?


18. What units comprise the reaction force to counter friendly armor or heliborne assaults?
a.
What enemy units have received orders to act as the reaction force for defensive positions in each brigade sector?

b.
What enemy units are rumored to be the reaction force for defensive positions in each brigade sector?

c.
What enemy units are located behind, but in proximity to, the defensive positions in each brigade sector?


19. What types of artillery are assigned to support the defense?
a.
What enemy artillery units have received orders to support the defensive positions in each brigade sector?

b.
What enemy artillery units are rumored to be supporting the defensive positions in each brigade sector?

c.
What types of artillery have been identified within each brigade sector?


20. Where is this artillery located?
a.
What is the current location of the enemy artillery units ordered to support the defensive positions in each brigade sector?

b.
What is the current location of the enemy artillery units rumored to be supporting the defensive positions in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the current location of all artillery identified within each brigade sector?


21. What units wiU take part in the retreat?
a.
What enemy units in each brigade sector have received orders to participate in a retreat?

b.
What enemy units in each brigade sector are rumored to be participating in a retreat?

c.
What enemy units within each brigade sector are disposed along an extended front?


Figure B-2. Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52
d.
What enemy units in each brigade sector have been notified their artillery support is moving to the rear?

e.
What enemy units in each brigade sector have been notified their logistical support is moving to the rear?


22. What are the current positions of the retreating units?
a.
What is the current location of enemy units in each brigade sector ordered to participate in a retreat?

b.
What is the current location of enemy units in each brigade sector rumored to be participating in a retreat?

c.
What is the current location of enemy units within each brigade sector disposed along an extended front?

d.
What is the current location of artillery units supporting enemy units in each brigade sector?

e.
What is the current location of logistical units supporting enemy units in each brigade sector?


23. When will each of the retreating units begin its movement?
a.
At what time have specific enemy units in each brigade sector been ordered to begin their retreat?

b.
What start times are being mentioned in rumors about the retreat of specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


24. What routes will be taken by the retreating units?
a.
What movement routes have been assigned for the retreat of specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What movement routes are being cited in rumors about the retreat of specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
What movement routes are being used or planned for use during the retreat of enemy artillery units in each brigade sector?

d.
What movement routes are being used or planned for use during the retreat of enemy logistical units in each brigade sector?


25. What units have been designated the rear guard for the retreat?
a.
What specific enemy units have been ordered to act as rear guard for the retreat in each brigade sector?

b.
What specific enemy units are rumored to be rear guard for the retreat in each brigade sector?


26. What units have been designated the covering force for the retreat?
a.
What specific enemy units have been ordered to act as covering force for the retreat in each brigade sector?

b.
What specific enemy units are rumored to be covering force for the retreat in each brigade sector?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52
27. Where will each of the retreating units establish new positions?
a.
Where are the new positions assigned to retreating enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What are the new positions being cited in rumors about the retreat of enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
Where are the new positions assigned to retreating enemy artillery units in each brigade sector?

d.
Where are the new positions assigned to retreating enemy logistical units in each brigade sector?


28. What types of artillery have been assigned to support the retreat?
a.
What specific enemy artillery units have been assigned to support the retreat in each brigade sector?

b.
What specific enemy artillery units are rumored to be supporting the retreat in each brigade sector?


29. What deception efforts will be made to conceal the retreat?
a.
What deception efforts have been ordered in conjunction with the retreat in each brigade sector?

b.
What specific enemy units are conducting deception efforts in conjunction with the retreat in each brigade sector?

c.
What deception efforts are being cited in rumors about the retreat in each brigade sector?

d.
What enemy units are rumored to be conducting deception efforts in conjunction with the retreat in each brigade sector?


30. What units comprise the enemy's second echelon?
a.
What specific units are known to be part of the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
What specific units are rumored to be part of the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

c.
How many units comprise the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

d.
What type of units comprise the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?


31. What is the combat effectiveness of the units in the enemy's second echelon?
a.
How many personnel are currently fit for duty within the specific enemy units comprising the second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
How many vehicles are currently operational within the specific enemy units comprising the second echelon in each brigade sector?

c.
How many weapons systems are currently operational within the specific enemy units comprising the second echelon in each brigade sector.


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52
d. What is the morale of the personnel assigned to the specific enemy units comprising the second echelon in each brigade sector?
32. What is the direction of travel for each unit in the enemy's second echelon?
a.
What is the known direction of travel for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
What are the known movement routes for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the rumored direction of travel for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

d.
What are the rumored movement routes for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?


33. How soon will units in the enemy's second echelon begin to enter each brigade's AO?
a.
What is the current known location of units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
What is the current rumored location of units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the known rate of travel for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

d.
What is the rumored rate of travel for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?


34. What units within the enemy's first echelon will receive reinforcements of personnel or equipment?
a.
What personnel or equipment replacement have been ordered for specific front-line enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What specific front-line enemy units in each brigade sector are rumored to be receiving personnel or equipment replacements?


35. To what extent will these units be reinforced?
a.
How many personnel replacements have been ordered for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
How many personnel are cited in the rumors concerning replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
How much lost equipment has been ordered replaced in specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

d.
How much equipment is cited in the rumors concerning replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


36. How soon will these reinforcements arrive?
a. At what time will scheduled personnel replacements arrive at specific enemy units in each brigade sector?
Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52

b.
At what time will scheduled equipment replacements arrive at specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
What time is cited in rumors concerning personnel replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

d.
What time is cited in rumors concerning equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


37. By what routes will these reinforcements arrive?
a.
What is the current known location of personnel and equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What is the current rumored location of personnel and equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
What are the known movement routes of personnel and equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

d.
What are the rumored movement routes for personnel and equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


38. What type of ammunition is the enemy stockpiling?
a.
What type of small arms ammunition is the enemy stockpiling in each brigade sector?

b.
What type of ammunition is the enemy stockpiling for crew-served weapons in each brigade sector?

c.
What type of ammunition is the enemy stockpiling for armored vehicles in each brigade sector?

d.
What type of artillery ammunition is the enemy stockpiling in each brigade sector?


39. What type of POL is the enemy stockpiling?
a.
What type of fuel is the enemy stockpiling in each brigade sector?

b.
What type of oil is the enemy stockpiling in each brigade sector?

c.
What type of lubricants is the enemy stockpiling in each brigade sector?


40. Where are these supply points located?
a.
Where are the enemy's ammunition supply points located in each brigade sector?

b.
Where are the enemy's POL supply points located in each brigade sector?


41. What units are se~ced by these supply points?
a.
What ammunition supply points support specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What POL supply points support specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


Figure B-2. Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
42. How much material is currently stockpiled at these locations?
a.
How much ammunition is stockpiled at specific supply points in each brigade sector?

b.
How much POL are stockpiled at specific supply points in each brigade sector?


43. What malfunctions are occurring with the enemy's weapons?
a.
What malfunctions are occurring with the enemy's small arms in each brigade sector?

b.
What malfunctions are occurring with the enemy's crew-served weapons in each brigade sector?


G What malfunctions are occurring with the enemy's artillery in each brigade sector?
44. What malfunctions are occurring with the enemy's vehicles?
a.
What malfunctions are occurring with the enemy's tracked vehicles in each brigade sector?

b.
What malfunctions are occurring with the enemy's wheeled vehicles in each brigade sector?


45. What malfunctions are occurring with enemy communications?
a.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy vehicle- mounted communications equipment in each brigade sector?

b.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy manpacked communications equipment in each brigade sector?

c.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy pyrotechnic means of communication in each brigade sector?


46. What malfunctions are occurring with enemy ammunition?
a.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy small arms ammunition in each brigade sector?

b.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy artillery ammunition in each brigade sector?

c.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy ammunition for armored vehicles in each brigade sector?

d.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy ammunition for crew-served weapons in each brigade sector?


47. What are enemy main supply routes?
a.
What are the known movement routes used by enemy supply convoys in each brigade sector?

b.
What movement routes are rumored to be used by enemy supply convoys in each of the brigade sectors?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52

c.
What is the known direction of travel for enemy supply convoys passing named areas of interest (NAIs) in each brigade sector?

d.
What direction of travel is rumored for enemy supply convoys passing NAIs in each brigade sector?


48. How often are supplies transported over these routes?
a.
How often are specific enemy units in each brigade sector resupplied?

b.
How often are enemy supply convoys sighted along established movement routes in each brigade sector?


49. What transportation priority has the enemy assigned to each category of supplies?
a.
What is the enemy's known transportation priority for each category of suppliesin each brigade sector?

b.
What is rumored to be the enemy's transportation priority for each category of suppliesin each brigade sector?

c.
What is the frequency with which specific enemy units in each brigade sector receive each category of supplies?


50. What choke points has the enemy identified along his own LOCs?
a.
What choke points are known to exist along the enemy's LOCs in each brigade sector?

b.
What choke points are rumored to exist along the enemy's LOCs in each brigade sector?


11. TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION.
1. Are NBC weapons present in any of the brigade sectors?
a.
Where have tracked, self-propelled rocket launchers been sighted within any of the brigade sectors?

b.
What was the direction of travel of any small convoys sighted traveling under unusually heavy security in any of the brigade sectors?

c.
Where have light aircraft been sighted circling over convoys moving in any of the brigade sectors?

d.
Where have noncommunications emitters normally associated with NBC weapons been identified in any brigade sectors?

e.
Where have installations with unusually heavy security been identified within any of the brigade sectors?

f.
Where have tall, slender objects (such as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees) suddenly appeared in any of the brigade sectors?


2. Where will these NBC weapons be used?
a. Where has enemy air activity suddenly increased within any of the brigade sectors?
Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEWtasks) (continued).
FM 34-52
b.
Where is unusual enemy air activity taking place within any of the brigade sectors?

c.
Where is smoke being used or planned for use as cover for any front-line enemy troops in any of the brigade sectors?

d.
Where has very heavy artillery been moved to within supporting distance of front-line enemy troops within any brigade sector?

e.
Where has random fuing of very heavy artillery occurred within any of the brigade sectors?


3. Where will the enemy attack?
a.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of mechanized infantry units within each brigade sector?

b.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of armor units within each brigade sector?

c.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of artillery units within each brigade sector?


4. What artillery groups, regimental or divisional, have been assigned to support the attack?
a.
What artillery units have been ordered to support the enemy regiments or divisions assigned to conduct offensive operations in each of the brigade sectors?

b.
How many artillery dispositions have been identified within supporting distance of the enemy regiments or divisions assigned to conduct offensive operations?


5. Where willthe enemy establish lines of defense?
a.
Where are enemy units preparing extensive field fortifications within each brigade sector?

b.
Where are enemy units establishing antitank strong points within each brigade sector?

c.
Where are alternate artillery positions being prepared within each brigade sector?

d.
Where are obstacles being emplaced within each brigade sector?

e.
Where are mines being emplaced within each brigade sector?


6. What units comprise the reaction force to counter friendly armor or heliborne assaults?
a.
What is the location of the enemy units ordered to act as the reaction force for defensive positions in each brigade sector?

b.
What is the location of the enemy units rumored to be the reaction force for defensive positions in each brigade sector?


7. What is the location of artillery units assigned to support the enemy's defense?
a. What is the current location of the enemy artillery units ordered to support the defensive positions in each brigade sector?
Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
b. What is the current location of the enemy artillery units rumored to be supporting the defensive positions in each brigade sector?
8. What are the current positions of retreating enemy units?
a.
What is the current location of enemy units in each brigade sector that have been ordered to participate in a retreat?

b.
What is the current location of enemy units in each brigade sector that are rumored to be participating in a retreat?

c.
What is the current location of enemy units within each brigade sector disposed along an extended front?

d.
What is the current location of artillery units supporting enemy units in each brigade sector?

e.
What is the current location of logistical units supporting enemy units in each brigade sector?


9. What routes will be taken by retreating enemy units?
a.
What movement routes have been assigned for the retreat of specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What movement routes are being cited in rumors about the retreat of specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
What movement routes are being used or planned for use during the retreat of enemy-


(1)
Artillery units in each brigade sector?

(2)
Logistical units in each brigade sector?


10. Where will each retreating enemy unit establish its new position?
a.
Where are the new positions assigned to retreating enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What are the new positions being cited in rumors about the retreat of enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
Where are the new positions assigned to retreating enemy artillery units in each brigade sector?

d.
Where are the new positions assigned to retreating enemy logistical units in each brigade sector?


11. How soon will units in the enemy's second echelon begin to enter each brigade's
AO?
a.
What is the current known location of units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
What is the current rumored location of units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?


Figure B-2. Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52
c.
What is the known rate of travel for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

d.
What is the rumored rate of travel for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?


12. By what routes will enemy reinforcements arrive?
a.
What is the current known location of personnel and equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What is the current rumored location of personnel and equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
What are the known movement routes of personnel and equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

d.
What are the rumored movement routes of personnel and equipment replacements for specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


13. Where are the enemy's supply points located?
a.
Where are the enemy's ammunition supply points located in each brigade sector?

b.
Where are the enemy's POL supply points located in each brigade sector?


14. What are the enemy's main supply routes?
a.
What are the known movement routes used by enemy supply convoys in each brigade sector?

b.
What movement routes are rumored to be used by enemy supply convoys in each of the brigade sectors?

c.
What is the known direction of travel for enemy supply convoys passing NAIs in each brigade sector?

d.
What direction of travel is rumored for enemy supply convoys passing NAIs in each brigade sector?


15. What choke points has the enemy identified along his own LOCs?
a.
Where are choke points along the enemy's LOCs in each brigade sector known to exist?

b.
Where are choke points rumored to exist along the enemy's LOCs in each brigade sector?


111. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD.
1. Are NBC weapons present in any of the brigade sectors?
a.
Have any noncommunications emitters normally associated with NBC weapons been identified in any brigade sector?

b.
What is the circular area in each brigade sector within which these noncommunications emitters are probably located?


Figure B-2. Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
c. What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of the noncommunications emitters identified in each brigade sector?
2. Where will these NBC weapons be used?
a.
Have specific areas within any brigade sector been identified as targets for NBC weapons?

b.
Have orders been received by any enemy units in any brigade sector which indicate NBC weapons might be used in support of their activities?


3. What types of systems will be used to deliver these NBC weapons?
a.
What noncommunications emitters associated with very heavy artillery have been identified within each brigade sector?

b.
What noncommunications emitters associated with TELs have been identified in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of any noncommunications emitters identified in each brigade sector?


4. When will the enemy attack?
a.
What rumors indicating future offensive operations are circulating within enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
Is the enemy massing mechanized infantry units in any of the brigade sectors?

c.
Is the enemy massing armor units in any of the brigade sectors?

d.
Is the enemy massing artillery units in any of the brigade sectors?

e.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of any electronic emitters belonging to enemy units preparing to conduct offensive operations in each brigade sector?


5. Where will the enemy attack?
a.
What avenues of approach will be used by specific enemy units within each brigade sector?

b.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of mechanized infantry units within each brigade sector?

c.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of armor units within each brigade sector?

d.
Where are the enemy's large concentrations of artillery units within each brigade sector?

e.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of any electronic emitters belonging to enemy units preparing to conduct offensive operations in each brigade sector?


6. What units have been assigned to conduct the attack?
a. What enemy units are rumored to be preparing for offensive operations within any of the brigade sectors?
-
Figure B-2.Sample overall objective stattement (JEW tasks) (continued).
b.
What enemy units have been assigned to use specific avenues of approach within each brigade sector?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of any electronic emitters belonging to enemy units preparing to conduct offensive operations in each brigade sector?


7. What artillery groups, regimental or divisional, have been assigned to support the attack?
a.
What artillery units have been ordered to support the enemy regiments or divisions assigned to conduct offensive operations in each of the brigade sectors?

b.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of noncommunications emitters belonging to the regimental or divisional artillery groups identified within each of the brigade sectors?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of communications emitters belonging to the regimental or divisional artillery groups identified within each of the brigade sectors?


8. Where will the enemy establish lines of defense?
a.
Where are enemy units preparing extensive field fortifications within each brigade sector?

b.
Where are alternate artillery positions being prepared within each brigade sector?


9. What enemy units have been assigned to each defensive belt?
a.
What specific enemy units are preparing extensive field fortifications within each brigade sector?

b.
What specific enemy units within each brigade sector are preparing alternate artillery positions?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to enemy units establishing lines of defense within each brigade sector?


10. What units comprise the reaction force to counter friendly armor or heliborne assaults?
a.
What enemy units are rumored to be the reaction force for defensive positions in each brigade sector?

b.
What enemy units are located behind, but in proximity to, the defensive positions in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to the units which are part of the enemy's reaction force within each brigade sector?


11. What types of artillery are assigned to support the defense?
a. What artillery units are rumored to be supporting the enemy's defensive positions in each brigade sector? -
Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52

b.
What is the current location of the enemy artillery units rumored to be supporting the defensive positions in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to the artillery units rumored to be supporting the enemy's defensive positions in each brigade sector?


12. What enemy units will take part in a retreat?
a.
What enemy units in each brigade sector are rumored to be participating in a retreat?

b.
What enemy units in each brigade sector have been notified their-


(1)
Artillery support is moving to the rear?

(2)
Logistical support is moving to the rear?

c.
What is the nomenclature and operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to retreating enemy units in each brigade sector?


13. What are current positions of retreating units?
a.
What is the current location of enemy units in each brigade sector rumored to be participating in a retreat?

b.
What is the current location of artillery units supporting enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the current location of logistical units supporting enemy units in each brigade sector?


14. When will each of the retreating units begin its movement?
a.
At what time have specific enemy units in each brigade sector been ordered to begin their retreat?

b.
What start times are being mentioned in rumors about the retreat of specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


15. What routes will be taken by the retreating units?
a.
What movement routes are being cited in rumors about the retreat of specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What movement routes are being used or planned for use during the retreat of enemy artillery units in each brigade sector?

c.
What niovement routes are being used or planned for use during the retreat of enemy logistical units in each brigade sector?


16. Where will each of the retreating units establish new positions?
a.
Where are the new positions being cited in rumors about the retreat of enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
Where are the new positions assigned to retreating enemy artillery units in each brigade sector?


Figure B-2. Sample overall objective statement (IEW,tasks) (continued).
c. Where are the new positions assigned to retreating enemy logistical units in each brigade sector?
17. What units comprise the enemy's second echelon?
a.
What specific units are rumored to be part of the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
How many units comprise the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

c.
What type of units comprise the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

d.
What is the nomenclature and operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to units in the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?


18. What is the direction of travel for each unit in the enemy's second echelon?
a.
What is the rumored direction of travel for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
What are the rumored movement routes for units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?


19. How soon will units in the enemy's second echelon begin to enter each brigade's
A0?
a.
What is the current rumored location of units comprising the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
What is the rumored rate of travel for units comprisiig the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?


20. How soon will enemy reinforcements arrive?
a.
What times are being cited in rumors about the arrival of personnel replacements at specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What times are being cited in rumors about the arrival of equipment replacements at specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


21. By what routes will enemy reinforcements arrive?
a.
What are the current locations of replacement personnel and equipment cited in rumors about specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What are the movement routes of replacement personnel and equipment cited in rumors about specific enemy units in each brigade sector?


22. What specific enemy units are serviced by enemy supply points?
a.
What ammunition supply points support specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

b.
What POL supply points support specific enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to enemy supply points in each brigade sector?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
FM 34-52

23. What malfunctions are occurring with enemy communications?
a.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy vehicle- mounted
communications equipment in each brigade sector?


b.
What malfunctions are occurring with enemy manpacked communications
equipment in each brigade sector?


c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of enemy communications
equipment which is malfunctioning?



24. What are major enemy supply routes?
a.
What are the known movement routes used by enemy supply convoys in each
brigade sector?


b.
What movement routes are rumored to be used by enemy supply convoys in
each of the boigade sectors?


c.
What is the known direction of travel for enemy supply convoys passing NAIs
in each brigade sector?


d.
What direction of travel is rumored for enemy supply convoys passing NAIs in
each brigade factor?



25. What choke points have the enemy identified along their own LOCs?
a.
What choke points along enemy LOCs in each brigade sector are known to
exist?


b.
What choke points are rumored to exist along enemy LOCs in each brigade
sector?



IV. FORCE PROTECTION.
1.
Where will NBC weapons be used?

a.
Have specific areas within any brigade sector been identified as targets for
NBC weapons?


b.
Have orders been received by any enemy units in any brigade sector which
indicate that NBC weapons might be used in support?


c.
Where has enemy air activity suddenly increased within any of the brigade
sectors?


d.
Where is unusual enemy air activity taking place within any of the brigade
sectors?


e.
Where has very heavy artillery been moved to within supporting distance of
front-line enemy troops within any brigade sector?


f.
Where has random firing of very heavy artillery occurred within any of the
brigade sectors?



2. What is the main objective of enemy attack?
a. What objectives have been assigned to specifrc enemy units in each brigade
sector for their offensive operations?

A

Figure B-2. Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
b.
How many enemy units within each brigade sector have been assigned the same objectives?

c.
What measures are the enemy using to conceal the offensive's objectives in each brigade sector?


3. What units have been assigned to conduct the attack?
a.
What enemy units are rumored to be preparing for offensive operations within any of the brigade sectors?

b.
What special operations elements are attached to enemy units preparing for offensive operations in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of any electronic emitters belonging to enemy units preparing to conduct offensive operations in each brigade sector?


4. What enemy units have been assigned to defensive belts?
a.
What specific enemy units are preparing extensive field fortifications in each brigade sector?

b.
What special operations elements have been attached to enemy units establishing lines of defense in each brigade sector?

c.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to enemy units establishing lines of defense within each brigade sector?

d.
What measures are employed to conceal defensive preparations in each brigade sector?


5. What units comprise the reaction force to counter friendly armor or heliborne assaults?
a.
What enemy units are rumored to be the reaction force for defensive positions in each brigade sector?

b.
What enemy units are located behind, but in proximity to, the defensive positions in each brigade sector?

c.
What special operations elements have been attached to the units in enemy reaction force in each brigade sector?

d.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to the units which are part of the enemy's reaction force within each brigade sector?


6. What enemy units will take part in a retreat?
a.
What enemy units in each brigade sector are rumored to be participating in a retreat?

b.
What special operations elements are attached to retreating enemy units in each brigade sector?

c.
What enemy units in each brigade sector have been designated as stay-behind elements?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
d.
What efforts have been made to recruit stay-behind agents from the local populace in each brigade sector?

e.
What is the nomenclature or operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to retreating enemy units in each brigade sector?


7. What deception efforts will be made to conceal the retreat?
a.
What deception efforts have been ordered in conjunction with the retreat in each brigade sector?

b.
What specific enemy units are conducting deception efforts in conjunction with the retreat in each brigade sector?

c.
What special operations elements are involved in the deception efforts being conducted in each brigade sector?

d.
What deception efforts are being cited in rumors about the retreat in each brigade sector?

e.
What enemy units are rumored to be conducting deception efforts in conjunction with the retreat in each brigade sector?


8. What units comprise the enemy's second echelon?
a.
What specific units are rumored to be part of the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

b.
How many units comprise the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

c.
What type of units comprise the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

d.
What special operations elements are attached to units in the enemy's second echelon?

e.
What is the nomenclature and operating frequency of electronic emitters belonging to units in the enemy's second echelon in each brigade sector?

V.
BA'ITLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.


1. What production loss has the enemy sustained?
a.
How long will it take to recuperate?

b.
What was the extent of battle damage?

c.
What was the attack's total effect?

d.
How much warfighting stock was lost?

e.
How many personnel were lost?

f.
What type, and how many pieces, of warfighting equipment were destroyed or damaged?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
g.
How many craters are visible?

h.
Where was the detonation point?

i.
What contingency plans have been put into effect?


VI. INDICATIONS AND WARNING.
1. How stable is the current government?
a.
What anti-allied demonstrations are planned?

b.
Who, or what organization, is responsible for the unrest?

c.
How well financed is the opposition?

d.
What outside help is the opposition receiving?

e.
What is the current economic situation?

f.
What kind of treatment can foreign citizens expect?


Figure B-2.Sample overall objective statement (IEW tasks) (continued).
Appendix C
Appendix C - cont.
Appendix C - cont.
FM

TO BE AFFIXED TO


TECH INTEL USE
CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT

ONLY




DO NOT DISTURB
NOMENCLATURE; flT-/do-A
TIME OF RECEIPT:
SERIAL. NO: /R3+567 -

99 DATE OF RECEIPT:
DATEIPLACE CAPTURED:~~S~
CA /23454
INSPECTED BY:
NAME HAN6
CAPTURING UNIT :lzdFf0/~/3&%7 QUANTITY: QdE EACH DISPOSITION: BELOW FOR USE BY TECH INTEL UNITS ONLY -a
3o NOTICE c
;C
THIS EQUIPMENT IS BEING HELD u
2 -4 4 c FOR: ANALYSIS UTlLlZATlCN
VI DESTRUCT13N
m

BY AUTHORITY OF 11.i JOINT
4
rn
= U.S. FORCES COMMANDER.
Y
-3e rn Z: IIONATUHL PAIUIEO nr~t
UNIT GAT^
Do



f DO NOT DISTURB
CT
2 THIS EQUIPMENT
0
CP

Y) PROPERTY U.S. GOVERNMENT
3

+
r
a=

PERSONNEL TAMPERING WITH
CL
0 Q; THIS EQUIPMENT WILL BE
L
SUBJECT TO PROSECUTION UNDER
ARTICLE 103,UCMJ
Figure C-2. Front and reverse sides of CEE tag.
Appendix C - cont.
Appendix C - cont.
FM 34-52
I OTHER SYMBOLS
OCCUPIED AREA
I
CONTAMINATED AREA (OR RESERVE)
ATOMIC BOMB OR DMCE
I
CONCRETE 'DRAGON 'TEETH
BRIDGE PREPARED FOR DESTRUCTION
HEAW MACHINEGUN
I
KEY ENEMY MAP SYMBOLS

TO BE OCCUPIED BY DEFENSIVE OCCUPIED ENEMY INFANIRY
CHEMICAL MEDIC DECON TRUCK
TROOPER
ANTI-PERSONNEL ANITTANK MINEFIELD ANTI-TANK DITCH MINEFIELD
ENEMY TIMBER AND FORTIFIED BUILDING BARBED OR CONCERTINA WIRE EARTH BUNKER
SMALL ARMS
L
-

UGHT MACHINEGUN COMPANY MACHINEGUN MEDIUM MACHINEGUN
+
HEAW AA MACHINEGUN ANTI-TANK RECOILESS ANTI-TANK RIFLE
GRENADE LAUNCHER

Figure C-4. Soviet and non-NATO map symbols.
KEY ENEMY MAP SYMBOLS
ARMOR
TANK APC I/ COMPANY IN THE AlTACK TANKS IN THE DEFENSE
0 06

MOTORIZED RIFLE
ARTILLERY
II 11 11
I
GUN HOWrrZER ADA ANTI-TANK MULTIPLE ROCKET MORTAR ARTILLERY BAlTERY LAUNCHER IN FIRING POSITION




+i+a fi

SAM UNIT ON SELF-PROPELLED 152-mm ROCKET AT AIR DEFENSE THE MARCH AA GUN SELF-PROPELLED LAUNCH SITE MISSILE HOWrrZER
COMMAND AND CONTROL

Ad$%LfEF

SQD LDR PLT LDR CO CDR RN CDR BN HQ RGMT HQ BDE HQ DIV HQ
HELICOPTERS
WXb x( d7+

CBT
CBT OTHER RADAR TRANSCEIVER SIGNAL
Figure C-4. Soviet and non-NATO map symbols (continued).
APPENDIX D
PROTECTED PERSONS RIGHTS VERSUS SECURITY NEEDS

The articles in this Appendix are extracted from the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,1949.
The GC attempts to balance the necessity of the proper treatment of protected persons with the needs of security by the Detaining or Occupying Power. The GC applies to the whole of the populations of the countries ii conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in par- ticular, on race, nationality, religion, or political opinion. It is the design of the Convention to alleviate the sufferings caused by war (Article 13).
At the outbreak of a conflict, many protected persons become displaced persons. They move within their own country to areas where hostilities are not a threat or a power is able to. protect them. They may become refugees, fleeing into neighboring countries seeking a safe haven. The GC provides that protected persons who desire to leave at the outset of, or during a conflict, should be allowed to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interest of the State (Article 35). However, in light of possible threats to the security of the State receiving the refugees or a Detaining Power, the Geneva Convention does recognize a State's right to take appropriate action to insure security.
The most typical security measure taken in such cases is the establishment of some manner of screening camps where the people may be identified and screened. During the process, useful intelligence may be obtained from legitimate displaced persons or refugees, and from potential threats, such as covert agents, who may be identified and interrogated.
In most cases, interrogators or linguists will conduct the screening operations while working closely with CI personnel to identify those protected persons of CI in-terest. Other military intelligence personnel may be re- quired to participate in this screening process because of the large numbers of refugees and/or the lack of other qualified personnel.
Internment of a protected person occurs when the Detaining Power determines that confinement or as- signment of residences to certain protected persons is absolutely necessary to the security of the Detaining Power (Articles 41 and 42). A civilian internee is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as a civilian who is interned during an armed conflict or oc- cupation for security reasons or for protection or be- cause he has committed an offense against the Detaining Power.
GENEVA CONVENTION PROVISIONSCONCERNING PROTECTED PERSONS

It is critical that the GC provisions concerning protected persons be strictly adhered to in the quest to identify legitimate threats and gain needed intelligence. Specifically:
(a) Article 5provid,es that if a Party to the conflict is satisfied that an individual protected person is suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual shall not be en- titled to claim rights or privileges under the convention, if the exercise of that right would be prejudicial to that State. However, such individuals must be humanely treated during internment and the pendency of any in- vestigation and/or prosecution. A limitation of rights or privileges may include the withholding of the right to communicate with members of their family or repre- sentatives of their government. Such restrictions would
.
be appropriate in a case involving spying.
(b)
Article 29 places the responsibility for the treat- ment accorded protected persons upon the Party in whose hands they are found. This is in addition to any personal responsibility incurred by an agent of that Party. This is an affirmative duty upon commanders to insure their subordinates are not mistreating protected persons or their property. The command and the government will ultimately be held responsible for any mistreatment.

(c)
Article 31 prohibits physical or moral coercion against protected persons to obtain information from them or from third parties. Prohibited coercion may be obvious, such as physically abusing the subject of the screening or interrogation. It may also be more subtle, such as threats to turn the individual over to hostile for- ces; subjecting the individual to humiliating or degrad- ing treatment; implying harm to the individual or his


property, or implying a deprivation of rights guaranteed by international law because of a failure to cooperate; threatening to separate parents from their children; or forcing a protected person to perform guide services.
(d)
Article 32 prohibits corporal punishment, tor- ture or taking any measure of such character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected'per- sons in your control. This prohibition not only applies to actions taken by the Detaining Party against the protected persons, but also any adverse action that others may take.

(e)
Article 33 prohibits collective punishments, penalties, reprisals, or pillaging of protected persons and their property. The principle behind this provision is that protected persons should only be held liable for offenses they personally commit. This prohibition in- cludes all measures of intimidation or terrorism.

(f)
Article 41 allows the Power, in whose hands the protected persons are found, to intern or force assigned residence to protected persons, if the other measures of control permitted by the convention are inadequate. Some persons may demand internment (for example, protected persons who may be threatened by others). Internment must be provided when the situation renders this step necessary (Article 42).

(g)
If interned or forced into assigned residences, protected persons have the right to have any such deter- mination reconsidered and reviewed on a periodic basis (Article 43).


(h)
In connection with the above, Article 44 prohibits the Detaining Power from automatically inter- ning or forcing an assigned residence against refugees who are nationals of an Enemy State, exclusively on the basis of their nationality, who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government. The purpose of this ar- ticle is to insure that refugees, who may only technically remain enemy aliens, are not, on that basis alone, auto- matically subject to control measures, notwithstanding the fact that they are not protected by their government. An example of this would be interning Iraqi refugees based solely on their status as Iraqis. This prohibition, however, does not in any way deny the right of a State to intern such persons or subject them to legitimate con- trols when there is an additional basis for taking such action in the interest of security of the State.

(i)
Article 45 prohibits the transfer of protected per- sons into the custody of a Power not a signatory to the convention. The transferring Power must insure that protected persons transferred from their custody will be treated in accordance with the conventions. In the event that the transferring Power discovers that the protected persons are not being treated in accordance with the convention, they shall request that the protected persons be returned to their custody.


Appendix E
BlOGRAPHlC DATA ENTRIES
The following data prosigns are used in biographic reporting. If available, biographic information will fit in the summary of the IIR, the text entry will be NONE.
Should the reportable information exceed the limita- tions of the summary, entries will be made in the text. When making entries, ensure that the numbers and prosigns shown here are those used in the biographic report; if you have no data for a particular item, skip it and list the next item for which you have a data entry. Items skipped are not listed on the report.
The paragraph classification follows the biographic prosign. Do not use colons to separate the prosign and data entries. Minimum essential data (MED) prosigns are asterisked.
SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT
The rationale behind the summary interrogation report, shown at Figure E-8, is to preclude duplication of effort. In DESERT STORM, as EPWs were being evacuated up the chain, the gaining interrogator would ask questions only to be told the same questions had al- ready been asked by somebody else at a previous loca- tion. This is embarrassing, and does not foster rapport building, because the gaining interrogator had no pre- vious EPW screening or interrogation reports. It was assumed this was the first time the EPW was ques- tioned.
If the previous echelon received EPW information pertaining only to their immediate tactical situation, with no reports being forwarded, it would have been to the gaining interrogators advantage to be apprised of what transpired at the lower echelon; hence the sum- mary interrogation report. This report is simple in design and purpose, but reveals EPW information that gives the gaining interrogator insight as to what was developed at the previous echelon.
VOICE MESSAGE TEMPLATE FOR A SPOT (SALUTE) REPORT
62,X hb THIS IS ~2, ZMF D, J SALUTE. OVER addressee originator
THIS IS SEND SALUTE. OVER originator addressee
THIS IS SALUTE PROBLEMS addressee originator
FLASH IMMEDIATE PRIORITY ROUTINE (Underline and transmit the
-
precedence of this message.) TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL (Underline and transmit the security classification of CLEAR UNCLASSIFIED this message.)
SALUTE REPORT
1.
SIZE ~QufiD (Enter the size of the unit
or target.)


2.
ACTIVITY (Enter a description of the
activity detected.)


3.
LOCATION CR /a3 4s6 (Enter the target location
[UTMI.)





MR~I+'~,I~Y/~~

4.
UNIT (Enter the unit identity or

type.)

5.
TIME n/17 /7/802F.09? (Enter the time of the
sighting.)


6.
EOUIPMENT dA (Enter the name of any
equipment sighted.)


7.
DIRECTION dA (Enter the direction if
target is moving in degrees
or mils.)


8.
TIME //057 (Enter hour-minute-zone.
See NOTE.)


9.
AUTHENTICATION IS / 70225 (Enter message authentication See NOTE.)

10.
OVER


NOTE: The message DTG is used when required to identify message time of origin. Authentication will be in accordance with joint task force procedures.
Figure E-1. Spot report voice message template.
BATTLEFIELD TECHINT SPOT REPORT
TO: VI CORPS TECHINT TEAM THRU: RS2,14th ACR FROM: SS2,3/14th ACR DTG: 300700ZJAN99 REPORT NO: 07-0623
SIZE 3xMissiles, Muitcase, lxControl Box with periscope sight, lxSpent missile round. ACTIVITY: Capture of antitank wire-guided missile system. NATO nomenclature AT-3lSAGGER Mannpack. LOCATION: Capture at coordinates //32UNB538331//. TIME: Time of capture was 300530ZJAN99.
EQUIPMENTIHOW: System captured intact after overrunning enemy ambush position. No associated enemy captured. Equipment secure. Awaiting disposition instructions.
REMARKS: SOURCE DATA: Captured Enemy Equipment. MAP DATA: GERMANY, 1:50,000, LAUTERBACH, L5322, EDITION 5 MISC DATA: REPORT NO: 07-0623
Figure E-2.Sample battlefield TECHINT spot report.
FM 34-52
(CLASSIFICATION)
TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

NAME OF PRISONER: KLEYMENOV INTERROGATOR: SGT ROYCE.
CATEGORY: A@C D UNITFORMATION TO WHICH
INTERROGATOR ATTACHED: Intg Sec,
Intel-Surv Co, 231st MI Bn, 23d Inf Div
INTG SERIAL NQ: US-AR-1234-1 MAPS USED: GERMANY, 1:50,000,
EISENAC HUNFELD, Ed #2.
DTG OF INTG: 221700ZNOV99 LANGUAGE USED: Russian
INTG REPORT NO: PT-001 INTERPRETER: None

PART I -INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)
A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:
1.
Rank, full name, service number, and position: JrLT, Dimitar KLEYMENOV, No. 0506031, Plt Ldr.

2.
Date and place of birth: 23 May 72, TBILISI, Georgian SSR, USSR.

3.
Nationality: Soviet (Ethnic Rumanian) (Religion: Orthodox).

4.
Knowledge of languages and proficiency: Russian (N).

5.
Unit, formation, or organization: 2 MR Plt (MRP), 2 MR Co (MRC), 3 MR Bn (MRB), 62 MR Regt (MRR), 34 MR Div (MRD)(2MRP/2/3/62/34MRD).

6.
Datettime, placelgrid references, capturing unit and circumstances of capture: 221330ZNOV99, Hill 457 (NB625305), A/1/2/3, captured after taking Hill 457.


B. CAREER:
1.
Premilitary: Gymnasium graduate, attended 1year at University of Moscow. Vocational training: None. Paramilitary training: None.

2.
Military: 5years military service, attended OCS Oct97; previous military jobs: Assistant Platoon Leader.


DOWNGRADINGPECLASSIFICATIONDATA:
(NOTE: This report is UNCLASSIFIED.
The word "CLASSIFICATION" is used for training purposes

to denote lines which may carry classification markings on an actual report.)
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure E-3. Sample TIR
FM 34-52

(CLASSIFICATION)
TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

NAME OF PRISONER: KLEYMENOV INTERROGATOR: SGT ROYCE.
CATEGORY: A@C D UNITFORMATION TO WHICH
INTERROGATOR ATTACHED: Intg Sec,
Intel-Suw Co, 231st MI Bn, 23d Inf Div
INTG SERIAL NO: US-AR-1234-1 MAPS USED: GERMANY, 1:50,000,
EISENAC HUNFELD, Ed #2.
DTG OF INTG: 221700ZNOV99 LANCiUAGE USED: Russian
INTG REPORT NO: PT-001 INTERPRETER: None

PART I -INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)
A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:
1.
Rank, full name, service number, and position: JrLT, Dimitar KLEYMENOV, No. 0506031, Plt Ldr.

2.
Date and place of birth: 23 May 72, TBILISI, Georgian SSR, USSR.

3.
Nationality: Soviet (Ethnic Rumanian) (Religion: Orthodox).

4.
Knowledge of languages and proficiency: Russian (N).

5.
Unit, formation, or organization: 2 MR Plt (MRP), 2 MR Co (MRC), 3MR Bn (MRB), 62 MR Regt (MRR), 34 MR Div (MRD)(2MRP/2/3/62/34MRD).

6.
Dateltime, placelgrid references, capturing unit and circumstances of capture: 221330ZNOV99, Hill 457 (NB625305), A/1/2/3, captured after taking Hill 457.


B. CAREER:
1.
Premilitary: Gymnasium graduate, attended 1year at University of Moscow. Vocational training: None. Paramilitary training: None.

2.
Military: 5 years military service, attended OCS Oct97; previous military jobs: Assistant Platoon Leader.


DOWNGRADINGIDECLASSIFICATIONDATA:
(NOTE: This report is UNCLASSIFIED.
The word "CLASSIFICATION" is used for training purposes

to denote lines which may carry classification markings on an actual report.)
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure E-3. Sample TIR
FM 34-52
(CLASSIFICATION)
C. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE:
1.
Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: EPW seemed cooperative in that he did not hesitate to answer questions. EPW has 5years' military experience. EPW appeared reliable in that no discrepancies were noted through the use of control and repeated questions. EPW was of average intelligence as he attended 1year University of Moscow.

2.
Specialist knowledge: None.

3.
Discussion of approach techniques: EPW cooperated on the orchestration of the Incentive (better treatment) and Pride and Ego Up (too good to do mundane EPW work) approaches.


D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:
1.
List of documents: MD card No. 0506031 (returned to EPW).

2.
Details of money and valuables: 18xrubles (impounded and receipted).


E. EOUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:
1.
Personal equipment: MhMK protective mask (returned to EPW).

2.
Weapons: Wmm FM pistol, 2xempty magazines, Mull magazine (all evacuated
through supply channels).



PART II -INFORMATION OBTAINED
A. SUMMARY:
1.
DO1is 221330ZNOV99 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.

2.
This report contains information pertaining to the 34th MRD, or units subordinate thereto.


B. TEXT:
1. MISSIONS:
a.
EPW:

(1)
TOC: To establish Plt OP and defensive position for 2MRP/2/3/62/34MRD.

(2)
FUTURE: To assist calling in artillery fire on enemy positions.

(3)
PAST: Participated in assault against Hill 457 (Nl3625305).



b.
UNIT: (2MRP/2/3/62/34MRD).

(1)
PRESENT: To establish and maintain OP and defensive positions.

(2)
FUTURE: To monitor convoy traffk, use position as jumping off point for future operations.




(CLASSIFICATION)
d
Figure E-3. Sample TIR (continued).
FM 34-52
(CLASSIFICATION)
(3)
PAST: Assaulted Hill 457 (NB625305).

c.
UNIT: (2MRCl3162134MRD).

(1)
PRESENT: To continue offensive operation east on highway.

(2)
FUTURE: To link up with the 3MRB in ALSFELD (NB1922) NLT 27NOV99.

(3)
PAST: Crossed international border 18NOV99 to liberate oppressed populace.


2. COMPOSITION: (62MRRl34MRD).
a:
62MRR had 2xMRB, dsg 1and 3. lxArty Btry, dsg unk. 2xEngr Bn, dsg unk.

b.
2MRBl62MRR had 3xMRC dsg 1,2, and 3.

c.
2MRCl3162MRR had lxHq Section and 3xMRP dsg 1,2,3.

d.
Ea MRPl213162MRR had 3xMRS, dsg 1,2,3.


3. STRENGTH: (2MRC).
a. Personnel: (2MRC).
(1)
2MRC had 93xpersonnel(6xOff/87xEM).

(2)
Hq SecJ2MRC had 6xpersonnel(3xOff -CO, PO, T013xEM lSG, BMP driverlmechanic, BMP commanderlgunner).

(3)
Ea MRPl2MRC had 29xpersonnel(lxOff -Plt Ldr128xEM -lxPlt SGT and 27xPlt mbrs).

(4)
Ea MRSIea MRPl2MRC had 9xEM (Mqd Ldr, 8xSqd mbrs).

b.
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT: (2MRPl2MRC).

(1)
Individual Weapons: (2MRP).

(a)
7x9mm pistol (Wlt Ldr, lxea RPG-16 gunner, lxea BMP driverlmechanic).

(b)
16x5.45mm AK-74 rifles (lxea remaining EM except RPK-74 gunners).

(c)
1x7.62mm SVD sniper rifle carried by sniper, 2MRP.

(2)
Crew-served Weapons: (2MRP).

(a)
6x5.45mm RPK-74 LMG (2xea MRSl2MRP).

(b)
3x58mm RPG-I6 ATGL (lxea MRSl2MRP).

(3)
Other Weapons: (2MRP) Ea mbrl2MRP carried unk no RGD-5 and F-1 hand grenades.

(4)
Armored Vehicles: (2MRP) (3xBMP, ea armed with lx73mmsmoothbore gun, lx7.62mm coaxial MG, and IxAT-3 SAGGER ATGM, lxea MRSl2MRP).

(5)
Other Vehicles: Unk.


(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure E-3. Sample TIR (continued).
FM 34-52
(CLASSIFICATION)
(6)
Communication Equipment: (2MRP).

(a)
3xR-123 transceivers, lxea BMP/2MRP.

(b)
1xR-126 transceivers, lxPlt Hql2MRP.

(7)
NBC Equipment: (2MRP).

(a)
Individual:

(1)
29xShM protective masks (lxea mbrJ2MRP).

(2)
2%U/I protective clothing sets (lxea mbrl2MRP).

(3)
29xU/I individual decon kits (lxea mbrl2MRP).

(b)
Vehicular: (2MRP) 3xU/I air filtration systems (lxea BMP/2MRP).

(8)
Specialized equipment: None.


4. DISPOSITIONS:
(a)
CP, 3MRB/62/34MRD loc vic NB673344 in abandoned 2xstory building in
HEIMBOLDSHAUSEN (NB6734) (HIS, CO, 2MRC/3MRB, DOI:
211200ZNOV99).


(b)
CP, 2MRC/3/62/34MRD loc vic NB639310 in building at road intersection in
RANSBACH (NB6331) (DOI: 211130ZNOV99).


(c)
CP, lMRP/2/3/62/34MRD loc vic NB626291, in building N of road junction
WEHRSHAUSEN (NB6229) (DOI: 210800ZNOV99).


(d)
CP, 3MRP/2/3/62/34MRD loc vic NB608324 in one-story, white building in HILMES (NB6032) (DOI: 210800ZNOV99).

(e)
CP, artillery battery, FUD UNK, loc vic NB626334. (WS, CO, 2MRC/3/62/34MRD
DOI: 220400ZNOV99).


(f)
CP, 2MRP/2/3/62/34MRD, Hill 457, loc vic NB625305. (DOI: 221330ZNOV99).


5.
TACTICS: (2MRC/3/62/34MRD) To continue rapid advance toward ALSFELD (NB1922) where various U/I units will consolidate and then advance SW.

6.
TRAINING: (2MRC/3/62/34MRD) Practiced small unit and company-size attack formation along with ground control of attack formations.

7.
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: (2MRC/3/62/34MRD).


a. Losses: (2MRC).
(1)
Personnel: lOxKIA in 2MRS/1/2/MRC due to artillery barrage on 20NOV99.

(2)
Equipment: lxBMP in 2MRS/1/2MRC due to artillery barrage on 20NOV99.

b.
Replacements: (2MRC).


(CLASSIFICATION)
-
Figure E-3. SampleTIR (continued).
f
k

FM 3452

(CLASSIFICATION)
(1)
Personnel: 5xEM received by 2MRS/1/2MRC to replace losses.

(2)
Equipment: lxBMP received by 2MRS/l/2MRC within 8 hours of loss.

c.
Reinforcements: Unk to EPW.

d.
Combat experience: Unk to EPW.

e.
Morale: (2MRPI2MRC) Morale was good due to offensive going as planned and faith in leaders. PO, 3MRB162134MRC gives good political indoctrination.

f.
Electronic technical data: Unk to EPW.


8. LOGISTICS: (2MRP/2/3/62/34MRD).
(a) Weapons and Ammunition: (2MRP).
(1)Weapons: (2MRP) All weapons were in excellent condition due to inspection in early Nov99. Spare parts for all weapons were stored in BMPs. No shortages of weapons or spare parts.
(2)
Ammunition: (2MRP) All ammunition were in excellent condition as it was issued new and also was inspected in early Nov99. No shortages.

(b)
Vehicles and POL: (2MRP).

(1)
Vehicles: (2MRP) All BMPs were in good conditions due to regular maintenance. Ea BMPl2MRP carried its own spare parts and tool kit. No shortages of vehicle spare parts.

(2)
POL: (2MRP) POL was resupplied ea evening by a U/I tanker truck at approximately 1800. No shortages.

(c)
FoodlWater: (2MRP).

(1)
Food: (2MRP) All personnel eating field rations since offensive began. Each member eats 2xcanned rations each day. Resupply every 3xdays. Last resupply on 2ONOV99. No shortages.

(2)
Water: (2MRP) Water was obtained from local sources. Each memberf2MRP has purification tablets to be used as necessary. No shortages.

(d)
Communication Equipment: (2MRP) All transceivers are in good working order as they were inspected in early Nov99. Spare parts are stored in BMPs.

(e)
Medical: (2MRP) Each member had Mrst-aid kit.


(0 NBC Equipment: (2MRP) All NBC gear was in excellent condition as it was
inspected in late Oct99.

9. MISCELLANEOUS: (3MRB).
a. Personalities: (3MRBI62134MRD).
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure E-3. SampleTIR (continued).
FM 34-52

(CLASSIFICATION)
Last Name First Name MND Rank Psn FUD
GARNOV W. MNU MAJ PO 3MRB PANKRATOV A. MNU CPT CO 2MRCl3MRB ZAGORSKIY H. MNU SrSGT 1SG 2MRCI3MRB MEL'NIKOV C. MNU SrLT Plt Ldr lMRP/2/3MRB KOVALEV I. MNU SGT Plt Ldr 2MRP/2/3MRB KHOLODNOV M. MNU JrLT Plt Ldr 3MRPI213MRB
b.
Code nameslnumbers: Unk to EPW.

c.
Radio frequencies: (2MRCl3MRB) Frequencies for the R-123 transceiver on 22NOV99 were: Primary -14.70MHz. Alternate -18.36MHz. Frequencies changed daily at 2400 per unit SOI. Effective date: 22NOV99.

d.
Call Signs: (2MRCl3MRB) Call signs for 22NOV99 were CO, 2MRC TASC 20; lMRPj2MRC -PZQN 11; 2MRP12MRC -PZQN 12;2MRP12MRC -PZQN 13. CdI signs changed daily at 2400 per unit SOI. Effective date: 22NOV99.

e.
Passwords: (2MRCl3MRB) Challenge for 22NOV99 was NOS; Countersign was UTROM. Passwords changed daily at 2400 per unit SOP.

f.
Obstacles: Unk to EPW.

g.
PSYOP: Unk to EPW.


PART Ill -REMARKS
Recommend EPW for further interrogation on annual training competition at battalion and regimental levels.
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure E-3. SampleTIR (continued).
FM 34-52
/ - /
/ I0 I Attach to 101
I I
/ I PW/ I

I I

/ I / Part A I I REMRRKS: I
I Serial No. of Tag: R~LI%/~i I
I Include any information that
I
I Nationality of Capture Unlt:
I LLS
I Capturing Unit:d&-/)/(/~/3
I
I I I I I I
I may assist in the intell-
I
I igence effort; eg, special I I circumstances of capture.
I I
I Associated PW captured at : same time/location. PW I
I Power Served, etc.
I I I
I
I
I I
I
I I
I
I
I I I
I I
I I
I
I I I I
I
I I
I I
I----Perforation--------------
I
I I0 I
I I I 1-I
I WIG of Capture: //Oh45zAW99I
I
I

I Location of capture:CAl23#5& I
I
I
; rw -: FiORZ5, Jmd I I

,First, MI) I
I
r PWDOB: /SMfiY 29
I
I IPW Senrice Number:
I
I Part B attached I or Dccuments:
!----------------------------------I
I part B

I
I
I
I

I

I

I01
1
I
Serial Number of Tag:0~6~~7iAttach to PW equipment

I I
I I documents. Ensure all I Nationality of Capture Unit: I I documents/equipnent are
1I
I
I I I secure in one package.
L
I
I I Mark with X in box below
I
; PW Name: ~06'~~~ II
I I if of particular intell -a (LastName, First, MI) I I igence rmportance.
I
I PW Rank: VT
I I

I
I
RE'P~6ilc I I I mr served by PW:&F Aum~drnI I
I I I I
/ MG or capture:j/Db~5gAM?97 : I
I
I bation of Capture: rA123$56: I I

I I I

I I I

I
I I

I
I
I I I
I I I
I I I I
I
I
I
I
I

Figure E-4. Standardized EPW and personal equipment and document captive tag (STAMG 2044).
FM 34-52
(CLASSIFICATION)
FM GZ, /d.T/t/FB/V TO G a, XI/ INFO G2, X GafPs
CLASSIFICATION/CAVEATS
SERIAL: (U).
PASS: (U) OPTIONAL.
COUNTRY: (U).
SUBJ: IIR bfl847/ A-@
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSImED (CLASSIFICATION/CAVEATS,WITH CAVEATS ABBREVIATED).
I
DOI: (U).
REQS: (U).
SOURCE: (&.
SUMMARY: (&).
TEXT: (a.
COMMENTS: (a.
//IPSP: (U) 87-11.
IICOMSOBJ: (U) 37-11.
PROJ: (U).
COLL: (U) (OPTIONAL).
PREP: (U).
ENCL: (g)TO FOLLOW. 1ENCLOSURES. (OPTIONAL). WARNING:

(U) REPORT CLASSIFIED (CLASSIF'ICATION/CAVEATSWITH CAVEATS SPELLED OUT).
DECL: OADR ##
NOTE: LEFT MARGIN DASHES ENSURE PROPER SPACING BETWEEN PROSIGNS.
(UNCLASSIFIED)
Figure E-5. Format for intelligence information report (IIR).
F

FM 3452
*l. NAME OF COUNTRY
2.
DATE OF INFORMATION (for example, YYMMDD or YYMMDD-YYMLDD)

3.
DATE OF REPORT (for example, YYMMDD)


*4.A. FULL NAME (Must be listed in Roman letters in the order normally used by the individual, with surname in capital letters; accent on last name, if known; phonetic pronunciation, as appropriate.)
4.B. NAME(S) BY WHICH INDIVIDUAL PREFERS TO BE ADDRESSED
(1)
IN OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

(2)
ORALLY AT OFFICIAL GATHERINGS


4.C. FULL NAME IN NATIVE ALPHABET (Include standard telegraphic code or other transcription code.)
4.D. VARIANTS, ALIASES, OR NICKNAMES *5. RANK (List complete official rank)
5.A. ENGLISH LANGUAGE (List American equivalent.)
5.B. NATIVE
6.
DATE OF RANK (for example, YYMMDD)

7.
POSITION/BILLET
*7.A. PRESENT POSITION (List what the person is and where.)



7.B. MILITARY ADDRESS

7.C. DATE ASSUMED POSITION (for example, YYMMDD)

7.D. SCHEDULED DATE OF DEPARTURE (for example, YYMMDD)

7.E. NAME OF PREDECESSOR I

(1)
PREDECESSOR'S RANK

(2)
PREDECESSOR'S BRANCH OF ARMED SERVICE

(3)
DATE PREDECESSOR ASSIGNED (for example, YYMMDD)

(4)
DURATION OF PREDECESSOR'S ASSIGNMENT (List from and to date in
YYMMDD order.)



*8. BRANCH OF ARMED SERVICE (for example, Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Branch)
9.
SPECIALITY/OTHER ORGANIZATIONS (List affiation with Ministry of Defense, a space program, or other specialized agencies or programs.)

10.
DATE OF BIRTH (for example, YYMMDD)

11.
PLACE OF BIRTH (List town, state, province, country.)


Figure E-6. Format for biographic report.
12.
SEX

13.
HOME ADDRESS

14.
TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code, if applicable.)


14.A. HOME
14.B. WORK
15.
MARITAL STATUS (List married, single, divorced, widowed, or separated.)

16.
CITIZENSHIP (List country or countries where citizenship is held.)

17.
ETHNIC GROUP (for example, Caucasian)

18.
NATIONALITY

19.
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION


19.A. NAME (for example, Roman Catholic)
19.B. PRACTICING OR NON-PRACTICING
20.
TITLES, HONORIFICS

21.
HIGH ORDER DECORATIONS (List native, US, other country awards, by what government awarded, and when.)

22.
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION


22.A. FACIAL HAIR (List beard, mustache, other.)
22.B. TEETH (Yes or No. Note whether teeth are natural.)
22.C. HARD OF HEARING (Yes or No)
22.D. GLASSES (Yes or No)
22.E. COLOR OF EYES
22.F. BALD (Yes or No)
22.G. COLOR OF HAIR
22.H. WRITING HAND
22.1. POSTURE (List whether erect or round-shouldered.)
225. HEIGHT (List in inches.)
22.K. WEIGHT (List in pounds.)
22.L. BUILD (List small, medium, or large.)
23.
MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS (List professional, social, military, and other organizations and inclusive date in YYMMDD order.)

24.
PREFERENCES (List preferences for food, drink, tobacco, entertainment, sports, and hobbies.)

25.
PUBLISHED WORKS--BY OR ABOUT INDIVIDUAL (List title and publication date of article or book. If an article, list name of publication in which article appeared.)


Figure E-6. Format for biographic report (continued).
-FM 3452
26.
CIVIL EDUCATION (List college or highest level schools, locations, major courses,
degrees, honors, and inclusive dates in YYMMDD order.)


27.
LANGUAGES (List proficiency, dialects, degree of fluency, and ability to act as a
translator or interpreter.)


28.
INTERNATIONAL TRAININGRRAVEL (List countries, purpose, and inclusive
dates in YYMMDD order.)


29.
PHOTOGRAPH SUBMITTED (Yes or No)

30.
DATE OF PHOTOGRAPH, IF SUBMITTED (for example, YYMMDD)

31.
MILITARY SERVICE (Chronologically, list inclusive dates in YYMMDD order and
locations. List all military schools, in-country and foreign; promotions and demotions by
listing rank to which moved and effective date in YYMMDD order; foreign service; units
served and position held; retired or reserve status; and involvement with programs,
activities, and key people.)


32.
FULL NAME OF SPOUSE


32.A. MAIDEN NAME (for example, ESCOBAL)
32.B. DATE OF BIRTH (for example, YYMMDD)
32.C. PLACE OF BIRTH (List town, state, province, and country.)
32.D. CITIZENSHIP (List country or countries in which citizenship held.)
32.E. ETHNIC GROUP
32.F. NATIONALITY
32.G. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
(1)
NAME (for example, Roman Catholic)

(2)
PRACTICING OR NON-PRACTICING


32.H. BACKGROUND (List education; languages; preferences in food, drink, hobbies,
and entertainment; special interests; and professional societies and groups.)

33.
NAMES OF CHILDREN (Include sex, date of birth in YYMMDD order, marital
status, and any other items of interest such as schools, health, or military service.)


34.
SIGNIFICANCE:
The following paragraphs are classified, except number 40.


35.
POLITICS

36.
MILITARY REPUTATION

37.
CHARACTER

38.
ACQUAINTANCES/RELATIONS INFLUENCE

39.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

40.
POLICE RECORD (Not a classified paragraph.)

41.
EVALUATION

42.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SPOUSE


Figure E-6.Format for biographic report (continued).
FM 34-52
PRECEDENCEIDTG
FM

TO
INFO
BT OR ZEN

CLASSIFICATION/CAVEATS/CODEWORDS

CITE:
SERIAL:
SUBJ: KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF (Classification)
REF:
SUMMARY: (Classification) (Source description limited to 414 characters, 6 message

lines)
TEXT:

1. (Classification) PERSONAL DATA:
1A.NAME:
1B. SRCNO: (14-characters)
1C. SRCNO1: (14-characters)
ID. SRCN02: (14-characters)
1E. SRCN03: (14-characters)
IF.CITIZEN: (2-characters)
1G. BIRTCITY: (30-characters including blanks)
1H. BIRTCRTY: (Zcharacters)

11. BIRTDT: (YYMMDD --6-characters)
1J. PCO: (2-characters)
1K.LEFTDT: (YYMMDD --6-characters)
1L. INITCTDT: (YYMMDD --dcharacters)
1M.LASTCTDT: (YYMMDD --6-characters)
IN. LASTCTRY: (YYMMDD --6-characters)

10.LANGCOMP: (3-characters; 3 occurrence limit.)
2. (Classification) EDUCATION:
2A. C or M (1 character; W-W;educational institution in 76-characters including blanks; geographic coordinates in 15-characters without blanks; city name in 30-characters including blanks; country code in 2-characters; degree/certificate/diplomaand major in 32-characters including blanks.
.
Figure E-7.Format for a knowledgeability brief.
FM 34-52
2B-2E. (Include these subparagraphs as needed using format above.)
3. (Classification) EMPLOYMENT:
3A. W-W: (Employment installation in 76-characters including blanks; geographic coordinates in 15-characters without blanks; city name in 30-characters including blanks; country code in 2-characters; employment position and duties in 30-characters including blanks; security clearance in 1character.)
3B-3G. (Include these subparagraphs as needed using format above.)
4. (Classification) MIL SERVICE:
4A. W-YY: (Military installation in 76-characters including blanks; geographic coordinates in 15-characters without blanks; service component in Zcharacters; rank in 2-characters; unit in 30-characters including blanks; city name in 30-characters including blanks; country code in 2-characters; military specialty and duties in 30-characters including blanks; security clearance in 1character.
4B-4T. (Include these subparagraphs as needed using format above.)
5. (Classification) SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGEABILITY: Freeltext variable length (maximum 6,900-characters or 100 message lines) to address full source knowledgeability. The last two elements or paragraph, list applicable military equipment and IPSP codes, as follows:
//MILEQUIP: Two 8-CHARACTER CODE; CODE; CODE; CODE; CODE; CODE// (6-CODE LIMIT).
//IPSP: Six 7-CHARACTER CODE; CODE; CODE; CODE; CODE; CODE; CODE; CODE// (8-CODE LIMIT).
6.
(Classification) COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS: Free textlvariable length (maximum 1,380-characters or 20 message lines) to address collection capability.

7.
(Classification) GUIDE: Free textlvariable length (maximum 1,380-characters or 20 message lines) to address desired method of intelligence tasking.


DECL: OADR
Figure E-7.Format for a knowledgeability brief (continued).
FM 34-52

(CLASSIFICATION)
SOURCE NAME
SOURCE'SRANK ANDSERVICEISERIAL NO. fiT 123 +567.
SOURCES DPOB 3&p 80, W~DIJ~~ SOURCE'S UNIT ISQ~ 03
I+/~/NRC INTG SEQUENCE ~ocmur~ AK-4F, AGLRE H)T~~KR
CAPTURED WISOURCE OF
CIVILIAN CAREER STUJ&~T M~LITARYCAREER RIF~LfldAI SPECIALIST KNOWLEDGE NDA/E DURA~ONOF INTO a/y/d IWG LOCATION 19'/.7 3+56 REPORTS GENERATED PfRS &SS&S Iwo OBTAINED smy om^ uuIT suFFWZD 60%
P-ASYAI T/E5 DUR/dG COAL~POHATACK.
INTG NAME AND UNIT &FC Ml TH
LANGUAGE USED c SOURCE?SMP SERIAL NO. US-23079/d
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure E-8. Sample summary interrogation report.
Appendix F
Appendix F - cont.
Appendix G
Appendix G - cont.
Appendix G - cont.

GLOSSARY

AC
ACE
ACR
ADA
'41
AIRDOC
A0
armd
ARNG
ARTEP
ASAS
ASPS
ATGM
BICC BIRTCRTY BIRTCITY BIRTDT bn BSA
I BT
CA
CAP

c3

C-E
C&E
CEE
CCIF
CED
CEM
CHA
CI
CID
CIF
CLP
CLPM
Active Component analysis and control element armored cavalry regiment air defense artillery area of interest Air Force document area of operations armored Army National Guard
Army Training Evaluation Program All-Source Analysis System all-source production section antitank guided missile
battlefield information control center birth country birth city birth date battalion brigade support area message break indicator
Civil Affairs civic action program command, control, and
communications command, control, communications,
and intelligence communications-electronics collection and exploitation captured enemy equipment combined corps interrogation facility captured enemy document captured enemy materiel central holding area counterintelligence Criminal Investigation Division Corps Interrogation Facility Command Language Program Command Language Program
Manager CMEC CMO co COA coll CONUS CP CPR CPT CPX CS CSS
DA DCPR DECL DEROS DIA DISCOM DISUM div DLEA DLPT DLIFLC
doc DOCEX DOD DO1 DOS DPOB DPRK
DS DSA
dsg DSN DST DTG collection management and
dissemination Captured Materiel Exploitation Center civil-military operations company course of action collection continental United States command post common point' of reference captain command post exercise combat support combat service support
Department of the Army destination common point of reference declassify date eligible for return from overseas Defense Intelligence Agency division support command daily intelligence summary division drug and law enforcement agency Defense Language Proficiency Test Defense Language Institute Foreign
Language Center document document exploitation Department of Defense date of information disk operating system date and place of birth Democratic People's Republic of
Korea direct support division support area designation digital support network decision support template date-time group ea EAC ECB ECM EM encl engr EPW equip ETS EW
FAX Feb FEBA FIS FLAMRIC
FLPP
FLTCE
G1
G5
GAZ
GC
GPW
GS
GSR
GWS each echelons above corps echelon corps and below electronic countermeasures enlisted member enclosure engineer enemy prisoner of war equipment expiration term of service electronic warfare
facsimile February forward edge of the battle area foreign intelligence and security US Army Forces Command Language
Maintenance Refresher and
Improvement Course foreign language proficiency pay Foreign Language Training Center,
Europe field manual fire support field training exercise
Assistant Chief of Staff (Personnel)
Assistant Chief of Staff (Civil Affairs)
Soviet truck
Geneva Convention Relative to the

Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
of August 12,1949 general support ground surveillance radar Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12,1949
hq HHC
HHS
HIC HPT HIS HUMINT HVT
hwy
ICF ICPR I&E IEW II-IA IIR IMINT info intg INTSUM INTREP
I0

IPB
J5 JCMEC
JIF JTF j r JUMP
headquarters headquarters and headquarters company headquarters, headquarters and
service high-intensity conflict high-payoff target hearsay human intelligence high-value target highway
Intelligence Contingency Fund initial common point of reference interrogation and exploitation intelligence and electronic warfare initial holding area intelligence information report imagery intelligence information interrogation intelligence summary intelligence report information objectives intelligence preparation of the
battlefield prisoner of war interrogation intelligence requirements intelligence and surveillance indications and warning
Plans and Policy Directorate Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation
Center Joint Interrogation Facility joint task force junior job, unit, mission, and PIR, IR, and
SIR
thousand LANGCOMP ldr LIC LLSO loc LN LRS LZ
MASINT mbr MDCI MED METL METT-T
MHz MI MIC MID mil misc MN/I MOS MP MRC
MRD

MRR MRS MS MSR MTF
NA NAI NATO NAVDOC NBC NCA NCO knowledgeability briefs
language competency leader low-intensity conflict low-level source operations location local national long-range surveillance landing zone
measurement and signature intelligence member multidiscipline counterintelligence minimum essential data mission essential task list mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and
time available megahertz military intelligence mid-intensity conflict military intelligence detachment military miscellaneous middle name or initial military occupational specialty military police motorized rifle company motorized rifle division motorized rifle regiment motorized rifle squad microsoft main supply route Message Text Format
not applicable named area of interest North Atlantic Treaty Organization Navy document nuclear, biological, and chemical national command authority noncommissioned officer NCOIC NEO no NS A
OADR
OB OBSTINTEL OCONUS OCS off OP OPCON OPLAN OPORD OPSEC
PC PCS PERINTREP pers PHA PIR
pit PM PO POC POL
Prep proj PSA
PSYOP PW
QSTAG
RAM RC REC recon REDTRAIN noncommissioned officer in charge noncombatant evacuation operations number National Security Agency
Originating Agency's Determination
Required order of battle obstacle intelligence outside continental United States officer candidate school officer observation post operational control operations plan operations order operations security
personal computer permanent change of station periodic intelligence report personnel permanent holding area priority intelligence requirements platoon Makarov pistol (Soviet) political officer point of capture petroleum, oils, and lubricants preparation project post-strike assessment psychological operations prisoner of war
Quadripartite Standardization
Agreement random access memory Reserve Components radio electronic combat reconnoiter readiness training RIF
S&T S2 SALUTE
sec SFG SFGA S JA SIGINT SIR SITMAP SOF SOP SO1 SOR
sqd sr srchno SSO STANAG STX SUPINTREP SVD SW
TCAE TE TECHDOC TECHINT TEL
THA
TIF TIR TOC TOE TQ TRADOC
TSA reconnaissance in force
scientific and technical Intelligence Officer size, activity, location, unit, time,
equipment section Special Forces Group Special Forces Group (Airborne) staff judge advocate signals intelligence specific information requirements situation map special operations forces standing operating procedure signal operation instruction specific operational requirement squad senior search number special support office Standardization Agreement situation training exercise supplementary intelligence report Soviet rifle southwest
technical control and analysis element tactical exploitation technical document technical intelligence transporter-erector-launcher temporary holding area Theater Interrogation Facility tactical interrogation report tactical operations center tables of organization and equipment tactical questioning United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command
technical support activity

UCMJ UII unk USAR USMTF
UTM
vic
v'rr
Uniform Code of Military Justice unit of issue unknown United States Army Reserve United States Message Text
Format universal transverse mercator (grid)
vicinity videoteletraining
with
executive officer
REFERENCES

SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
Armv Publications
AR 310-50. Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes. 15 November 1985.
DA Form 330. Language Proficiency Questionnaire. July 1985.
AR 350-30. Code of Conduct/Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Training. 10 December 1985.
AR 380-5. Department of the Army Information Security Program. 25 February 1988.
FM 21-26. Map Reading and Land Navigation. 30 September 1987.
FM 21-31. Topographic Symbols. 19 June 1961.
(C)FM 21-78. Resistance and Escape (U). 15 June 1989.
FM 34-2. Collection Management. 20 October 1990.
FM34-3. Intelligence Analysis. 15 March 1990.
FM 34-54. Battlefield Technical Intelligence. 5 April 1990.
FM 34-60. Counterintelligence. 5February 1990.
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 23 May 1989.
FM 100-20. Low Intensity Conflict. 5 December 1990.
FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Symbols. 21 October 1985.
STP 21-1-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1. 1 October 1990.
STP 21-24-SMCT. Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Levels 2-4. 10 January 1989.
STP 34-97E1-SM. Soldier's Manual, Skill Level 1,MOS 97E, Interrogator. 27 June 1990.



DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DA Form 1132-R. Prisoner's Personal Property List -Personal. April 1986.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. February 1974.
DA Form 2662-R. United States Army EPW Identification Card. May 1982.
DA Form 4237-R. Prisoner of War Personnel Record. August 1985.
DA Form 5976. Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Tag. January 1991.
DODD 5100.77. Department of Defense Law of War Program.
AR 381-10. US Army Intelligence Activities. 1July 1984.
AR 12-15. Joint Security Assistance Training (JSAT) Regulation. 28 February 1990.
AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War -Administration, Employment, and Compensation. 1June 1982.
AR 190-57. Civilian Internees -Administration, Employment, and Compensation. 4 March 1987.
AR210-174. Accounting Procedures for Prisoners' Personal Property and Funds. 17 September 1986.

AR 500-51. Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources Support to Civilian LawEnforcement. 1 July 1983.
AR 611-6. Army Linguist Management. 16 October 1985.
FM 19-4. Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons. 23 May 1984.
FM 25-100. Training the Force. 15 November 1988.
FM25-101. Battle Focused Training. 30 September 1990.
FM27-10. The Lawof Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
FM34-1. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. 2 July 1987. (S-NF)FM 34-60A. Counterintelligence Operations (U). 6 June 1989.
FM71-101. Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Division Operations. 26 March 1980.
FM100-5. Operations. 5 May 1986.
(S)TC34-5. Human Intelligence Operations (U). 3 October 1988.

ARTEP 34-298-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for Interrogation Platoon Military Intelligence Battalion Light Infantry Division. 8 October 1991. STP 34-97E24-SM-TG. Soldier's Manual, Skill Levels 2/3/4 and Trainer's Guide, MOS 97E, Interrogator. 27 June 1990. (S-NF)DIAM58-13. Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Procedures (U). 28 March 1988.
Standardization Aareements (STANAGs)
2033. Interrogation of Prisoners of War. Edition 6.
2044. Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War. Edition 5.
2084. Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents, Edition 5.
A
approach phase. See also interrogation phases.
approach combinations, 3-13 through 3-20
developing rapport, 3-12,3-13
part of interrogation phase, 3-5,3-10
rapport postures, 3-11

B
battle damage assessment (BDA). See IEW tasks.
BEST MAPS, 3-32,3-33
briefings,3-30

C
captured enemy documents
accountability of, 4-6
as sources of information, 2-17,3-1,4-1,4-13
definition and types of, 1-12,4-1,4-9
disposal of, 4-13
evacuation of, 4-4,4-12,4-14
exploitation of, C-1
grouping of, 4-12
inventory of, 4-7
logging of, 4-7,4-8
tracing of, 4-7
transmittal of, 4-6,4-12

CED. See captured enemy documents.
Command and Language Program (CLP), F-1

conflicts
types of, 1-16

Corps Interrogation Facility (CIF), 2-10, 2-11,4-5
counter-drug operations
use of interrogators, 1-5

INDEX

debriefings
OPSEC requirement, 3-31
responsibilities during, 3-31
strategic, 3-31

E
enemy. See ME=-T factors.
enemy prisoner of war (EPW)
as sources of information, 2-17
at CIF, 2-10
at TIF, 2-12
evacuating and guarding, 2-9
when wounded, 2-12

F
force protection. See IEW tasks.
G
Geneva Conventions. See GWS, GPW, and GC.
GWS, GPW, and GC, 1-14,l-16
command responsibilities, 1-7, 1-9
coordinating with SJA, 1-9,3-14
definition of, iv, v, 1-11
posting Articles of, 3-14
protected persons rights vs security needs, D-1
violations of, 3-16

hearsay information, 3-9,3-24
high-intensity conflict (HIC). See conflicts.
human intelligence (HUMINT), 1-2

I

IEW tasks
BDA, 1-5
force protection, 1-5
I&W, 1-3
IPB, 1-3,l-4
overall objective statement samples B-11, B-13

situation development, 1-5
target development and target acquisition, 1-5

imagery intelligence (IMINT), 1-2

indications and warning (I&W). See IEW tasks.
individual and collective training, G-1

information objectives, 3-31

Intelligence Information Report (IIR). See reports.
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). See IEW tasks.
intelligence requirements (IR)
screening for, 3-2

interrogation operations
cultural aspects on, 1-5
factors affecting, 1-5, 1-6
IEW support in, 1-1
offensive and defensive, 1-5

interrogation phases, 343-7 through 3-28

interrogations
architecture, 2-1
debriefing, 3-31
in armored and mechanized infantry operations, 2-16
strategic, 3-31
objective of, 1-7,l-17
prohibition against use of force, 1-7
types of, 1-7 through 1-9
with interpretors, 3-29

interrogation support in LIC, 2-21

interrogators
characteristics of, 1-12 through 1-16
functions of, 3-1
in defensive operations, 2-20
in GS and DS role, 2-23
in offensive operations, 2-18

Interrogators Guide, 3-23

K
Knowledgeability Brief (KB). See Reports.
L
leads
hot and cold, 3-24

M
Message Text Format 0,
E-1

ME'IT-T factors
enemy, 1-6
mission, 1-5
terrain, 1-6
time available, 1-6
troops, 1-6

mission essential tasklist (METL), G-1

mission support. See METT-T factors.
military police, 2-1,2-9,2-13,2-24,3-2,4-5,4-13
P
planning and preparation, 3-5,3-7 through 3-10. See also interrogation phases.
Prisoner of War Information System (PWIS), 2-1

Q
Quadripartite Standardization Agreements
(QSTAGs),v

questioning phase, 3-7,3-20 through 3-26. See also
interrogation phases.
hearsay information, 3-24
Interrogators Guide, 3-23
leads, 3-24
questioning guides, B-1, C-1
questions to avoid, 3-23
sequencing, 3-24 through 3-26
spot reportable information, 3-23,3-24
techniques, 3-21,3-22, C-4

I reporting phase, 3-28. See also interrogation phases.
Reports
Biographic Report, E-1, E-13
Captive Tag, E-1, E-11
captured document log format, 4-8
captured document.tag format, 4-4
CED transmittal, 4-6
Detainee Personnel Record, 3-3
EPW Capture Tag, 3-8
EPW ID Card, 3-27
IEW process, 1-16,2-1
IIR, E-1, E-12
Interrogation Report, E-1, E-18
Knowledgeability Brief, E-1, E-16
SALUTE Report, 1-6,3-21, E-1, E-3
screening format, 3-6
TECHINT Spot Report, E-1, E-4
TIR, E-1, E-5

responsibilities of
capturing unit, 2-9,4-5

1 commanders, 1-9,2-1,2-21
Provost Marshal, 2-10 .
team leaders, 2-1,4-5

S
screening
CI interest in, 3-2
definition and types of, 3-2 through 3-6
priorities, 3-7

signals intelligence (SIGN), 1-2

situation development. See IEW tasks.
size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE). See reports.
sources
assessing, 3-5
breaking points of, 3-13
definition and types of, 1-10

Special Forces, 2-14
spot reportable information, 3-23,3-29, E-1, E-4

Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)
1059, iv, 4-4
2033, iv
2044, v
2084, V, 4-1
assessment codes, 3-29

strategic intelligence components, 3-32,3-33
strategic intelligence cycle, 3-33

Tactical Interrogation Report (TIR). See Reports.
target development and target acquisition. See IEW tasks.
technical documents (TECHDOCs), 444-9

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT). See Reports.
termination phase. See also interrogation phases.
procedures, 3-26
reasons for, 3-28

terrain. See METT-T factors.
terrorists, 2-18

Theater Interrogation Facility (TIF)
functions of, 2-12
mission, 2-22

time available. See also METT-T factors.
at operational and strategic levels, 1-6
at tactical level, 1-6

translations
reports, 4-10
types of, 4-9

troops. See ME'IT-T factors.
U
UCMJ, iv, 1-9,l-12 Extract, A-1
FM 34-52 28 SEPTEMBER 1992

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
GORDON R. SULLIVAN General, United States Army Chief of Staff


OFFICIAL:
MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

02404
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-1 1El requirements for FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (Qty rqr block no. 1 130).
'U.S. Government Printing Office: 1992-627-027160015