Intel interrogation may-1987

Cover page
Field Manual *FM 34-52
NO 34-52 HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington. DC. 8 May 1987

INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION
Table of Contents
Page
Preface ................................................................................iii

Chapter 1 Interrogation and the Interrogator .......................................... 1-0

Principles of Interrogation ................................................. 1-0

Sources of Information ......................................................1-1

Personal Qualities ......................................................... 1-2

Specialized Skills and Knowledge .......................................... 1-4


Chapter 2 Role of the Interrogator ..................................................... 2-0

Commander's Mission Under Air-Land Battle .............................. 2-0

Military Intelligence and Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield ............................................. 2-0

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations ............................. 2-2


Counterintelligence ........................................................ 2-4

Electronic Warfare ......................................................... 2-6



Capabilities and Limitations of Interrogators ............................... 2-6

Chapter 3 Interrogation Process ...................................................... 3-0

Screening Sources ..........................................................3-0

Interrogating Procedures ...................................................3-3




Chapter 4 Processing Captured Enemy Documents .................................... 4-0

Document Handling .......................................................4-0

Document Exploitation .................................................... 4-4

Evacuation Procedures ..................................................... 4-8

Documents Captured with a Source ........................................ 4-11



Chapter 5 Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations .............................. 5-0


Advice and Assistance ..................................................... 5-0

Prepare and Move to the Deployment Site .................................. 5-0

Establish a Site for Interrogation Operations ............................... 5-1


Supervise the Interrogation Process ........................................ 5-1

Supervise the CED Processing Cycle ....................................... 5-2

Supervise Administrative Tasks ............................................5-2


/ Approved for public release; distrib tion is unlimited .i

"This publication supersedes d30.15. 29 September 1978 .
Chapter 6 Operational Environment .................................................. 6-0'

Command Relationships ................................................... 6-0

Tasking Relationships ..................................................... 6-3

Support Relationships ..................................................... 6-4

Interrogator Training ...................................................... 6-7



/Chapter 7 Strategic Debriefing ........................................................ 7-0

Duties and Responsibilities ................................................7-0

Notification ............................................................... 7-0

Planning and Preparation ................................................. 7-0

Contact and Interview ..................................................... 7-0



Components of Strategic Intelligence ....................................... 7-1

Intelligence Cycle .......................................................... 7-3

Chapter 8 Joint Interrogation Facilities ............................................... 8-0

Formation .................................................................8-0

Use .......................................................................8-1



Chapter 9 Low-Intensity Conflict .....................................................9-1

Terminology ...............................................................9-1

Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict ............................. 9-1

Interrogation Support to Low-Intensity Conflict ............................ 9-3


The Source ................................................................ 9-6

Interrogation Operations ................................................... 9-9



Appendix A STANAG Extracts .......................................................A-1

Appendix B Sample Detainee Personnel Record .......................................B-0
Glossary .......................................................................Glossary-0
References ...................................................................References-1


Appendix C Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card ............................. C-0

Appendix D Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag ..............................D-1

Appendix E Sample JINTACCS Salute Report Format and Report ..................... E-0

Appendix F Sample Screening Report Format and Report ..............................F-0

Appendix G Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report ................. G-0


Appendix H Approaches ..............................................................H-0

Appendix I Interrogation Guides ......................................................1-0

Appendix J 1949 Geneva Conventions .................................................J-0





Preface

This manual sets forth the basic principles of interrogation doctrine and establishes proce- dures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations, applies to the doctrine contained in FM 34-1, and follows operational procedures outlined in FM 100-5. It provides general guidance for commanders, staff officers, and other personnel in the use of interroga- tion elements of Army intelligence units. It outlines procedures for the handling of the sources of interrogations, the exploitation and processing of documents, and the reporting of intelligence gained through interrogation. It covers directing and supervising interrogation operations, conflict scenarios and their impact on interrogation operations, and peacetime interrogation operations.
These principles, procedures, and techniques apply to operations in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts; to the use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemi- cal (NBC) weapons; to the CI operations contained in FMs 34-60 and 60A (S/NOFORN); and to the psychological operations (PSYOP) contained in FM 33-1.
The provisions of this publication are the subject of international agreements 1059 (National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces), 2033 (Interrogation of Prisoners of War), 2044 (Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War), and 2084 (Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents).
These principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used within the constraints established by FM 27-10, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the Uniform Code of Mili- tary Justice (UCMJ).
Sources for tactical interrogations may be civilian internees, insurgents, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. Sources in strategic debriefings are emigres, refugees, resettlers, and selected US sources.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes for improving this pub- lication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to Commander, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000.
CHAPTER 1
Interrogation and the Interrogator
Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining -a source to obtain the maxi- mum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain usable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec- tors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. A successful interrogation produces needed information which is timely, complete, clear, and accu- rate. An interrogation involves the interac- tion of two personalities: the source and the interrogator. Each contact between these two difrers to some degree because of their individual characteristics and capabilities, and because the circumstances of each con- tact and the physical environment vary.
PRINCIPLES OF
INTERROGATION

Intelligence interrogations are of many types, such as the interview, debriefing, and elicitation. However, the principles of objec- tive, initiative, accuracy, prohibitions against the use of force, and security apply to all types.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of any interrogation is to obtain the maximun amount of usable information possible in the least amount of time. Each interrogation has a definite purpose-to obtain information to satisfy the assigned requirement which contributes to the successful accomplishment of the supported unit's mission. The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he obtains the information. The objective may be specific, establishing the exact location of a minefield, or it may be general, seeking order of battle (OB)information about a specific echelon of the enemy forces. In either case, the interrogator uses the objec- tive as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. He should not concen- trate on the objective to the extent that he overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source. For example, during an interro- gation, he learns of an unknown, highly destructive weapon. Although this informa- tion may not be in line with his specific objective, he develops this lead to obtain all possible information concerning this weap- on. It is then obvious that the objective of an interrogation can be changed as neces- sary or desired.

INITIATIVE
Achieving and maintaining the initiative is essential to a successful interrogation just as the offense is the key to success in combat operations. The interrogator must remain in charge throughout the interroga- tion. He has certain advantages at the beginning of an interrogation, such as the psychological shock the source receives when becoming a prisoner of war, which enable him to grasp the initiative and assist him in maintaining it. An interrogator may lose control during the interrogation by allowing the source to take control of the interrogation. If this occurs, he must post- pone the interrogation and reassess the situation. To resume the interrogation, a different interrogator should conduct the interrogation. In addition, the interrogator must identify and exploit leads developed during the interrogation.

ACCURACY
The interrogator makes every effort to obtain accurate information from the source. He assesses the source correctly by repeating questions at varying intervals. The interrogator, however, is not the final analyst and should not reject or degrade information because it conflicts with pre- viously obtained information. The interro- gator's primary mission is the collection of information, not evaluation. Conversely, the interrogator should not accept all information as the truth; he views all information obtained with a degree of doubt. If possible, and when time permits, he should attempt to confirm information received and annotate less credible or unproven information. It is of great impor- tance to report accurate information to the using elements. The interrogator checks his notes against the finished report to ensure that the report contains and identifies the information as heard, seen, or assumed by the source.

PROHIBITION AGAINST USE
OF FORCE

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohi- bited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experi- ence indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, ver- bal trickery, or other nonviolent and non- coercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.
The psychological techniques and princi- ples outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brain- washing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally consti- tute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an inter- rogator ineffective should the source chal- lenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agree- ments, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as inter- rogation techniques.

SECURITY
The interrogator, by virtue of his position, possesses a great deal of classified informa- tion. He is aware constantly that his job is to obtain information, not impart it to the source. He safeguards military information at all times as well as the source of informa- tion. This becomes very clear when one considers that among those persons with whom the interrogator has contact, there are those attempting to collect information for the enemy. The interrogator is alert to detect any attempt made by the source to elicit information.


SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The interrogator is concerned primarily with two sources of information in his intel- ligence collection effort: human sources and material sources (mainly captured enemy documents (CEDs)). The senior interroga- tor, depending on the supported command- er's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR), decides which of these sources will be more effective in the intelligence collection effort.
HUMAN SOURCES
The interrogator encounters many sources who vary greatly in personality, social class, civilian occupation, military specialty, and political and religious beliefs. Their physical conditions may range from near death to perfect health, their intelli- gence levels may range from well below average to well above average, and their security consciousness may range from the lowest to the highest. Sources may be ci- vilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec- tors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. Because of these variations, the interrogator makes a careful study of every source to evaluate his mental, emotional, and physical state and uses it as a basis for interrogation. He deals mainly with three categories of sources: cooperative and friendly, neutral and non- partisan, and hostile and antagonistic.
Cooperative and Friendly
A cooperative and friendly source offers little resistance to the interrogation and normally speaks freely on almost any topic introduced, other than that which will tend to incriminate or degrade him personally. To obtain the maximum amount of informa- tion from cooperative and friendly sources, the interrogator takes care to establish and to preserve a friendly and cooperative atmosphere by not inquiring into those pri- vate affairs which are beyond the scope of the interrogation. At the same time, he must avoid becoming overly friendly and losing control of the interrogation.

Neutral and Nonpartisan
A neutral and non~artisan source is cooperative to a limited degree. He normally takes the position of answering questions asked directly, but seldom volunteers information. In some cases, he may be afraid to answer for fear of reprisals by the enemy. This often is the case in low- intensity conflict (LIC) where the people may be fearful of insurgent reprisals. With the neutral and nonpartisan source, the interrogator may have to ask many specific questions to obtain the information required.

Hostile and Antagonistic
A hostile and antagonistic source is most difficult to interrogate. In many cases, he refuses to talk at all and offers a real chal- lenge to the interrogator. An interrogator must have self-control, patience, and tact when dealing with him. As a rule, at lower echelons, it is considered unprofitable to expend excessive time and effort in interro- gating hostile and antagonistic sources. When time is available and the source appears to be an excellent target for exploi- tation, he should be isolated and repeatedly interrogated to obtain his cooperation. A more concentrated interrogation effort can be accomplished at higher levels, such as corps or echelons above corps (EAC), where more time is available to exploit hostile and antagonistic sources.

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS
CEDs include any piece of recorded information which has been in the posses- sion of a foreign nation and comes into US possession. This includes US documents which the foreign nation may have pos- sessed. There are numerous ways to acquire a document, some of the most common ways are: found in the possession of human sources, on enemy dead, or on the battle- field. There are two types of documents: (1) official (government or military) documents such as overlays, field orders, maps, and codes; (2) personal (private or commercial) documents such as letters, diaries, news- papers, and books.


PERSONAL QUALITIES
An interrogator should possess an inter- est in human nature and have a personality which will enable him to gain the coopera- tion of a source. Ideally, these and other personal qualities would be inherent in an interrogator; however, in most cases, an interrogator can correct some deficiencies in these qualities if he has the desire and is willing to devote time to study and practice. Some desirable personal qualities in an interrogator are motivation, alertness, patience and tact, credibility, objectivity, self-control, adaptability, perseverence, and personal appearance and demeanor.
MOTIVATION
An interrogator may be motivated by several factors, for example, an interest in human relations, a desire to react to the challenge of personal interplay, an enthusi- asm for the collection of information, or just a profound interest in foreign languages and cultures. Whatever the motivation, it is the most significant factor used by an inter- rogator to achieve success. Without motiva- tion, other qualities lose their significance. The stronger the motivation, the more suc- cessful the interrogator.

ALERTNESS
The interrogator must be constantly
aware of the shifting attitudes which nor-
mally characterize a source's reaction to

interrogation. He notes the source's every gesture, word, and voice inflection. He determines why the source is in a certain mood or why his mood suddenly changed. It is from the source's mood and actions that the interrogator determines how to best proceed with the interrogation. He watches for any indication that the source is with- holding information. He must watch for a tendency to resist further questioning, for diminishing resistance, for contradictions, or other tendencies, to include susceptibility.


PATIENCE AND TACT
The interrogator must have patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the source, thereby, enhancing the success of the interrogati~n. Additionally, the validity of the source's statements and the motives behind these statements may be obtainable only through the exercise of tact and patience. Display- ing impatience encourages the difficult source to think that if he remains unres- ponsive for a little longer, the interrogator will stop his questioning. The display of impatience may cause the source to lose respect for the interrogator, thereby, reduc- ing his effectiveness. An interrogator, with patience and tact, is able to terminate an interrogation and later continue further interrogation without arousing apprehen- sion or resentment.

CREDIBILITY
The interrogator must maintain credi- bility with the source and friendly forces. Failure to produce material rewards when promised may adversely affect future inter- rogations. The importance of accurate reporting cannot be overstressed, since interrogation reports are often the basis for tactical decisions and operations.

OBJECTIVITY
The interrogator must maintain an objec- tive and a dispassionate attitude, regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience, or which he may simulate dur- ing the interrogation. Without this required
objectivity, he may unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable to vary his interrogation techniques effectively.

SELF-CONTROL
The interrogator must have an excep- tional degree of self-control to avoid dis- plays of genuine anger, irritation, sym- pathy, or weariness which may cause him to lose the initiative during the interroga- tion. Self-control is especially important when employing interrogation techniques which require the display of simulated emo- tions or attitudes.

ADAPTABILITY
An interrogator must adapt himself to the many and varied personalities which he will encounter. He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being able to adapt, he can smoothly shift his techniques and approaches during interro- gations. He must also adapt himself to the operational environment. In many cases, he has to conduct interrogations under a va- -riety of unfavorable physical conditions.

PERSEVERANCE
A tenacity of purpose, in many cases, will make the difference between an interroga- tor who is merely good and one who is superior. An interrogator who becomes eas- ily discouraged by opposition, noncoopera- tion, or other difficulties will neither aggressively pursue the objective to a suc- cessful conclusion nor seek leads to other valuable information.

PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND DEMEANOR
The interrogator's personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct of the interrogation and the attitude of the source toward the interrogator. Usually a neat, organized, and professional appearance will favorably influence the source. A firm, deliberate, and businesslike manner of speech and attitude may create a proper environment for a successful interrogation. If the interrogator's personal manner reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove cooperative and more receptive to questioning. However, depend- ing on the approach techniques, the inter- rogator can decide to portray a different (for example, casual, sloven) appearance and demeanor to obtain the willing cooperation of the source.

SPECIALIZED SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE
The interrogator must be knowledgeable and qualified to efficiently and effectively exploit human and material sources which are of potential intelligence interest. He is
'
trained in the techniques and proficiency necessary to exploit human and material sources. His initial training is in foreign language, and his entry-level training is in the exploitation of documents and human sources. The interrogator must possess, or acquire through training and experience, special skills and knowledge.
WRITING AND SPEAKING SKILLS
The most essential part of the interroga- tor's intelligence collection effort is report- ing the information obtained. Hence, he must prepare and present both written and oral reports in a clear, complete, concise, and accurate manner. He must possess a good voice and speak English and a foreign language idiomatically and without objec- tionable accent or impediment.
Knowledge of a foreign language is nec- essary since interrogators work primarily with non-English speaking people. Lan- guage ability should include a knowledge of military terms, foreign idioms, abbrevia- tions, colloquial and slang usages, and local dialects. Although a trained interrogator who lacks a foreign language skill can interrogate successfully through an inter- preter, the results obtained by the linguisti- cally proficient interrogator will be more timely and comprehensive. Language labs, tapes, or instructors should be made avail- able wherever possible to provide refresher and enhancement training for interrogator linguists.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE US ARMY'S
MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND
OPERATIONS

Interrogation operations contribute to the accomplishment of the supported com- mander's mission. The interrogator must have a working knowledge of the US Army's missions, organizations, weapons and equipment, and methods of operation. This knowledge enables him to judge the relative significance of the information he extracts from the source.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE
TARGET COUNTRY

Every interrogator should be knowledge- able about his unit's target country, such as armed forces uniforms and insignia, OB information, and country familiarity.
Armed Forces Uniforms and Insignia
Through his knowledge of uniforms, in- signia, decorations, and other distinctive devices, the interrogator may be able to determine the rank, branch of service, type of unit, and military experience of a mili- tary or paramilitary source. During the planning and preparation and the approach phases, later discussed in this manual, the identification of uniforms and insignia is very helpful to the interrogator.
Order of Battle Information
OB is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and disposi- tion of personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. OB elements are separ- ate categories by which detailed informa- tion is maintained. They are composition, disposition, strength, training, combat effectiveness, tactics, logistics, electronic technical data, and miscellaneous data. During the questioning phase, OB elements assist the interrogator in verifying the accuracy of the information obtained and can be used as an effective tool to gain new information. Aids which may be used to identify units are names of units, names of commanders, home station identifications, code designations and numbers, uniforms, insignia, guidons, documents, military pos- tal system data, and equipment and vehicle markings.
Country Familiarity
The interrogator should be familiar with the social, political, and economic institu- tions; geography; history; and culture of the target country. Since many sources will readily discuss nonmilitary topics, the interrogator may induce reluctant prisoners to talk by discussing the geography, eco- nomics, or politics of the target country. He may, then, gradually introduce significant topics into the discussion to gain important insight concerning the conditions and atti- tudes in the target country. He should keep abreast of major events as they occur in the target country. By knowing the current events affecting the target country, the interrogator will better understand the gen- eral situation in the target country, as well as the causes and repercussions.
KNOWLEDGE OF COMMON
SOLDIER SKILLS

Interrogators must be proficient in all common soldier skills. However, map read- ing and enemy material and equipment are keys to the performance of interrogator duties.
Map Reading
Interrogators must read maps well enough to map track using source informa- tion obtained about locations of enemy activities. Through the use of his map tracking skills, the interrogator can obtain information on the locations of enemy activities from sources who can read a map. Furthermore, his map reading skills are essential to translate information into map terminology from sources who cannot read a map. Map reading procedures are outlined in FM 21-26.
Enemy Material and Equipment
The interrogator should be familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and employ- ment of standard weapons and equipment so that he may recognize and identify changes, revisions, and innovations. Some of the more common subjects of interest to the interrogator include small arms, infan- try support weapons, artillery, aircraft, ve- hicles, communications equipment, and NBC defense. FM 100-2-3 provides informa- tion on enemy material and equipment.
Specialized Training
The interrogator requires specialized training in international regulations, secu- rity, and neurolinguistics.
International Agreements
The interrogator should know interna- tional regulations on the treatment of pris- oners of war and the general principles of the Law of Land Warfare and The Hague and Geneva Conventions.
Security
Interrogators must know how to identify, mark, handle, and control sensitive mate- rial according to AR 380-5. He should have received special training on Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA).
Neurolinguistics
Neurolinguistics is a behavioral commu- nications model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The interro- gator should read and react to nonverbal communications. An interrogator can best adapt himself to the source's personality and control his own reactions when he has an understanding of basic psychological factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motiva- tions, and inhibitions.
Chapter 2
capabilities and probable courses of action. This estimate must consider the terrain fea- tures in the area of operations, the number and type of enemy units in this area, and the prevailing weather conditions. Intelli- gence assets collect and analyze informa- tion to develop this estimate, then, give the estimate to commanders in sufficient time for use in their decision making. -
Commanders request the information they need. These information requests are translated into collection requirements. The collection requirements are consolidated into collection missions and assigned to specific collection assets. Collection assets cbnduct operations to obtain information
1
that satisfies their assigned collection mis- sions. As collection assets gather informa- tion, they report it. The reported informa- tion is consolidated and analyzed to determine its reliabilitv and validitv. Valid information is collated and used to produce intelligence, which is then provided to the commanders, and simultaneously to collec- tion assets to provide immediate feedback to assist in coilection operations. This pro- cess is continuous, since commanders must react to a constantly changing battlefield. The following illustration shows the overall process followed by intelligence personnel in producing this estimate.
THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
s
,q
THE COMMANDER s:::E:::kk:-
PIR/IR CREATED AND/OR
REVISED TO COVER ALL
THE IDENTIFIED NEEDS.

u

v
COLLECTION MISSIONS
FORMULATED TO COVER
ALL PIR/IR.

v
MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO
I SPECIFIC, CAPABLE
COLLECTION ASSETS.

ASSETS RESPOND TO
ASSIGNED MISSIONS BY
COLLECTING INFORMATION.

I

I

STAFF ELEMENTS PLAN
FUTURE OPERATIONS BASED
ON INTEL PREDICTIONS.

INTEL USED TO PREDICT

I
PROBABLE ENEMY FUTURE
ACTIVITY. I
INFORMATION PROCESSED
TO PRODUCE INTEL.

I I

COLLECTED INFORMATION
IS REPORTED BACK THRU
INTEL CHANNELS.

Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
CHAPTER 3
Interrogation Process
The interrogation process involves the screening and selection of sources for inter- rogation and the use of interrogation tech- niques and procedures. Both screening and interrogation involve complex interpersonal skills, and many aspects of their perfor- mance are extremely subjective. Each screening and interrogation is unique because of the interaction of the interroga- tor with the source. There are five interro- gation phases: planning and preparation, approach, questioning, termination, and reporting.
SCREENING SOURCES
Screening is the selection of sources for interrogation. It must be conducted at every echelon to determine the cooperativeness and the knowledgeability of sources and to determine which sources can best satisfy the commander's PIR and IR in a timely manner.
CONDUCT PRESCREENING
Observe the Source

Screeners should personally observe the source. During this observation, the screener should first examine the EPW cap- tive tag (Appendix D). The EPW captive tag will provide the screener information regarding the source's circumstances of capture (when, where, how, by whom, and so forth). This information can assist the interrogator in the conduct of the screening and most importantly can show imme- diately if the source has the potential of possessing information which could answer the supported commander's PIR and IR. The screeners should pay particular atten- tion to rank insignia, condition of uniforms and equipment, and behavior demonstrated by the source. Screeners should look for things like attempts to talk to the guards, intentionally joining placement in the wrong segregation group, or any signs of nervousness, anxiety, or fear. Any source whose appearance or behavior indicates
that he is willing to talk should be noted by the screeners. During the observation, the screener should look for signs (such as the source's branch insignia or other identifi- able features) to indicate that the source could have knowledge of information related to the supported commander's PIR and IR.
Question Guards
Screeners should question guards about the source. Since the guards are in constant contact with the source, they can provide the information on the source's behavior. The guards can provide information on how the source has responded to orders, what requests have been made by the source, what behavior has been demonstrated by the source, and so forth. In addition, the guards can help screeners with specific items of interest to identify sources who might answer the supported commander's PIR and IR.
Examine Documents
Screeners should examine the documents captured with the source and any docu- ments pertaining to the source. Documents captured with the source (identification card, letters, map sections, and so forth) can provide information that identifies the source, his organization, his mission, and other personal background (family, knowl- edge, experience, and so forth). Available documents pertaining to the source (screen- ing reports, interrogation reports, and administrative documents, such as detainee personnel record (see Appendix B)) prepared by the military police, can help the screener by providing information on the source's physical and emotional status, knowledge, experience, and other background informa- tion. This information can be used to verify information from documents captured with the source and further assess his willing- ness to cooperate. When examining docu- ments, screeners should look for items that will indicate whether the source is coopera- tive or willing to cooperate based on any
Chapter 3 - cont.
who responds hesitantly to questioning. The number "3" represents a source who does not respond to questioning. The letter "A" represents a source who is very likely to possess information pertinent to the sup- ported commander's PIR. The letter "B" represents a source who might have infor- mation pertinent to the supported com- mander's IR. The letter "C" represents a source who does not appear to have perti- nent information.
Those sources who have been assigned to the same category may be interrogated in any order deemed appropriate by the senior interrogator. Category 1A sources should normally be the first to be interrogated. Category 1B sources are next, followed by those assigned to categories 2A, lC, 2B, 3A, 2C, and 3B. Category 3C sources are nor- mally interrogated last. This order of priori- ties ensures the highest probability of obtaining the greatest amount of pertinent information within the time available for interrogations. Screening codes may change with the echelon. The higher the echelon, the more time is available to con- duct an approach. The following illustra- tion depicts the order in which sources will be interrogated.
NOTE: The term "screening category" should not be confused with EPW- or source-assigned category that is assigned according to their intelligence value (see Appendix A).
INTERROGATION PRIORITIES BY SCREENING CATEGORY
AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGE MOST LEAST
LEAST

Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
the approach phase. Make assessment by asking background and nonpertinent ques- tions which will indicate whether or not the approaches chosen will be effective. The questions can be mixed or they can be separate. If, for example, the interrogator had chosen a love of comrades approach, he should ask the source questions like "How did you get along with your fellow squad members?" If the source answers that they were all very close and worked well as a team, then the interrogator can go right into his love of comrades approach and be reasonably sure of its success. However, if the source answers, "They all hated my guts and I couldn't stand any of them!," then the interrogator should abandon that approach and ask some quick nonpertinent questions to give himself some time to work out a new approach.
Make Smooth Transitions. The interro- gator must guide the conversation smoothly and logically, especially if he needs to move from one approach technique to another. "Poking and hoping" in the approach may alert the prisoner of ploys and will make the job more difficult. Tie-ins to another approach can be made logically and smoothly by using transitional phrases. Logical tie-ins can be made by the inclusion of simple sentences which connect the previously used approach with the basis for the next one. Transitions can also be smoothly covered by leaving the unsuccess- ful approach and going back to nonperti- nent questions. By using nonpertinent con- versation, the interrogator can more easily move the conversation in the desired direc- tion, and as previously stated, sometimes obtain leads and hints as to source's stresses or weaknesses or other approach strategies that may be more successful.
Be Sincere and Convincing. All profes- sional interrogators must be convincing and appear sincere in working their approaches. If an interrogator is using argument and reason to get the source to cooperate, he must be convincing and appear sincere. All inferences of promises, situations, and arguments, or other invented material must be believable. What a source may or may not believe depends on his level of knowledge, experience, and training. A good assessment of the source is the basis for the approach and is vital to the success of the interrogation effort.
Recognize the Breaking Point. Every source has a breaking point, but an interro- gator never knows what it is until it has been reached. There are, however, some good indicators that the source is near his breaking point or has already reached it. For example, if during the approach, the source leans forward with his facial expres- sion indicating an interest in the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is probably nearing the breaking point. The interrogator must be alert and observant to recognize these signs in the approach phase. Once the interrogator determines that the source is breaking, he should inter- ject a question pertinent to the objective of the interrogation. If the source answers it, the interrogator can move into the question- ing phase. If the source does not answer or balks at answering it, the interrogator must realize that the source was not as close to the breaking point as was thought. In this case, the interrogator must continue with his approach or switch to an alternate approach or questioning technique and con- tinue to work until he again feels that the source is near breaking. The interrogator can tell if the source has broken only by interjecting pertinent questions. This pro- cess must be followed until the prisoner be- gins to answer pertinent questions. It is entirely possible that the prisoner may cooperate for a while and then balk at an- swering further questions. If this occurs, the interrogator can either reinforce the approaches that initially gained the source's cooperation or move into a differ- ent approach before returning to the ques- tioning phase of the interrogation. At this point, it is important to note that the amount of time that is spent with a particu- lar source is dependent on several factors, that is, the battlefield situation, the expe- diency with which the supported command- er's PIR and IR requirements need to be answered, and so forth.
Approach Techniques
Interrogation approach techniques are usually performed by one interrogator
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
rapport. A response which is inconsistent with earlier responses or the interrogator's available data is not necessarily a lie. When such a response is obtained, the interroga- tor reveals the inconsistency to the source and asks for an explanation. The source's truthfulness should, then, be evaluated based on the plausibility of his explanation.
There are two types of questions that an interrogator should not use. These are com- pound and negative questions. Compound questions are questions which ask for at least two different pieces of information. They are, in effect, two or more questions combined as one. They require the source to supply a separate answer to each portion of the question. Compound questions should not be used during interrogations because they allow the source to evade a part of the question or to give an incomplete answer. They may confuse the source or cause the interrogator to misunderstand the response. Negative questions are questions which are constructed with words like "no," "none," or "not." They should be avoided because they may confuse the source and produce mis- leading or false information. They usually require additional questions to clarify the source's responses.
SALUTE Reportable Information
SALUTE reportable information is any information that is critical to the successful accomplishment of friendly courses of action. SALUTE reportable information is reported by the interrogator in a SALUTE report format, written or oral (see Appendix E for an example). Information may be SALUTE reportable even when an interro- gator cannot determine its immediate intel- ligence value. SALUTE reportable informa- tion is always time sensitive and answers the supported, higher, or adjacent unit's PIR and IR. SALUTE reportable informa- tion is identified by its potential value. If the information indicates a change in the enemy's capabilities or intentions, it is SALUTE reportable. If an interrogator cannot decide whether or not a piece of information is SALUTE reportable, he should act as though it is. This means that he should exploit it fully and record all per- tinent information. The interrogator should
then consult the senior interrogator for a
final determination of the information's
value.

Hot and Cold Leads
Leads are signs which tell an interrogator that the source has additional pertinent information that can be obtained through further questioning. Leads are provided by a source's response to the interrogator's questions. There are two types of leads that concern interrogators-hot and cold. A hot lead, when exploited, may obtain informa- tion that is SALUTE reportable. A cold lead, when exploited, may obtain informa- tion that is not SALUTE reportable but is still of intelligence value. The use of follow-up questions to fully exploit hot and cold leads may require an interrogator to cover topics that he did not list in his inter- rogation plan. An interrogator must exploit hot leads as soon as he identifies them. Once the interrogator is sure that he has obtained and recorded all the details known to the source, he issues a SALUTE report. The interrogator then resumes his question- ing of the source at the same point where the hot lead was obtained. An interrogator should note cold leads as they are obtained and exploit them fully during his question- ing on the topics to which the cold leads apply. Cold leads may expand the scope of the interrogation because they may indicate that the source possesses pertinent informa- tion in areas not previously selected for questioning. If the interrogator does not fully exploit all of the cold leads he obtains, he must include information on all the leads he did not exploit in his interrogation
report.
Hearsay Information
Hearsay information must include the most precise information possible of its source. This will include the name, duty position, full unit designation of the person who provided the information, and the date time group of when the source obtained the information.
Questioning Sequence
An interrogator begins his questioning phase with the first topic in the sequence he
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Throughout the briefing, the interrogator must answer all questions that the interpre- ter may have as fully and clearly as possi- ble. This helps ensure that the interpreter completely understands his role in the interrogation.
Conduct the Interrogation
During the interrogation, the interrogator corrects the interpreter if he violates any of the standards on which he was briefed. For example, if the interpreter injects his own ideas into the interrogation, he must be cor- rected. Corrections should be made in a low-key manner. At no time should the interrogator rebuke his interpreter sternly or loudly while they are with the source. The interrogator should never argue with the interpreter in the presence of the source. If a major correction must be made, and only when it is necessary, the interrogator and interpreter should leave the interroga- tion site temporarily.
When initial contact is made with the source, the interpreter must instruct him to maintain eye contact with the interrogator. Since both rapport and control must be established, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the attitude, behavior, and tone of voice used by both the interrogator and the source is especially important. The questioning phase is conducted in the same way that it would be if no interpreter was used.
During the termination phase, the inter- preter's ability to closely imitate the inter- rogator and the source is again very impor- tant. The approaches used are reinforced here, and the necessary sincerity and con- viction must be conveyed to the source.
The interpreter assists the interrogator in preparing reports. He may be able to fill in gaps and unclear areas in the interrogator's notes. He may also assist in transliterating, translating, and explaining foreign terms.
Following the submission of all reports, the interrogator evaluates the performance of his interpreter. The evaluation must cover the same points of information that the interrogator received from the senior interrogator. The interrogator submits the results of his evaluation to the senior inter- rogator. The senior interrogator uses this evaluation to update the information he has about the interpreter. This evaluation may also be used in developing training pro- grams for interpreters.
Chapter 4
CAPTURED DOCUMENT TAG
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TAG
1.
DATEITIME CAPTURED:

2.
PLACE CAPTURED:

3.
CAPTURING UNIT:

4.
IDENTITY OF SOURCE (IF APPLICABLE):

5.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:


ACCOUNTABILITY
At each echelon, starting with the captur- ing unit, steps are taken to ensure that CED accountability is maintained during docu- ment evacuation. To establish account- ability, the responsible element inventories all incoming CEDs. Thorough account- ability procedures at each echelon ensure that CEDs are not lost. To record each pro- cessing step as it occurs helps correct mis- takes in CED processing. Accountability is accomplished by anyone who captures, evacuates, processes, or handles CEDs. All CEDs should have captured document tags, and all captured document tags should be completely filled out. An incoming batch of documents includes a transmittal document (see the illustration on page 4-10). When a batch is received without a transmittal, the interrogation element contacts the forward- ing unit and obtains a list of document serial numbers. The interrogation element records all trace actions in its journal. Accountability includes inventorying the CEDs as they arrive, initiating any neces- sary trace actions, and maintaining the captured document log. Whenever intelli- gence derived from a CED is included in a unit or information intelligence reports, the identification letters and number of the document concerned are quoted to avoid false confirmation. All CEDs are shipped with any associated documents.
Chapter 4 - cont.
UNIT:
FILE RECEIVED DOCUMENT INCOMING FORWARDING RECEIVED BY NUMBER DTG SERIAL TRANSMIS-UNIT NUMBER SlON NUMBER
CAPTURING UNIT SCREENING DESCRIPTION OF OUTGOING
CATEGORY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL
TIME AND PLACE OF CAPTURE (DTG)
C)
B
w
-I
C
a

m
u

u

0
C)
E

m
Z
-I r
0 G)
REMARKS
-

Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
especially for lengthy or technical docu- ments. It is unlikely that many full transla- tions will be performed at corps or below. Even when dealing with category A docu- ments, it may not be necessary to translate the entire document to gain the information it contains.
Extract Translation. An extract transla- tion is one in which only a portion of the document is translated. For instance, a technical intelligence analyst may decide that a few paragraphs in the middle of a 600-page helicopter maintenance manual merit translation and a full translation of the manual is not necessary. Therefore, he would request an extract translation of the portion of the text in which he has an interest.
Summary Translation. A translator be- gins a summary translation by reading the entire document. The translator then sum- marizes the main points of information instead of rendering a full translation or an extract translation. This type of translation requires that a translator have more analy- tical abilities. The translator must balance the need for complete exploitation of the document against the time available in combat operations. A summary translation may also be used by translators working in languages in which they have not been formally trained. For instance, a Russian linguist may not be able to accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarian language document. However, he can proba- bly render a usable summary of the infor- mation it contains.
Translation Reports
Except for SALUTE reports, all informa- tion resulting from document exploitation activities will be reported in a translation report (see the following illustration for a sample translation report). After all required SALUTE reports have been sub- mitted, the translator will prepare any required translation reports. CEDs that contain information of intelligence value that was not SALUTE reported are the sub- ject of translation reports. Translation reports are prepared on all category C CEDs and include portions of category A, TECHDOCs, and category B CEDs not SALUTE reported.
SAMPLE TRANSLATION REPORT
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 231500ZAug85 TO: G2, V Corps
FROM: Team 1, IPW Section, REPORT NUMBER: 08-0356 241st MI Bn, 23d Div (Armd), V Corps
PART I:CONTROL DATA
1.
DOCUMENT NUMBER: US-WAIBVO-03093

2.
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Personal letter, 1 page, handwritten, mentions a tank factory disguised as a sugar processing plant, and school teachers and elderly people working in factories

3.
DOCUMENT'S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: Russian

4.
DATE AND TIME RECEIVED: 240847ZAug85

5.
DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: 230923ZAug85

6.
PLACE OF CAPTURE: NB640320

7.
CAPTURING UNIT: All-50513182 ABN DIV

8.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Found in an abandoned enemy CP.

9.
TRANSLATOR: SSG Schnurbart

10.
TYPE OF TRANSLATION: Full


PART 11: TEXT OF TRANSLATION
My dear Serezhen'ka: It has been a long time since Ireceived a letter from you. How are and where are you? The last time you wrote that fighting was going on around you all the time, and this worries me alot. Take care of yourself. There have been many changes at home. Your mother, des- pite her age, had to go to work in the factory. They make tanks there, but the sign over the entrance says this is a sugar plant. Idon't know why they do this. At the school where I work, we were also told to go and work at the same plant. They are going to close the school. Everyone has either to go to the front or work in the war industry. This is necessary in order to speed up the victory over the enemy of our country. Iwould be more at ease if I knew that you are alive and well. Please write as soon as you can. Your KATHY.
UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
SAMPLE CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL TO: DATEITIME: FROM: TRANSMITTAL NO:
SCREENED: YES NO CATEGORY: A B C D NIA
DOCUMENT SERIAL NUMBERS:
Chapter 4 - cont.
them away from him so that he cannot de- stroy them. In general, this is good, but there is one major exception. Under no cir- cumstances is a source's identification card to be taken from him.
When documents are taken from a source, it is necessary to ensure the source from whom they were taken can be identified. The easiest way to accomplish this is with the source's captive tag (see standardized captive tag in Appendix D). The bottom portion of the tag is designed to be used for marking equipment or documents. Three possible actions may be taken with docu- ments captured with a source. The docu- ments may be confiscated, impounded, or returned to the source.
Confiscation
Documents confiscated from a source are taken away with no intention of returning them. Official documents, except identifica- tion documents, are confiscated and appro- priately evacuated. The intelligence value of the document should be weighed against the document's support in the interrogation of the source. Category A documents require exploitation and should be copied. One copy should be translated and exploited sepa- rately, and the other copy should be evacu- ated with the source. If copying facilities are not available, a decision should be made on whether to evacuate the document with the source or evacuate it separately. Cate- gory B CEDs should be evacuated to the TCAE for appropriate exploitation. Cate- gory C official documents can best be used in the interrogation of the source. Therefore, these CEDs and category D official docu- ments should be evacuated with the source.
Impounded
Impounded CEDs are taken away with the intention of returning them at a later time. When a document is impounded, the source must be given a receipt. The receipt must contain a list of the items impounded and the legible name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the receipt. All personal effects, including monies and other valu- ables, will be safeguarded. An inventory of personal effects that have been impounded will be entered on DA Form 4237-R (Appen- dix B).Also, DA Form 1132 will be com- pleted and signed by the officer in charge or authorized representative. A copy will be provided the source. Further procedures for the handling of personal effects are pro- vided in AR 190-8.
Returned
Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature, taken only for inspection and information of interest, and immediately given back to the source. Personal docu- ments belonging to a source will be returned to the source after examination in accor- dance with the Geneva Convention. Copies of such papers may be made and forwarded if considered appropriate. An identification document must be returned to the source.
RECOGNITION AND EVACUATION OF DOCUMENTS
In a fast-moving tactical situation, it is possible that documents captured with, sources will not be handled expediously. Final disposition of these documents may not be made until the source is evacuated at least as far as the corps holding area. Some documents captured with a source will aid in the interrogation of the source. Others, particularly category A documents, should be copied and evacuated separately. One copy can then remain with the source to aid in the interrogation, and the other can be translated and exploited separately. This makes it particularly important for the cap- turing unit to correctly identify the docu- ments captured with the source. This is more easily done when the interrogation element rather than the military police ele- ment signs for the documents captured with sources.
EVACUATION OF SIGNIFICANT
DOCUMENTS

For more efficient exploitation of CEDs and sources, documents captured with a source are normally evacuated with the source. A document of great significance may be evacuated ahead of the source, but a reproduction should be made and kept with the source. If reproduction is not possible, the captured document tags should be annotated as to where the document was sent. Significant documents such as cate- gory A documents and TECHDOCs, Cate- gory B documents, maps, charts, and Air Force- and Navy-related documents are evacuated directly.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCUMENTS
The evacuation of documents captured with a source follows the same account- ability procedures as with documents found on the battlefield. The capturing unit pre- pares a captive tag listing details pertain- ing to the source and the place and circum- stances of capture. The bottom portion is used to list documents captured with the source.
Documents captured with a source are subject to the same screening and exploita- tion procedures as those found on the bat- tlefield. These documents are categorized as category A, B, C, or D. Category A docu- ments have SALUTE reportable informa- tion extracted and are copied, if possible. A copy can then be used to aid in the exploita- tion of the source, and the other copy is sent forward for prompt exploitation and trans- lation. Category B documents should be treated as secret and evacuated to the TCAE. Category C documents are exploited. A category C document may also require copying and evacuation. Official documents should be evacuated through document evacuation channels. If they would aid in the interrogation of a source, personal documents may require similar copying.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 - cont.
SCREENING REPORTING

Screening determines who will be interro- gated on a priority basis and in many cases how many times a source will be interro- gated. For this reason, the successful accomplishment of the intelligence collec- tion effort depends on qualified screeners. The senior interrogator designates his most qualified interrogators as screeners. He should not assign himself to screening operations. This cannot always be avoided, however, but must be kept to a minimum. He is required to supervise all steps of the interrogation process.
INTERROGATION
The senior interrogator ensures that sources are assigned for interrogation according to the screening results. This method of assigning assures that the high- est probability of obtaining the maximum amount of pertinent information within the time available is chosen.
The senior interrogator, then, assigns his subordinates to interrogate screened sources. He does this by comparing infor- mation gained during the screening process to the abilities (linguistic skills, technical expertise, and special knowledge) of his subordinate interrogators. He then selects the interrogator best suited to conduct the interrogation of a particular source.
At times, a situation will occur in which none of the available interrogators speaks the target language well enough to conduct an interrogation. When this occurs the senior interrogator coordinates with Sl/Gl for procurement of native interpreters. The senior interrogator maintains a list of available interpreters. He compares this list with the qualifications of his subordinate interrogators and the information listed on the screening report. Based on this compari- son, the senior interrogator can then assign the best qualified interpreter and interroga- tor. Interrogators must monitor interpreters periodically to ensure their performance is according to the standards established by the senior interrogator.
The senior interrogator ensures that all reports are prepared and submitted in an accurate and timely manner. SALUTE reports must be generated immediately upon identification of information which satisfies an intelligence requirement. Other reports which are generated by an interro- gation must be correctly and accurately prepared and submitted upon completion of the interrogation.
The senior interrogator ensures that all reports generated in the interrogation pro- cess are transmitted within established time frames. Transmission procedures and time frames should have already been dis- cussed and verified with the site communi- cations officer upon arrival to the holding area.
SUPERVISE THE CED
PROCESSING CYCLE

The senior interrogator ensures that the three steps of CED processing: account- ability, exploitation, and evacuation are correctly and rapidly conducted (see Chap- ter 4).
SUPERVISE
ADMINISTRATIVE
TASKS

The senior interrogator ensures that three major functions are accurate and kept updated. These are maintaining the SITMAP, updating the collection mission, and maintaining the Army files.
SITUATION MAP
He ensures that the SITMAP is kept updated by posting all known enemy units and activities within the supported unit's area of operations, according to the intelli- gence summary (INTSUM), intelligence report (INTREP), periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP), and other intelli- gence reports. In addition, he ensures any dispositions obtained through interroga- tions are posted to the SITMAP as accu- rately as the information will allow.
COLLECTION MISSION
UPDATE

Through previously discussed liaison vis- its and established communications, he ensures that all subordinate interrogators are kept abreast of any changes to the col- lection mission.
MODERN ARMY BOOKKEEPING SYSTEM
He ensures that files have been estab- lished for any documents, reference mate- rials, and blank forms that the interroga- tion element has in its possession. The same files must be generated for any docu- ments, reference materials, and blank forms that may be acquired or generated during day-to-day interrogation operations. He ensures that these files are established, maintained, and disposed of according to AR 25-400-2.
Chapter 6
Memory stores information in two areas: The five senses constantly transmit infor- mation to the brain's short-term memory. This data is stored there tempo- rarily and then shifted to the brain's long-term memory. The time at which this transfer takes place varies widely, but research shows that a great amount of detail is lost during that transfer. Studies conducted on classroom learning indicate that even though students know informa- tion stressed in class is important, by the next day most of the information is forgot- ten. The percentage of information lost beyond recall varies from study to study, but a 70-percent figure is a conservative estimate. Much of the information of value to the interrogator is information that the source is not even aware he has. Although no research data is available in this area, it is reasonable to assume that this type of information will be lost even faster than classroom learning.
CEDs, while not affected by memory loss, are often time sensitive and are screened for possible exploitation as quickly as possible. Interrogators were given the CED exploita- tion mission because of their linguistic ability. This makes printed and typed mate- rial readily exploitable, but many handwrit- ten documents are illegible. Information contained in undeveloped imagery and recordings is inaccessible to most interroga- tion elements. The intelligence value of painted, drawn, or engraved material can- not be exploited by many elements unless it is accomplished by explanatory informa- tion in writing. An example of this would be an overlay prepared without map data, reg- istration points, orjdentifying terrain fea- tures. In spite of these limitations, an esti- mated 90 percent of all the information contained in CEDs can be exploited. The following illustration shows a comparison along a time line of the amounts of infor- mation available to the interrogator from the two collection targets. The comparison assumes that the CEDs and the sources initially had the same amount of informa- tion, and that it was of equal intelligence value. Bear in mind that the figures used are conservative estimates, and that the time between the two target types might be even greater between 24 and 72 hours. The percentage of information available from sources drops sharply during the first 24 hours after capture. This represents the rapid loss of what sources would consider to be insignificant details. A slower drop in the percentage begins at 48 hours to repre- sent the resurgence of established value systems. This resurgence makes it harder for interrogators to obtain what informa- tion the source still remembers.
The supported echelon's intelligence officer determines the guidelines for priority of exploitation. The commander's intelli- gence needs and the G2's or S2's estimate of the enemy's intentions dictate the extent to which these guidelines can be applied. Exploitation priorities are reviewed and changed when needed.
ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION OVERTIME.

-

100
90 -
80 -
70 -
Z
0-k 60 -
a
I
a
0
L -
z- 50
LL
0
I-
Z W 0 40 -
a
W
a
-
30
20 -
- EPWS OR SOURCES
10
I I I I I I I
0 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 72
TIME SINCE CAPTURE IN HOURS

Chapter 6
Chapter 6 - cont.
Chapter 6 - cont.
Chapter 6 - cont.
Chapter 6 - cont.
Chapter 7
Chapter 7 - cont.
Chapter 7 - cont.
Chapter 7 - cont.
Chapter 8
Chapter 8 - cont.
COORDINATION
Effective coordination between the JIF and numerous component, theater, and national and host-government assets is necessary to ensure the success of JIF operations.
Theater 52 and service components' intel- ligence staffs require interface and coordi- nation with the JIF to ensure collection requirements are satisfied accurately and in a timely manner. The success of JIF opera- tions depends in part upon the screening, interrogation, and debriefing operations of division and corps interrogation and CI elements. The JIF establishes and main- tains working relationships with service component HUMINT collection managers and interrogation and document exploita- tion units at all echelons. Service compo- nent members attached to the JIF facilitate this interface.
Interface and coordination with compo- nent security and military police elements are required to ensure the timely evacuation and proper safeguarding and exploitation of sources.
The JIF is located in the immediate vi- cinity of the theater EPW camp. The loca- tion of the EPW camp is the responsibility of the military police EPW camp com- mander. Army component G2s and provost marshal staffs coordinate all EPW plan- ning about location.
Security arrangements for the EPW camp and planning for the segregation and safe- guarding of JIF sources are the responsi- bility of the EPW camp commander. Sources are identified, classified, and segre- gated according to their status, sex, nation- ality, languages, and intelligence category. JIF sources are segregated and safeguarded from other sources. Security of the JIF and control over the sources within the JIF are under the direction of the JIF commander.
Component security and military police units are responsible for the evacuation, safeguarding, and control of sources. JIF MIT at lower echelons coordinate with these units for access to a source and the source's subsequent evacuation to the JIF
JIF coordination and interface with theater and service component CI elements are necessary at all times. CI teams located at the JIF and with the MIT facilitate this interface and coordination. The JIF and MIT assist CI elements in the identification and exploitation of all sources of CI interest.
JIF coordination and interface with PSYOP and CA units are facilitated by direct access to members of these units con- ducting operations in support of military police EPW camps. PSYOP analysis con- cerning motivational and cultural factors of sources is of direct benefit to JIF operations.
JIF coordination and interface with legal, medical, and chaplain activities and authorities supporting EPW camps are required to ensure compliance with the Geneva Convention concerning the treat- ment and care of sources.
National agency access and participation in debriefings and interrogations conducted by the JIF are coordinated in advance through the theater 52. National agencies may establish liaison officers at the JIF.
Access to or knowledge of JIF operations and activities by host governments is coor- dinated through the theater 52.
COMMUNICATIONS
To effect required interface and coordina- tion, the JIF requires secure communica- tions with the theater 52, service compo- nents, and the MIT. Secure record and voice communications circuits and telephone switchboard trunks are used. Interface and compatibility with service component inter- rogation and CI team communications are required.
Chapter 9
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Increasing world tension, continuing con- flicts, scarce resources, and general distrust have created environments in which a mili- tary force may be employed to achieve, re- store, or maintain peace. A peacekeeping mission may present situations that are often ambiguous and may require forces to deal with extreme tension and violence in the form of terrorism, sabotage, and minor military conflicts from known and unknown belligerents.
Given the worldwide nature of US national interests, it is vital to US security to maintain not only the capability to employ force, but also the ability to assist in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. US Army participation in peacekeeping opera- tions may be multinational in nature or may be conducted unilaterally.
Multinational peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. They may be undertaken in response to a request for assistance made to either a mul- tinational organization or to the US di- rectly. Historically, the United Nations has been the most frequent sponsor of multina- tional peacekeeping operations, though re- gional organizations have acted in a simi- lar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.
Although unilateral peacekeeping opera- tions are possible, they are inherently sensi- tive and require tacit international appro- val. Unilateral peacekeeping operations conducted by the US require clear humani- tarian justifications.
The two common missions in peacekeep- ing operations are cease fire supervision and law and order maintenance.
Cease Fire Supervision
Peacekeeping forces can be deployed to observe and report on compliance with diplomatically arranged cease fires. The force will require the capability for rapid deployment to perform its peacekeeping function and must be initially self- sufficient, have self-defense capability, and possess effective internal and external communications. The terms of the cease fire agreement may call for the peacekeeping force to supervise the withdrawals and dis- engagements of the belligerents, supervise the exchange of prisoners of war, or moni- tor demobilization.
Law and Order Maintenance
Peacekeeping operations also include res- toration or maintenance of law and order. Traditional civilian law enforcement func- tions are generally not performed by US military personnel. However, situations may arise which require limited support to duly authorized law enforcement authori- ties of a receiving state.
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE
FID encompasses those actions taken by civilian and military agencies of one government in any program taken by another government to preclude or defeat insurgency. Insurgencies cannot be over- come by military measures alone but by military support to national programs.
US Army forces operate in concert with other services, both US and host nation and with other US Government agencies. Opera- tions are conducted in support of plans developed by the host nation and the US Government.
US forces involved in FID must have an appreciation of the culture into which they are employed and should be selected, edu- cated, and prepared to ensure that US involvement and goals are understood and complied with. Language capabilities are important and must be developed to the maximum extent possible. Units should be prepared for the FID mission prior to deployment and arrive in the host country established as an effective, cohesive group, prepared to begin operations immediately.
US Army forces can assume various rela- tionships with the host nation's military forces in FID operations. They can serve as advisors or instructors at all levels. Special forces units are specifically trained for this mission. Combat support of CSS units may augment the host nation's efforts and serve to prepare the battlefield for US combat forces, if required. US forces must assume an unobtrusive support role to maintain credibility of the host government.
The manner in which US combat forces are employed will vary with the situation. Because of their familiarity with local communities and population, it is generally better to use indigenous military assets in more populated areas and to employ US combat assets in remote areas.
When US Army combat troops are required for FID operations, planning for their withdrawal begins at the time of deployment. The withdrawal of Army units depends on the capability of the host nation forces to regain and maintain control.
PEACETIME CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS

In certain environments, peacetime con- tingency operations become necessary when diplomatic initiatives have been, or are expected to be, ineffective in achieving extremely time-sensitive, high-value objec- tives. Failure to influence a belligerent nation or activity through diplomatic means may necessitate the use of military forces to protect US national interests, rescue US citizens, or defend US assets.
Intelligence is a particularly critical part of all peacetime contingency operations. The rapid and tightly controlled introduc- tion of US combat forces is a part of contin- gency operations which requires precision planning. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence determines the success or fail- ure of these operations. Time for planning and execution is typically short, and intelli- gence assets must be able to anticipate requirements and provide comprehensive products on extremely short notice. City plans with complete detail of utilities, per- sonality profiles of local officials, and details of specific ports, airports, roads, and bridges are examples of information which must be made readily available. Intelli- gence gathering missions into sensitive areas are also conducted as required.
TERRORISM COUNTERACTION
Terrorism, employed worldwide, may be sponsored by political or other terrorist groups within a nation, sponsored by an external source, or employed as a tactic of insurgents. It is clearly a dimension of war- fare which pays high dividends with mini- mum risk. Population areas, public trans- port conveyances, industrial facilities, and individuals are high-probability targets for terrorist activities. Terrorist groups increas- ingly threaten US interests throughout the world.
Terrorism counteraction consists of those actions taken to counter the terrorist threat. Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. Counterterrorism refers to offensive measures taken against terrorists. Specially trained US Army forces are the main ele- ment used in counterterrorism operations.
Intelligence is essential to implementing effective antiterrorism and counterterrorism measures. Its purpose in terrorism counter- action is to identify and quantify the threat and provide timely threat intelligence. This includes the evaluation of terrorist capabili- ties, tactics, targets, and the dissemination of this information.
Terrorism counteraction varies according to the type of terrorist organization involved. Autonomous terrorist groups, for example, are vulnerable to intelligence and police-type operations. In a different arena, the actions of state-supported and state- directed groups would certainly be sensitive to measures taken against the supporting states.
INTERROGATION SUPPORT
TO LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT

The principles and techniques of interro- gation discussed elsewhere in this manual apply with equal validity to interrogations conducted in LIC operations. Specific appli- cations of the general principles and tech- niques must be varied to meet local pecu- liarities. However, because of these peculiarities of LIC operations, this chapter provides additional guidelines for the con- duct of interrogations in support of such operations. Intelligence interrogations play a significant role in ascertaining the devel- opment of an insurgency in the latent or initial stage; the intentions, attitudes, capabilities, and limitations of the insur- gents: their underground organizations: and their support systems. In addition to the traditional military concepts of intelli- gence concerning the enemy, terrain, and weather, LIC operations have added a new dimension-the population. The major aim of both the threatened government and the insurgents is to influence the population favorably and win its support.
LIMITATIONS TO UNITED
STATES ASSISTANCE

US military or civilian participation in intelligence interrogations during LIC operations is generally limited to that per- mitted by the host government concerned. This limitation places certain restrictions on US military and civilian personnel engaged in such operations. The degree of participation will, therefore, be determined by combined US and host-country policies. Normally, the interrogator is asked to advise, assist, and train host-country per- sonnel who are members of the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and other ~ecurity agencies (FM 100-20). The interro- gator may also provide intelligence interro- gation support to committed US or allied forces during LIC operations. This will require effective, close coordination of the combined effort with host-country agencies. In this respect, coordination problems can be avoided by conducting a combined inter- rogation effort with interrogators of the host country. Further advantages of such a measure are the language capability and the intimate knowledge of the area- personalities, customs, ethnic differences and geography-possessed by the host country's interrogation personnel.
INTERROGATOR SKILLS
AND ABILITIES

LIC operations intelligence requirements demand detailed familiarity with the mili- tary, political, and front organizations of the insurgent enemy and the environment in which he operates.
The interrogator's familiarity with the areas of operations must include an under- standing and appreciation of the insur- gency, its objectives, history, successes, and failures. This understanding and apprecia- tion is required not only on a general coun- trywide basis, but also on an expanded basis within the interrogator's particular area of operation. Therefore, it is essential that the intelligence interrogator fully grasps the importance that the insurgent organization places on the accomplishment of political objectives as opposed to military successes.
One measure of the interrogator's effec- tiveness is his ability to apply the appro- priate interrogation techniques to the per- sonality of the source. Interrogations associated with LIC operations dictate the need for skill in the full range of interroga- tion techniques so that the interrogator can conduct the many types of interrogations demanded.
ADVISOR AND INTERROGATOR RELATIONSHIPS
In some instances, US Army interroga- tors are assigned to a host country to assist in developing interrogation capabilities of host-country forces. FM 100-20 contains detailed information on advisor duties, techniques, and procedures. However, the operations and relationship of the advisor to host-country interrogators require special mention and are discussed below.
Advisor Qualifications
The advisor must be a qualified, experi- enced interrogator with an extensive intel- ligence background. He requires area orien- tation and must have language ability, and a personality favorable for working with indigenous peoples. The following are nor- mal functions of an interrogation advisor: the host country, military, and civilian offi- cials. But if harmonious working relation- ships are established with the key person- alities involved, the advisor can succeed in integrating all available resources.
Chapter 9 - cont.
The interrogator (advisor) should estab- lish liaison with US advisors working with host-country tactical forces operating within his area. From these advisors he can be constantly informed of insurgents cap- tured by these tactical forces. The interro- gator (advisor) and tactical unit advisor, working together with their respective counterparts, can ensure effective interro- gation of these captured insurgents. Fur- ther, the advisors can assist in achieving the required coordination between host- country tactical units and area forces to improve handling and exploiting interroga- tion sources.
THE SOURCE
The status of insurgents in LIC opera- tions differs from that of recognized bellig- erents; the field of interrogation will encompass a wider variety of sources involved in operations.
LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENTS
EPW interrogations are conducted in support of wartime military operations and are governed by the guidelines and limita- tions provided by the Geneva Conventions and FM 27-10. However, insurgent subver- sive underground elements who are seeking to overthrow an established government in an insurgency do not hold legal status as belligerents (see DA Pam 27-161-1). Since these subversive activities are clandestine or covert in nature, individuals operating in this context seek to avoid open involvement with host-government police and military security forces. Hence, any insurgent taken into custody by host-government security forces may not be protected by the Geneva Conventions beyond the basic protections in Article 3. The insurgent will be subject to the internal security laws of the country concerning subversion and lawlessness. Action of US forces, however, will be gov- erned by existing agreements with the host country and by the provisions of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
POPULATION
LIC operations place the population in the position of a prime target. Therefore, the population becomes a principal source of intelligence. The population with which the interrogator will have to deal may be com- posed of friendly, hostile, or completely indifferent elements. In dealing with these population elements, as well as with the insurgents, the desires of the host country must be considered. There is a need to gain the support of the population to deprive the insurgents of their primary sources of sup- port. Such a need places a burden upon the interrogator to learn more about the people-their customs and taboos (by ethnic groups, if appropriate), distrust and fear of foreigners, fear of insurgent reprisal, philo- sophy or outlook on life, and other facets of their political, economic, and social institu- tions. Since CI elements are tasked with the mission of countersubversion, the primary responsibility of identifying insurgent operations within the population is placed upop CI personnel. Therefore, it is essential that the intelligence interrogator maintain close and continuous coordination with CI personnel to ensure complete exploitation of the population.
INSURGENT VULNERABILITY
TO INTERROGATION

The individual insurgent may lack many of the conventional psychological supports which are helpful in resisting interrogation. Often he is in conflict with his own people, perhaps of the same ethnic group, religion, environment, or even, in some cases, his family. Further, the insurgent has no legal status as an EPW and, therefore, realizes he may be considered a common criminal. The insurgent often expects to receive harsh and brutal treatment after capture. If he does not receive this harsh treatment, the psy- chological effect may make him amenable to the interrogator. In addition, the shock effect normally induced by capture will further increase his susceptibility to inter- rogation. Therefore, the individual insur- gent may rationalize cooperation with the interrogator as the best course of action for his survival.
Chapter 9 - cont.
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS AND KNOWLEDGEABILITY OF SOURCES
The characteristics and knowledge of interrogation sources vary widely, based upon the position, status, and mission of the insurgent within his organization. The interrogator's appraisal of these factors, coupled with his own knowledge of the source and the organization to which he belongs, will assist in quickly evaluating the informational potential of each source. Interrogation sources vary and include the combatant, terrorist, propagandist, courier, political cadre, and intelligence agent. They may be young or old, male or female, edu- cated or illiterate. General characteristics and knowledgeability of the more common types are discussed below.
Main and Local Forces
The main force combatant is the best indoctrinated, trained, led, disciplined, and equipped of all insurgent forces. He will know more, but may be inclined to reveal less than a local force insurgent or a member of the village militia. When prop- erly interrogated, however, he can be expected to be a fruitful source of informa- tion on his unit and its personnel; current and past military operations; supply and base areas; status of training and morale; some information of higher, lower, and adjacent units; routes of infiltration and exfiltration; tactics and general information on his area of operations. In short, he may be likened to the more conventional pris- oner of war and will be knowledgeable on topics akin to that type of individual. He will differ, however, in that his knowledge of units other than his own will be far less than that of the conventional prisoner of war. Generally speaking, the local force insurgent soldier (the second component of the insurgent regular armed forces) will be almost as valuable as a main force soldier for interrogation purposes. His knowledge will depend primarily upon the methods of operation used by the insurgent movement in the employment of its regular armed forces.
Militia
Compared to the main and local force insurgent, the local village militia member is often poorly trained, disciplined, and equipped. While he is not likely to be a prof- itable source of information on regular force units, his native familiarity with the area in which he operates makes him a most valu- able source on local terrain, insurgent infrastructure, food and weapons caches, lines of communications and logistics, intel- ligence operations, and OB information on his own militia unit. When cooperative, he, likewise, can be used to identify local insur- gent sympathizers within his area.
Political Cadre
This individual is a profitable interroga- tion source for obtaining information on the composition and operation of the insur- gent's political structure. At the lowest level (hamlet and village) he normally wears "two hats," one as the political leader, the other as the commander of the militia. At higher levels the individual is more political in orientation and can provide information on cell members, front organizations, sym- pathizers, and nets. He is also knowledge- able on the military units within his area, their lines and methods of communications, and future plans and operations of both the political and military organizations.
Sympathizer
This individual may be a sympathizer in fact or one of circumstance-that is, through blackmail, terror, or relatives being held hostage. In either event, if skillfully interrogated, the sympathizer can become the most fruitful source of information on one of the greatest and most perplexing questions of insurgency-"How do you tell the difference between friend and foe?" The sympathizer coerced into assisting the insurgent is, of course, the most useful type of individual, but care must be taken to pro- tect him after he has revealed useful information.
Defectors
These individuals are perhaps the best source of information available during LIC.
They are usually cooperative and easily susceptible to direct approach interrogation techniques. The most important feature of interrogating defectors is the capability to exploit physically the individual who voluntarily agrees to accompany friendly personnel into tactical operations areas. The primary methods of exploiting defec- tors are to use them as tactical guides and advisors, as informants, as aides in interro- gation and document analysis, and as advi- sors on enemy agent net modus operandi. It should be noted, however, that some of these techniques involve personal danger for the defector, and for that reason, he should be provided appropriate protective equipment. Coercion cannot be used to induce his cooperation. However, when defectors are employed to accomplish objec- tives, as discussed in FM 34-60,they will be controlled only by qualified CI personnel.
INTERROGATION
OPERATIONS

SCREENING TECHNIQUES
The screening of insurgent captives and suspects is the key to productive interroga- tion by CI personnel. Screening is a twofold operation conducted to identify insurgents or their sympathizers in the population and, of these, to find the most knowledgeable individuals for interrogation. Techniques for accomplishing these functions are var- ied and depend mainly upon the imagina- tion and ingenuity of screener personnel. For this reason, only the most resourceful interrogators should be selected as screen- ers. Examples of successful screening aids and techniques are discussed below.
Local Leader
The local leader, whether a government official, religious personage, teacher or vil- lage elder, is a useful screening assistant. This individual knows the people, their hab- its and activities. He knows the legitimate resident from the stranger and can often point out insurgents and their sympathizers in his area. However, since the local leader is vulnerable to insurgent terror or repri- sals, his overt use in screening may be sometimes limited. When employed in an overt capacity, he will always require pro- tection later. The mere fact that a man is a constituted local leader should never be viewed as prima facie evidence of loyalty to the host-country government. A leader may be secretly or tacitly supporting the insur- gency or may, for personal political rea- sons, discredit political rivals with false accusations.
Insurgent Captive
The insurgent captive can be used as a "finger man" in a police-type line-up, an excellent means of mass screening. As the entire population of a community files past, the captive points out those individuals loyal to the insurgency. A police "mug file" is a useful variant of this technique. Here the captive reviews photographs taken from family registries.
Agent or Friendly
Civilian

The line-up or the "mug file," described above, is most productive when friendly agents and civilians are used as screening assistants. However, care should be taken to hide the identity of these individuals by placing them behind a barrier or covering their faces. An excellent source for employ- ment of this technique is the individual who has close relatives within the government or its military forces.
Area Cordon
A good method to screen a community is to cordon off the area and restrict the inhabitants to their homes. All movement thereafter must be strictly controlled and regulated. With this accomplishment, each member of the community is questioned regarding the identities of party members and sympathizers for the same length of time and with the same questions. If the desired information is not obtained after completion of all questioning, the process should begin again and continue until peo- ple start to talk. Once information is obtained, the members of the local insur- gent infrastructure are apprehended simul- taneously and removed from the commu- nity for intensive, detailed interrogation.
Informant Technique
This technique involves placement of a friendly individual among a group of sus- pects or captives. The individual acts out the role of an insurgent sympathizer to gain the confidence of the group and to learn the identity of the true insurgents and their leaders.
INTERROGATION OF ILLITERATES
The interrogation of illiterate sources requires special questioning techniques. The interrogator is after facts, and eliciting such simple data from illiterates as "size" or "how many" is often difficult. The interro- gator must agree on common terminology with his source so that he can communicate and obtain the informa.tion he desires. He can use a system of holding up fingers on his hands, marking on a piece of paper, or using matchsticks, pieces of wo-od, or other materials to determine numerical facts. In determining types of weapons, the interro- gator can show actual weapons, photo- graphs, or drawings of weapons from which the source can make a comparison with what he actually saw. Description of colors can be made from pieces of materials or color charts. Direction of movement may be found out by location of the sun, stars, or landmarks familiar to the source. Time can be determined by the position of the sun, locating a traveled route and then comput- ing how rapidly the source walked, or find- ing out how often he stopped and how many meals he ate. The methods discussed are examples of common terminology or reference points which an interrogator employs. Additionally, knowledge of the specific habits of the populace and of the area allows the interrogator to select a defi-nite term of reference.
APPENDIX A
STANAG Extracts
Extracts from STANAGs 1059,2033, copied as they appear in the STANAGs and 2044, and 2084 pertaining to intelligence are not reformatted. Copies of STANAGs interrogations and document exploitation can be obtained from Naval Publications are being provided in this Appendix for and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, your information. The extracts have been Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19120.
EXTRACT FROM STANAG
1059

NATIONAL DISTINGUISHING LETTERS FOR USE BY NATO FORCES
2. The following national distinguishing letters shall be used whenever it is necessary to use abbreviations in staff work and communications, including publications, documents, communications, orders or other media, to identify a NATO nation or any part of NATO Forces. The distinguishing letters are to be used to denote the countries concerned in all documents or papers, ir-respective of whether they are in the English or French language. Whenever the
NATO nations are listed in any paper or document, they are to be listed in the
, order shown in both English and French versions.
Belgium BE
Canada CA (see Note 1)
Denmark DA
France FR
Federal Republic of Germany GE
Greece GR
Iceland IC
Italy IT
Luxembourg LU
Netherlands NL
Norway NO
Portugal P 0
Spain SP
Turkey TU
United Kingdom UK (see Note 2)
United States uS
Notes: 1. The national distinguishing letters for Canada are not to be used to
identify Canadian Army format ions which have the word "can-
adian/Canadiennel' in their official designation.
2. The letters "UK" denote the United Kingdom, or a force or part of a
force provided solely from the United Kingdom. The letters "BR" may, however, be used in special cases to denote a force comprising units or elements of more than one country of the British Commonwealth.
3. When used to identify a National Force or component of a National Force the distinguishing letters are to be bracketed immediately following the Force,
formation or unit number. Examples: 12(~~)
Army Group ~(FR)Armoured Division 6(NL) Infantry Brigade 5(1T) Infantry Regiment
National distinguishing letters for components of Army Forces smaller than a
division are to be used only when it is necessary to avoid confusion.
EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2033
EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2033 INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
21. Interrogation Serial Number. In order to avoid errors in cross-checking the information obtained from interrogating PW, the origin of infbrmation repeated in intelligence reports will be indicated in brackets. To this end, every PW interrogated is to be given an interrogation serial number as a
source of information (not to be confused with the internment serial number discussed in STANAG 2044 which is given to PW for administrative reasons).
This number is to be allocated by the first interrogation unit to interrogate him officially. It is to be noted on the Tactical Interrogation Report. Only one interrogation serial number is to be allocated to each prisoner; it will not be changed or re-allocated subsequently. The system of allocating the
interrogation serial number is given in Annex B.
ANNEX B TO STANAG 2033 (~dition No. 4)
SYSTEM FOR ALLOCATING AN INTERROGATION SERIAL NUMBER
TO A PRISONER OF WAR

1. Every PW selected for interrogation shall receive an interrogation serial
number as a source of information, (not to be confused with an internment
serial number discussed in STANAG 2044, which is given to all PW for
administrative reasons). his interrogation serial number will be allocated
to the PW by the first team of interrogators officially interrogating him and
responsible for his selection. This number will be constituted as follows:
a.
Two letters, in accordance with STANAG 1059, indicating the nationality of the unit which captured the prisoner (e.g. BE, CA, GE, etc.).

b.
Two letters indicating the service or enemy forces to which the


prisoner belongs :
Army. ............AR Marines..............YR
Navy.............NV Airborne.............AB
Naval Air Arm.. ..NA Police...............PL
Air Force.. ......AF Irregular....... .....IR

c.
Four or five figures as required, to designate the team which carried out the first .official interrogation.

d.
A number to identify the prisoner himself. Every prisoner selected


for interrogation will receive a personal number, allocated in numerical order and given by the first team to interrogate him officially.. This number, preceded by a dash will be added to the code number constituted as described
above.
2. Table showing how numbers are allocated to teams of interrogators:
a. NATO Forces:
SACEUR : CINCNORTH : CINCENT :
CINCSOUTH :
a. National
1.000 -4.999 -SACLANT : 5.000 -6.999
1.000
-1.999 -CINCHAN : 7.000 -7.999

2.000
-2.999

3.000
-3.999


Forces:
BELGIUM : 10.000 -10.999
CANADA : 11.000 -11.999 DENNARK : 12.000 -12.999 FRANCE : 13.000 -13.999
Federal Republic of Germany: 14.000 -14.999 GREECE : 15.000 -15.999
-ITALY
-LUXENBOURG -NETHERLANDS -NORWAY -PORTUGAL -SPAIN
-TURKEY : 16.000 -16.999 : 17.000 -17.999 : 18.000 -18.999 : 19.000 -19.999 : 20.000 -20.999 : 24.000 -24.999
: 21 .OOO -21.999
-UNITED KINGDOM : 22.000 -22.999 -UNITED STATES : 23.000 -23.999
3. Example of an interrogation serial number:
"BE-AR-2207-137"
BE : Belgian capturing unit.
AR : Prisoner is a member of enemy army forces.
2207 : The team of interrogators which allocated the number is part of a
force attached to CINCENT.
137 : He is the 137th prisoner interrogated and numbered as such by this team.
9. Categories of PW According to Intelligence Value. According to their value of intelligence, PW may be divided for convenience into the following broad categories which are not listed in any agreed order or priority.
a. Categories A. High level PW whose broad or specific knowledge of the enemy war effort makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specially qualified interrogators and at the highest level. This category will normally include all:
(1)
General officers or equivalent, who have knowledge of sufficient value to NATO to warrant detailed interrogation.

(2)
Chiefs of Staff of formations down to and including divisions or the equivalent.

(3)
Heads of staff sections down to army group/army level or the equivalent.

(4)
Scientific personnel.

(5)
Technical personnel with up-to-date knowledge of radiological, biological, and chemical weapons or any other type of equipment.


(6) Psychological personnel.
(7) Political officers.
(8) Other officials, war correspondents, supply contractors, etc.,

who have a wide knowledge of enemy logistics capabilities or political and economic factors.
(9)
Personnel with a knowledge of enemy communications and especially cyphers or cryptographic equipment.

(10)
Officers serving intelligence appointments or organizations.

(11)
Personnel who are intimately associated with or have a working knowledge of items of major intelligence importance.

(12)
Flying personnel whose mission, subordination, training and knowledge of enemy locations and movements is thought likely to be of considerable intelligence interest.

(13)
Officers, warrant officers and senior Non commissioned Officers (NCO) of special purpose forces.

b.
Category B. PW who have enough information on any subject of
intelligence interest to warrant a second interrogation.


c.
Category C. PW who have only information of immediate tactical value and do not therefore warrant a second interrogation.

d.
Category D. pW who are of no interest to intelligence.


EXTRACT FROM STANAG 2044
PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH PRISONERS OF WAR
7. PW Processing-Stage 1-The Capture. As far as practicable, the responsibilities of the capturing unit are:
a.
To disarm the PW without delay and to remove all their military documents and equipment, except for clothing and protective equipment (~rticle 18 of the Convention). Tagging should then be carried out as described in Annex C.

b.
To segregate, Eor the purpose of interrogation, PW according to rank,


grade and service, sex, nationality, deserters, civilians and political indoctrination personnel. Such segregation is not to violate the requirements of Article 16 of the Convention.
c.
To treat PW with correctness but to permit no talking or fraternization that may prejudice future interrogation.

d.
To arrange for naval and air force PW to be interrogated by naval or


air force interrogators as appropriate. To place adequate guards around crashed enemy aircraft.
e. To segregate, as soon as possible, from PW and other captured enemy personnel, enemy nationals who identify themselves as defectors. These personnel will be screened to ascertain whether they possess information of ground, naval or air interest. Upon determination of primacy of interest, the defector will be interrogated by that service. Subsequently, to send a report along staff channels, as may be prescribed by the commander concerned, giving details of the alleged defector and asking for disposal instructions.
I
f.
To segregate from other personnel, captured personnel claiming to be special agents of an allied service and send a report on such personnel to the appropriate staff.

g.
TO inform PW of their rights under Section V of the Convention. elations of Prisoner of War with the Exterior.)

h.
To escort PW to the nearest collection point or PW Holding Area as quickly as possible.


8. EProcessing-Stage 2-Evacuation and Holding. If the situation has
prevented the capturing unit from fulfilling the responsibilities listed in para. 7 above, the unit administering the collection points should do so without delay. If PW bypass the collection points these responsibilities will be fulfilled by the unit administering the Corps of Army PW Holding Area. Then if possible the following should be carried out: Completion of Detainee Personnel Record. The Detainee Personnel Record (Appendix B) is to be used as the basic Prisoner of War Personnel Record. The
I
form is to be printed in the national language of the capturing unit and in
one of the NATO languages. It remains a national responsibility to provide
translation keys in the language of the prisoner concerned.
9.
PW Processing-Stage 3-PW Camp. If any of the responsibilities or duties listed in paras 7 and 8 above or arising from the Convention have not been fulfilled they must be so fulfilled by the PW Camp authorities. In addition prisoners will be allotted internment Serial Numbers which are to be consecutive and composed of prefix code letters identifying the capturing nation in accordance with STANAG 1059.

10.
Handling of Personal Property. The procedures set forth in Annex B are to govern the handling of personal property, including money.


-

11, Financial Accountability. Financial accounts, pay and work records, and receipts for property and money are to be in accordance with the terms of the Convent ion.
ANNEX B TO STANAG 2044 (edition no. 4)
PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE HANDLING OF PROPERTY AND MONEY
OF PRISONERS OF WAR

1. No attempt has been made to standardize a list of those effects of
personal use, sums of money and articles of value to be impounded, confiscated or to remain in the possession of the prisoners. Policies in these matters are to be individually determined by the nations. ~ikewise, nations are independently to determine policies with regard to the conversion of foreign currencies into their own currency. When laying down these policies, nations are to ensure that the appropriate articles of the Geneva Convention of 1949 are complied with.
2.
In addition to issuing receipts to the prisoners for articles and sums of money which are impounded for reasons of security, such impounded articles and money are to be listed in the appropriate space on the Prisoner of War Personnel Record. Sums of money are not be taken away from PW except on order of an officer. That record must be maintained up to date by the addition of items taken from the prisoners subsequent to the initial entry and by the deletion of items returned to the prisoners.

3.
In the event of an international transfer of prisoners, their impounded articles and money which has been converted into the currency of the detaining nation are to accompany them and must be clearly accounted for on the Prisoner of War Personnel Records which also accompany the prisoners. The appropriate representative of the receiving nation is to verify and sign for the articles and money received. Money taken from the prisoners in the currency of the


detaining nation and that which has been converted into the currency of the
detaining nation at the request of the prisoners is not to be the subject of
transfer. Such money is accounted for in the certificate required to be issued to the prisoners at the time of the transfer by the tranferring nation, showing the amounts standing to the credit of their accounts, and need not to be the subject of concern to the nation receiving the prisoners. It should be
clearly indicated on the Prisoner of War Personnel Record that such money, although initially listed on the form as impounded money, is not included in the articles and money delivered to the receiving nation.
4. Impounded articles and money, except money initially in the currency of the Detaining Power or subsequently converted to same and credited to the prisoner's account, which for any reason do not accompany the prisoner at the time of an international transfer, must be sent to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau of the nation receiving the
ANNEX C TO STANAG 2044 (edition no. 4) STANDARDIZE CAPTIVE AND EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENT TAG GENERAL
1. A standardization tag is considered necessary for temporary use in identifying captured personnel and equipment or documents captured with personnel, be fore formal documentat ion can be completed. This tag should
contain on one side the minimum necessary information in a standard format. The reverse side may be used for national handling instructions. The tag is not to be used for labelling captured equipment or documents not associated with captured personnel. The procedure for dealing with such equipment is covered by STANAG 2084.
2. The tag which is in 3 parts will be used as follows (Note 1):
a. Top part (marked "A")
To serve as identification of captured personnel before completion of the Prisoner of War Record; and to serve as a substitute identifying card when required.
b.
Middle part (marked "B")
For administrative purposes according to national requirements.


c.
Bottom part (marked "c")


To mark document and/or equipment.
3.
The form is to be printed in the national language of the capturing unit and in one of the NATO official languages.

4.
A specimen tag and description is at Appendix 1 to this annex. PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS

5.
Each captive is to be tagged by the capturing unit as soon as possible.

6.
If a captive possesses equipment or documents, the capturing unit is to complete the bottom part of the tag (C) and affix it to the equipment or documents as soon as possible.

7.
The tag number is to be preceded by the printed national code (see STANAG 1059) -e.g. BE, CA, FR, etc... NOTE 1: Those nations which do not wish to use 3 part tags many have only a 2


part tag consisting of the top and bottom parts (marked A and c).
A

EXTRACT FROM STANAG
2084
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS
3. Document. For the purpose of this agreement, "document" is defined as any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics including, but not limited to, all:
a. Written material, whether handwritten, printed or typed.
I
b.
Painted, drawn or engraved material. I

c.
Sound or voice recordings.

d.
Imagery.

e.
Punched cards, punched paper tape, printed output and associated material.

f.
Reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process.


PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEEN DOCUMENTS (CED). Ceneral.
17.
CED are valuable sources of information and should be exploited for intelligence purposes with minimum of delay.

18.
CED associated with CEE (i.e. ATD marked TECHDOC) will be handled as described in part I. All other types of CED will be handled as described in this part. Such documents are to be divided into categories as follows:


a.
Category A. Documents containiq infonnation concerning subjects pf [sic] priority intelligence imterest [sic].

b.
Category B. Cryptographic documents, encrypted items and all other documents relating to enemy co~nmunications systems.

C.
Category C. Documents considered of less intelligence value.

d.
Category D. Documents containing no infor~wtion of intelligence value.


19.
In principle CED belong to the nation of the capturing unit, but in order to ensure that information of tactical intelligence interest is ef-ficiently utilized, such documents should be handled through command channels in the initial phases of the exploitation process. Final, thorough investiga- tion will be the responsibility of the capturing nation.

20.
CED associated with a PW, or copies thereof, should follow the PW dur- ing the PW interrogation process. Otherwise, the exploitation of CED should be carried out in accordance with the principles laid down for CEE in Part I, paras. 6 -10.


EXPLOITATION PROCESS
21. CED will be exploited through the following process but, whenever feasible, in order to expedite the handling, the processing stages may be combined.
a.
Preliminary screening and reporting of information of immediate tacti- cal value by capturing unit.

b.
Complementary examination, translation, categorization (see para 181, reporting, reproduction and dissemination by or for intelligence staffs.

c.
Detailed exploitation and further reporting, reproduction and dis-


semination by CDU or other special elements. MARKING OF CED
22. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise mark the CED as follows: National identifying letters as prescribed in STANAG 1059. Designation of capturing unit including service. Serial number of the CED. This will consist of a number allocated sequentially by the capturing unit.
Date-time of captur-
Place of capture (UTM co-ordinates).
Summary of circumstances~under which the CED was obtained.
Interrogation serial number of any associated PW, if appropriate or
known.

25. ~eproduction and dissemination of CED and translation as necessary will be carried out at the earliest ~ossible stage of the exploitation process. Copies of CED considered of interest or translations thereof and lists of exploited documents, whether disseminated or not, will be submitted
to appropriat-e NATO and national staffs.
HANDLING OF CATEGORY "8" DOCUMENTS
26.
Category B documents require special, restricted handling. National and NATO 110 should he kept informed of the seizure and disposition of such docnmcnts ss soon as possible. They are to be handed over to the most relevent [sic] Service without delay. Here they should be handled in close coordination with the co~n~nunications staff. HANDLING: OF SPECIAL DOCUMENTS

27.
Unmarked maps, charts, air imagery and other types of cartographic material and information should be forwarded to the nearest geographic staff, survey unit or topographical section for exploitation. Copies may be retained to meet operational needs.

28.
Marked maps, charts, and air imagery will be handled as ordinary types


of CED, but relevant geographic staffs, survey units and topographical sections are to be infonned of their existance, with scale, series, edition and other identification data.
29. Personal papers belonging to a PW will be returned to the PW after examination in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Copies oi s~ch papers may be made and forwarded if considered appropriate.
APPENDIX B
Sample Detainee Personnel Record
DETAINEE PERSONNEL RECORD
wywlm of Mtdl~l
31. REMARKS 37. PnOTO
PHOTO (Ront V1.u) PHOTO IRUht R0lD.l
3m. PREPARED BV llndividvol and unit1 30. SIGNATURE
40. DATE PREPARED 41. PLACE
DA FORM 4237-R, Aug 85 EDITION OF MAV 81 18 OMOLLTL
.-

PART II-TO BE MAINTAINED BY UNIT HAVINO CUSTODY
428. LAST NAME b. FIRST NAMES
44. MEDICAL RECORD
a. IMMUNIZATION (Vocclnallon# and lnnoculatioru wllh Date,)
b. MAJOR ILLNESSES AND PHYSICAL DEFECTS (Wlth Dole#) c. BLOOD GROUP
46. INTERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OUALIFICATIONS
4(1. SERIOUS OFFENSES. PUNISHMENTS. AN0 ESCAPES (Wilh Dater)
47. TRANSFERS
v/
FROM fLoeetion) I TO (Locotion) DATE 1
I
48. REMARKS
4s. RNATIONAL TRANSFER
a. CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUE0 TO EPW (Amount in word,) b. AMT IN FIGURES
I
C. LOCATION d. DATE
1
W. NTERNATIONAL TRANSFER
a.
CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT b. AMT IN FIGURES I

c.
LOCATION Id. DATE-


I
61. REPATRIATION
a.
REASON

b.
MODE c. DATE


62. FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF REPATRIATION
a.
CERTIFICATE OF CREDIT BALANCE ISSUED TO EPW (Amount inwords) b. AM1 IN FIGURES

C.
LOCATION


REVERSE OF DA FORM 4237.R. AUG 86
APPENDIX C

Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card

..""I". "" .,...--
f Sktei Army. Thu cud mwt bs curied at dl timer by the EPW
x to whom it u iuucd.

APPENDIX D
Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag
0

A
DATE OF CAPTURE
( I
NAME ( I
SERIAL NUMBER I I

RANK ( I
DATE OF BIRTH ( J
UNIT ( I

LOCATION OF CAPTURE (
CAPTURING UNIT I J
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE
I )

WEAWNSIDOCUMENTS I I ---
FORWARD TO UNlT
( I
DATE OF CAPTURE I 1
NAME 1 1

0
P
Search Thoroughly
( )
Tag Correctly
( 1
I Report lmmed~ately ( 1
Evacuate Raptdly
)
Segregate by Category
( 1
I Safeguard from DangertEscape ( 1
PW
b
B

SERIAL NUMBER ( I
RANK l 1-
DATE OF BIRTH I I
UNIT ( I
LOCATION OF CAPTURE ( I
CAPTURING UNIT ( 1 SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE
I I
WEAPONSJDOCUMENTS ( I
ATTACH TO ITEM
I J
DATE OF CAPTURE ( NAME ( J SERIAL NUMBER RANK ( I
DATE QF BIRTH I UNIT 1 1 LOCATION OF CAPTURE
C
I
I
I,
I

DESCRIPTION OF WEAPONSIDOCUMENTS
VUMENTAND, 0
FRONT
APPENDIX E

Sample JINTACCS SALUTE Report Format and Report

SALUTE REPORT FORMAT
TO: DTG:
FROM: REPORT NO:

1.
SIZE/WHO:

2.
ACTIVITY/WHAT:

3.
LOCATION/WHERE :

4.
UNIT/WHO:

5.
TIMEINHEN:

6.
EQUIPMENT/HOW :

7.
REMARKS


a.
SOURCE:

b.
MAP DATA:


SAMPLE JINTACCS SALUTE REPORT
I
(UNCLASSIFIED)
SALUTE REPOT TO: G2, V Corps DATE: 2309502 Aug 85 FM: Team 1, IPW Section REPORT NUMBER 08-0175
241st MI Bn, 23d Div (ARMD)
1.
(u) SIZE/WHO: Company-size tank unit.

2.
(u) ACTIVITY~WHAT: Reconnoiter and secure river crossing sites (number unknown).

3.
(U) LOCATION/WHERE: West bank of FULDA River, southwest of BEBRA (NB 5547). Exact location unknown to source.

4.
(u) UNIT/WHO: Amph Tank CoIRecon ~11156th MRD.

5.
(u) ~IME~WHEN: ~ission to be completed no later than 2323002 Aug 85.

6.
(u) EQUIPMENT/HOW: Using assigned weapons and equipment.

7.
(u) REMARKS:


a. (U) SOURCE: EPW assigned interrogation serial number US-AR-2235-1.
b . (u) MAP DATA: GERMANY, .1:50,000, EISENACH-HUNFELD, USACGSC 50-242.
(UNCLASSIFIED)
<
APPENDIX F
Sample Screening Report Format and Report
REPORT FORMAT
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SCREENING REPORT Report Number: ~ate/~ime: PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE
A. PREVIOUS SCPEENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (unit/Report No.)
B. CAPTURE DATA
1.
Captive Tag Number:

2.
Capturing Unit:

3.
~ate/~ime Capture:


of
4.
Place of Capture:

5.
Documents Captured (~is~osition):

6.
Equipment Captured/ Disposition:

7.
Circumstances of Capture:


C. BIOGRAPHIC ' INFORMATION
1.
Full Name / Rank / Service Number:

2.
Date / Place of Birth:

3.
Sex / Marital Status / Religion:

4.
Full Unit Designation / Unit Code:

5.
Duty Position:

6.
Military Education / Experience:

7.
Civilian Education / Experience :

8.
Languages Spoken (proficiency) :


D. OBSERVATIONS
1.
Physical Condition of Captive:

2.
Uniform / Insignia (type and condition):

3.
Assessment of Attitude / Behavior:

4.
Assessment of Knowledgeability:


PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SCREENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS :
1.
Screener's / Interpreter's ~ame(s):

2.
Place of Screening:

3.
Screening Code:

4.
Remarks:


B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
Senior Inter,rogatort s Name:

2.
Interrogate (Y/N) :

3.
Remarks:


Sample Screening Report
7.
Civilian Education / Experience: 10 yrs compulsory

8.
Languages Spoken (~roficienc~) (N), Russian (FL)


: Ukrainian
D. OBSERVATIOE
1.
Physical Condition of Captive: Tired and wet.

2.
Uniform / Insignia (type and condition):

3.
Assessment of Attitude / ~ehavior: A little shaken but
cooperative


4.
Assessment of Knowledgeability: Probably will answer PIR /I5


PART I I. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SCREENER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
~creener's/ lnterrreterls ~arne(s): SGT PFREZ

2.
Place of Screening:

3.
Screening Code: 2B

4.
Remarks: Source may respond to futility approach


B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.
Senior Interrogator's Name: SSG RIVERA

2.
Interrogate (Y/N): Yes

3.
Remarks Assigned SSG Gonzalez


APPENDIX G

Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report

TACTICAL INTERROGATION
REPORT FORMAT

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
TACT IC AL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NAME OF PRISONER: INTERROGATOR:
CATEGORY: A B C D UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH
INTERROGATOR ATTACHED:
INTG SERIAL NO:. MAPS USED
DTG OF INTG: LANGUAGE USED:
INTG REPORT NO: INTERPRETER: PART I -INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR
A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:
1.
Rank, full name, service number, and position:

2.
Date and place of birth:

3.
Nationality: Ethnic: Religion:

4.
Knowledge of languages and proficiency:

5.
Unit formation or organization:

6.
Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances of capture:


B. CAREER:
1.
Premilitary:

2.
Military:


C. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE: (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
(CLASS IFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
1.
Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability:

2.
Specialist knowledge:

3.
Discussion of approach technique:


D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:
1.
List of documents:

2.
Details of money and valuables:


E. EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:
1.
Personal equipment:

2.
Weapons:


NOTE: The aim of any interrogation is to obtain information whichwill con-tribute to the satisfaction of a canmander's intelligence requirements. Since these requirements will differ in scope at each level of command, when conducting PIR and IR interrogations nonapplicable paragraphs may be deleted. Part 1 must always be included according to STANAG 2033
PART I1 -INFORMATION OBTAINED
A. DO1 is unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report. .B. TEXT:
1. MISSIONS:
a. EPW: (and full unit designation)
(1)
Time of capture:

(2)
Future:

(3)
Past:

b.
Unit: (full unit designation)

(1)
Present:

(2)
Future:


(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
(3)
Past:

c.
hit: (full unit designation):

(1)
Present:

(2)
Future:

(3)
Past:


2. COMPOSI'rTON (Level of knowledgeability) and (unidentified, full unit designation unknown if applicable):
a.
(tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (~2, directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation):

b.
(tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (c2, directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation) :


3. STRENGTH: (level of knowledgeahility):
a. Personnel: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1)
(Tie-in to level of knowledgeahility) had. ..(number x total personnel, number X officers/enlisted, duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of attachedldetached personnel :

(2)
(Tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had...(numher x total personnel, nurnher X off icerslenlisted ,duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of at tachedldetached personnel:


(NOTE: Duty Positions: Only obtained for headquarters elemnts, squads, sections, teams, and record duty positions of officers/senior enlisted member for platoons if there is no platoon headquarters).
h. Weapons and eqriipment (level of knowledgeahili ty) :
(1)
Individual weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahili ty):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(h)
Number x f'ull military nomenclature, distribution):

(2)
Crew-served weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahilitv):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):


(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
(b)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(3)
Other weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgcability):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature., distribution) :

(b)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution).

(4)
Armored vehicles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, armament, distribution of armored vehicles:

(b)
Number x full military nomenclature, armament, distribution of armored vehicle

(5)
Other Vehicles: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a)
number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b)
number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(6)
Canmunications Equipment: (tie-in to level of knowledge-ability):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(7)
NBC equipment (tie-in to level of kn~wled~eability):

(a)
Individual: ((1)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution: ((2)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b)
Vehicular: ((1)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution: ((2)) Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(8)
Specialized equipment: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution:

(b)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution: (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)


(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
4. DISPOSITIONS:
a.
Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, 6-digit grid coordinate--physical description, security measures, date of informat'ion. (HIS):

b.
Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, collocated activities, 6-digit grid coordinate -physical description, security measures, DOI. (HIS):


5. TACTICS (level of knowledgeability) :
a.
Offensive:

b.
Defensive:

c.
Special operations:


6. TRAINING (level of knowledgeability) :
a.
Individual:

b.
Unit:

c.
Special:



7. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (level of knowledgeabili ty) :
a. Losses (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :
(1)
Personnel:

(2)
Equipment:

b.
Replacements and Reinforcements (tie-in to level of
knowledgeability) :


(1)
Personnel:

(2)
Equipment:

c.
Combat experience ( tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

d.
Morale ( tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :


8. LOGISTICS (level of kn~wled~eability):
a. Weapons and ammunition (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1) Weapons:
(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
(2) Ammunition:
b. Vehicles and POL (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1) Vehicles:
(2) POL:
c. Food and water: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1) Food:
(2) Water:
d. Cmmunications equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
e. Medical (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :
(1) Individual equipment:
(2) Vehicular equipment:
(3) Personnel:
(4) Facilities:
(5) Evacuation procedures:
f. NBC equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1) Individual:
g. Specialized equipment (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
9. ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA (level of knowledgeability):
10. MISCELLANEOUS (level of knowledgeability):
a. Personalities (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MN/I RANK POS FUD
(tie-in to
tie-in)
(tie-in to
tie-in)
(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(CLASSIFLCATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
b. Code names/numbers (tie-in to level of knowledgeabili ty) :
(1)
Code name:

(2)
Code number:

c.
Radio frequencies/call signs (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1)
Radio frequency:

(2)
Call sign:

d.
Passwords (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

e.
Obstacles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1)
Enemy:

(2)
NATO;

f.
PSYOP (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1)
Enemy:

(2)
NATO:


(CLASS IFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
-

SAMPLE TACTICAL
INTERROGATION
REPORT

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT
( NAME OF PRISONER: SCHULTZ ( INTERROGATOR: SFC JONES
( ) CATEGORY: A (B) C D ( ) UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH
INTERROGATOR ATTACHED:
Team 1, Interrogation

Sect ion, 241s t MI Bn, 23d Div (ARMD)
( INTG SERIAL NO: US-AR 2235-1 ( ) MAPS USED: Germany,
1 :50,000, EISENACH-HUNFELD,
USACGSC 50-242

( DTG OF INTG: 230930ZAug 85 ( ) LANGUAGE USED: Russian
( INTG REPORT NO: ( INTERPRETER: None

PART I -INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)
A. ( ) PERSONAL PARTICULARS:
1.
( ) Rank, full name, service number, and position: JrSgt Georg SCHULTZ, 1634921, Squad Leader.

2.
( ) Date and place of birth: 12 Jun 62, KIEV, UkSSR, USSR.

3.
( ) Nationality: Soviet Ethnic: Germari Religion: none.

4.
( ') Knowledge of languages and proficiency: Russian (N), German


(FL).
5.
( ) Unit formation or organization: 1 MR Sqd (MRS), 2 MR Plt (MRP), 3 MR Co (MRC) 3 MR Bn (MRB), 44 MR Regt (MRR), 32 MR Div (MRD), (1~~~/2/3/3/44/32~~~).

6.
( Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances of capture: 221800ZAug 85, NB655498, 1st ~lt/~/2/1/23


Div (ARMD), captured during a counterattack across the main road northwest of BAUHAUS (~~662495).
B ( CAREER:
1 ( ) Premi1ita.r~: 10 years civilian education, c ivil~an occupation: coal miner.
2. ( ) Military: 5 years military service, attended NCO school in July 1982.
(DOWN GRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS)
C. ( ASSESSMENT 01- INTELLIGENCE VALUE:
1.
( ) Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: Source was
of average intelligence; experience is rated good; source was cooperative,
answering all questions; reliability is rated good as no discrepancies were
noted by use of repeat and control questions.


2.
( ) Special knowledge: None

3.
( ) Discussion of approach technique: Source cooperated on the direct approach.


D. ( DOCUMENTS CARRILD AT TIME OF CAPTURE:
1.
( ) List of documents: 1 x Enemy ID card (1634921) (returned to source).

2.
( ) Details of money and valuables: None


E. ( ) EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE.
1.
( ) Personal equipment: 1 x ShM protective mask (returned to source).

2.
( ) Weapons: 1 x 7.62mm AKM, 3 x empty magazines (evacuated through supply channels)


PART I1 -INFORMATION OBTAINED
A. ( ) DO1 is 221800ZAug 85 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.
B. ( ) TEXT:
1. ( ) MISSIONS:
a. ( EPW:
(1)
( ) Time of capture: Taking part in the defense of Hill 456.

(2)
( ) Future: Continue to defend Hill 456.

(3)
( Past: Participate in the assault against NATO forces on Hill 456.

b.
( ) Unit: MRD).

(1)
( ) Present: Defend ill 456 w/antitank ~lt/3/44/32 MRD in support.

(2)
( ) Future: cbntinue to defend Hill 456 until ordered to rejoin 3 MRc/3/44/32MR~.

(3)
( ) Past: Assault and secure ill 456; set up perimeter defense.

c.
( ) Unit: (Arnph Tank Co, Recon Bn, 32 MILD).

(1)
( ) Present: Reconnoiter and secure river crossing sites (no. unk) on the west side of the Fulda River, SW of BEBRA (~~5547)


(2~~~/3/,3/44/32
NLT 232300ZAug 85. (HIS U/I Sqd Ldr, Amph Tank Co. DOI: 220900ZAug 85.)
(2)
( Future: Unk.

(3)
( ) Past: Unk.


2. ( ) COMPOSITION: (32 MRD and u/I MRL unit).
a.
( ) 32 EW) had 44 MRR and 1 x Recon Bn.

h.
( ) MRD had 3 x MRD, dsg 1, 2, and


4 ~~~132 3.
c.
( ) 3 MRR/44/32 MRD had 3 x MRC, dsg 1, 2, 3 and 1 x AT Plt.

d.
( ) 3 ~~C/3/44/32 had a Co tQ and 3 x MRP, dsg 1, 2, and 3.


PtRD
e. ( ) MRL) had 3 x EIRS, dsg 1, 2, and 3.
Ea ~~~/3/3/44/32
f.
( ) Recon Bn/32 PW had 1 x Amph Tank Co.

g.
( ) U/I MRL unit.


3. ( ) STKENGTH: (3 ~iRC/3/44/32 MRD).
a. ( ) Personnel: (3 HRC)
(1)
( ) 3 MRC had 103 x pers. (6 x OFF, 102 x EM) (HISPlt Sgc, 2 MR11/3 ERC, DOI: 201800ZAug 85).

(2)
( ) Co HQ/3 MRC had 9 x pers. (3 x Of f--CO, PO, TO 6 x EM--lSG, BPW driver, BblP gunner, 1 x PKM gunner, and 2 x riflemen).

(3)
( 2 MKP/~ bIRC had 33 x pers. (1 x Off--Plt Ldr, 32 x EM--Plt Sgt and 31 x Plt mbrs).

(4)
( ) 1 ~lRS/2/3/ MRC had 10 x pers. (Sqd Ldr, sniper, WG-7 gunner, 2 x PKM gunners, BlIP driver, BMP gunner, and 3 x riflemen).


b* ( Weapons and equipment: (3bEC).
(1)
( ) Individual weapons: (1 MRS/2/3 MRC).

(a) ( ) 1 x 9mm PM, carried by BMP driver.

(b)
( ) 1 x 7.b2mrn AKM, 1 x ea EM except BMP driver,
sniper, and PKM gunners.


(c) ( ) 1 x 7.62mm SVD, carried by sniper.

(2)
( ) Crew-served weapons: MRC)


(IEIRS/~/~ .
(a)
( ) 2 x 7.62mm PKM, 1 x ea PKM gunner.

(b)
( ) 1 x 85mm RPG-7 ATGL, carried by RPG-7 gunner.


(3)
(.) Other weapons: (lMRs/2/3 MRC) Approx 50 x F-1 hand grenades, 5 x ea member, 1 MRS.

(4)
( ) Armored vehicles: (2~~~13 3 x BMP, ea armed with


MRC) 1 x 73mm smoothbore gun, 1 x 7.62mm PKT, and 1 x AT-3 launcher, 1 x ea MRS/~MRP.
(5)
( ) Other vehicles: Notie.

~MKP/~MRC)

(6)
( ) Ccmmunications equipment: 3 x R-123


(~MRP/~MRC) transceivers, 1 x ea BMP/~MRP.
(7)
( ) NBC equipment: (3MRC).

(a)
( ) Individual: Ea mbr had 1 x ShM protective mask, 1 x set U/I protective clothi.ng, and 1 individual decon kit.

(b)
( ) Vehicular: Ea vehicle had 1 x air filtration sys tem.

(8)
( Specialized equipment: Unk.


4. ( ) DISPOSITIONS:
a. ( ) CP, 3 MRc/3/44/32M~~ location vicinity NB660495, in the last house on light sllrface road at SW edge of BAUHAUS (~~6649).security measures and collocated units: UNK. (HIS Plt Sgt, 2~1~~/3/3/44/32 220800ZAug
MRD DOI: 85.)
b.
( ) U/I deployment of 6 x 122mm howitzers from NB651491 approx 500 meters N along a light surface road to 14B654494. Guns were pointing west. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 220930ZAug85.

c.
,( ) U/I convoy of 10 x T-72 Tanks from NB659495 to NB654496,


traveling W along secondary road. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 221600ZAu~ 85.
5. ( ) (2~1~~/3/3/4432hlR~)
TACTICS: Defensive tactics used by the 21iRP
at Hill 456 were based on the use of boiling oil and catapulting large stones
over the perimeter.
6.
( ) TRAINING: (3M~C/3/44/32MRll) Political training by the PO, 3MRC had since 1 Aug 85 involved increased emphasis on perfidy of the NATO Alliance and especially the FRG in planning an invasion of the GDR.

7.
( ) COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: (3M.~C/3/44/32MRD).


a. ( ) Losses: (2bRS/2/3MRC).
(1)
( ) Personnel: 1 x KIA on 21 Aug 85, when the 2 MRS BMP was destroyed by an U/I US missile.

(2)
( Equipment: The 2 MRS BMP was completely destroyed by
the same U/I US missile on 21 Aug 85.


(1)
( ) Personnel: 1 x EM arrived as replacements for 2 MRS/2/3 MRC at 221430ZAug 85. The replacements arrived already formed in a MRS and appeared to be well-trained troops.

(2)
( ) Equipment: A new BlIP arrived at 221430ZAug 85.

c.
( ) Combat experience: None prior to current offensive.

d.
( ) Morale: (3MRC) Morale in the 3 1.IItC was excellent, due to
successes in the early stages of the offensive.


e.
( ) Additional information: None.


8. ( LOGISTICS: (~MRC/~/~~/~ZMRD).
a. ( ) Weapons and ammunition: (2MRP/3MRC).
(1)
( ) Weapons: All weapons are in good condition. Spare parts for all weapons were scored in the BFLP. No shortages of weapons.

(2)
( ) Ammunition: All ammunition in the 2 MRP was in good condition and in adequate supply.

b.
( ) Vehicles and POL: (3MKC).

(1)
( ) Vehicles: All BMPs were in good condition. Each BMP carries its own spare parts and tool kit.

(2)
( ) POL: POL resupply to the 3 MRC is delivered by truck of an U/I unit each evening at about 2000 hours. No shortages of POL.

c.
( Food and water (3MRC).

(1)
( ) Food: Since 17 Aug 85 all personnel have been eating canned rations. There were no shortages of food. Last resupply of food was at 2120uOZAug 85.

(2)
( ) Water: Water was available from water trucks of an U/I unit which arrived at the CP, 3MRC each evening at 2030 hours. No shortages of water.

d.
( ) Cmrnunicatioils equipment. (~MRP/~MRC) transceivers


All wdre in good working order.
e. ( ) Other: (3MRC).
(1)
( ) Medical: Each mbr had 1 x individual first aid kit.

(2)
( ) NBC: All individual and vehicular NBC gear was in excellent condition, since it had been inspected in early Aug 85.


9.
( ) ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA: None.

10.
( ) NISCELLANEOUS: (3~~~/3/44/32M~~).


a. ( Personalities: (3MRC).
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MN/I RANK POSN F E HOFBAUEK FNU MNU CPt CO 3MRC
t
KAEMPERT PNU MNU SrSgt 1 SG 3MRC BECK Co slno s MNU JrLt PltLdr ~MRP/~MRL GUCIiENKO Franz MNU SrS,t PltLdr ~MRP/~MRC
b.
( i Code narne./code number: Unk.

c.
( ) Radio frequencies/call signs: ( MRC).


(1)
( ) Radio frequencies for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: Primary, 16.90 MHz; Alternate, 18.75 MHz. Frequencies are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOI.

(2)
( ) Call signs: (~MRP/~MRC) for 22 Aug 85


Call signs were as follows: ~MRs/~MRP,AFCS 25; ZMRS/PMRP, AFCS 22, ~MRs/ZMRP, AFCS 19. Call signs are changed at 2400 ho~rs daily by unit SOI.
d. ( ) Passwords: Challenge for 22 Aug 85 is DZIEN; countersign is
DOBRY. Both are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOP.
e. ( Obstacles: Unk.
f. ( ) PSYOP: Unk.

APPENDIX H
Approaches
DIRECT APPROACH
The direct approach is the questioning of a source without having to use any type of approach. The direct approach is often called no approach at all, but it is the most effective of all the approaches. Statistics tell us that in World War 11, it was 85 percent to 95 percent effective. In Vietnam, it was 90 percent to 95 percent effective. The direct approach works best on lower enlisted per- sonnel as they have little or no resistance training and have had minimal security training. Due to its effectiveness, the direct approach is always to be tried first. The direct approach usually achieves the maxi- mum cooperation in the minimum amount of time and enables the interrogator to quickly and completely exploit the source for the information he possesses. The advantages of this technique are its sim-plicity and the fact that it takes little time. For this reason, it is frequently used at the tactical echelons where time is limited.
INCENTIVE APPROACH
The incentive approach is a method of rewarding the source for his cooperation, but it must reinforce ~ositive behavior. This is done by satisfying the source's needs. Granting incentives to an uncooperative source leads him to believe that rewards can be gained whether he cooperates or not. Interrogators may not withhold a source's rights under the Geneva Conventions, but they can withhold a source's privileges. The granting of incentives must not infringe on the Geneva Conventions, but they can be things to which the source is already entitled to. This can be effective onlv if the
"
source is unaware of his rights or privileges.
Incentives must seem to be logical and possible. An interrogator must not promise anything that cannot be delivered. Interro- gators do not make promises, but usually infer them while still sidestepping guaran- tees. If an interrogator made a promise that he could not keep and he or another inter- rogator had to talk with the source again, the source would not have any trust and would most probably not cooperate. Instead of promising unequivocably that a source will receive a certain thing, such as political asylum, an interrogator will offer to do what he can to help achieve the source's desired goal; as long as the source cooperates.
The incentive approach can be broken down into the incentive short term (recej immediately) and incentive long term (received within a period of time). The determination rests on when the source expects to receive the incentive offered.
EMOTIONAL APPROACH
The emotional approach overrides the source's rationale for resisting by using and manipulating his emotions against him. The main emotions of any source at the time of capture might be either love or fear. Love or fear for one person may be ex- ploited or turned into hate for someone else. For example, the person who caused the source to be in the position in which he now finds himself. The source's fear can be built upon, or increased so as to override his rational side. If the situation demands it and the source's fear is so great that he cannot communicate with the interrogator, the interrogator may find that he has to decrease the source's fear in order to effec- tively collect information from him. There are two variations of the emotional approaches: Emotional love, emotional hate.
EMOTIONAL LOVE APPROACH
For the emotional love approach to be successful, the interrogator must focus on the anxiety felt by the source about the cir- cumstances in which he finds himself. The interrogator must direct the love the source feels toward the appropriate object: family, homeland, comrades, and so forth. If the interrogator can show the source what the source himself can do to alter or improve his situation, the approach has a chance of success. This approach usually involves some incentive; such as communication with the source's family, a quicker end to the war to save his comrades' lives, and so forth. A good interrogator will usually orchestrate some futility with an emotional love approach to hasten the source's reach- ing the breaking point. Sincerity and con- viction are extremely important in a suc- cessful attempt at an emotional love approach as the interrogator must show genuine concern for the source and for the object to which the interrogator is directing the source's emotion. If the interrogator ascertains that the source has great love for his unit and fellow soldiers, he can effec- tively exploit the situations by explaining to the source that his providing information may shorten the war or battle in progress, thus saving many of his comrades' lives. But, his. refusal to talk may cause their deaths. This places a burden on the source and may motivate him to seek relief through cooperation with the interrogator.
EMOTIONAL HATE APPROACH
The emotional hate approach focuses on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire for revenge, the source may feel. The interroga- tor must correctly pick up on exactly what it is that the source may hate so that the emo- tion can be exploited to override the source's rational side. The source may have negative feelings about his country's regime, his immediate superiors, officers in general, or his fellow soldiers. This approach is usually most effective on a member of racial or reli- gious minorities who has suffered discrimi- nation in both service and civilian life. If a source feels that he has been treated unfairly in his unit, the interrogator can point out that if the source cooperates and divulges the location of that unit, the unit can be destroyed, thus affording the source an opportunity for revenge. By using a con- spiratorial tone of voice, the interrogator can enhance the value of this technique. Phrases, such as "You owe them no loyalty for the way they have treated you," when used appropriately, can expedite the success of this techn:q ue.
1

One word of caution, do not immediately begin to berate a certain facet of the source's background or life until your assessment indicates that the source feels a negative emotion toward it. The emotional hate approach can be much more effectively used by drawing out the source's negative emotions with questions that elicit a thought-provoking response. For example, "Why do you think they allowed you to be captured?" or "Why do you think they left you to die?" Do not berate the source's forces or homeland unless you are certain of his negative emotions. Many sources may have great love for their country, but still may hate the regime in control. The emo- tional hate approach is most effective with the immature or timid source who may have no opportunity up to this point for revenge, or never had the courage to voice his feelings.
INCREASED FEAR UP
APPROACH

The increased fear up approach is most effective on the younger and more inexperi- enced source or on a source who appears nervous or frightened. It is also effective on a source who appears to be the silent, confi- dent type. Sources with something to hide, such as the commission of a war crime, or having surrendered while still having ammunition in his weapon, or breaking his military oath are particularly easy to break with this technique. There are two distinct variations of this approach: the fear up (harsh) and the fear up (mild).
FEAR UP (HARSH)
In the fear up (harsh) approach, the inter- rogator behaves in a heavy, overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice. The interrogator may even feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the source's implanted feelings of fear. Great care must be taken when doing this so that any actions taken would not violate the Geneva Conventions. This technique is to convince the source that he does indeed have something to fear and that he has no option but to cooperate. A good interrogator will implant in the source's mind that the interrogator himself is not the object to be feared, but is a possible way out of the trap.
The fear can be directed toward reprisals by international tribunals, the government of the host country, or the source's own forces. Shouting can be very effective in this varia- tion of the fear up approach.
FEAR UP (MILD)
The fear up (mild) approach is better suited to the strong, confident type of inter- rogator as there is generally no need to raise the voice or resort to heavy-handed, table banging violence. It is a more correct form of blackmail when the circumstances indicate that the source does indeed have something to fear. It may be a result of coincidence; the soldier was ca.ught on the wrong side of the border before hostilities actually commenced (he was armed, he could be a terrorist), or a result of his actions (he surrendered contrary to his mili- tary oath and is now a traitor to his coun- try, and his own forces will take care of the disciplinary action). The fear up (mild) approach must be a credible distortion of the truth. A distortion that the source will believe. It usually involves some incentive; the interrogator can intimate that he might be willing to alter the circumstances of the source's capture, as long as the source coop- erates and answers the questions.
In most cases, shouting is not necessary. The actual fear is increased by helping the source to realize the unpleasant conse- quences that the facts may cause and then presenting an alternative, which of course can be effected by answering some simple questions. The fear up approach is dead- end, and a wise interrogator may want to keep it in reserve as a trump card. After working to increase the source's fear, it would be difficult to convince him that everything will be all right if the approach is not successful.
DECREASED FEAR DOWN
APPROACH

The decreased fear down approach is used primarily on a source who is already in a state of fear due to the horrible circum- stances of his capture, or on a source who is in fear for his life. This technique is really nothing more than calming the source and convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated, or that for him the war is mercifully over and he need not go into combat again. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rap- port and usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate. While calming the source, it is a good idea to stay initially with nonpertinent conversation and to care- fully avoid the subject which has caused the source's fear. This works quickly in develop- ing rapport and communication as the source will readily respond to kindness.
When using this approach, it is important that the interrogator meets the source at the source's perspective level and not expect the source to come up to the interrogator's per- spective level. If a prisoner is so frightened that he has withdrawn into a shell or regressed back to a less threatening state of mind, the interrogator must break through to him. This may be effected by the interro- gator putting himself on the same physical level as the source and may require some physical contact. As the source relaxes somewhat and begins to respond to the interrogator's kindness, the interrogator can then begin asking pertinent questions.
This approach technique may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing the source that he has nothing to fear, he may cease to be afraid and may feel secure enough to resist the interrogator's pertinent questions. If this occurs, reverting to a harsher approach technique usually will rapidly bring the desired result to the interrogator.
PRIDE AND EGO APPROACH
The pride and ego approach concentrates on tricking the source into revealing perti- nent information by using flattery or abuse. It is effective with a source who has dis- played weaknesses or feelings of inferiority which can be effectively exploited by the interrogator. There are two techniques in this approach: the pride and ego up approach and the pride and ego down approach.
A problem with the pride and ego approach techniques is that since both variations rely on trickery, the source will eventually realize that he has been tricked and may refuse to cooperate further. If this occurs, the interrogator can easily move into a fear up approach and convince the source that the questions he has already answered have committed him, and it would be useless to resist further. The inter- rogator can mention that it will be reported to the source's forces that he has cooperated fully with the enemy, and he or his family may suffer possible retribution when this becomes known, and the source has much to fear if he is returned to his forces. This may even offer the interrogator the option to go into a love-of-family approach in that the source must protect his family by pre- venting his forces from learning of his duplicity or collaboration. Telling the source that you will not report the fact that the prisoner talked or that he was a severe discipline problem is an incentive that may enhance the effectiveness of the approach.
PRIDE AND EGO UP APPROACH
The pride and ego up approach is most effective on sources with little or no intelli- gence or on those who have been looked down upon for a long time. It is very effec- tive on low ranking enlisted personnel and junior grade officers as it allows the source to finally show someone that he does indeed have some "brains." The source is con- stantly flattered into providing certain information in order to gain credit. The interrogator must take care to use a flatter-ing somewhat-in-awe tone of voice and to speak highly of the source throughout the duration of this approach. This quickly engenders positive feelings on the source's part as he has probably been looking for this type of fecognition all his life. The interrogator may blow things out of propor- tion using items from the source's back- ground and making them seen noteworthy or important. As everyone is eager to hear themselves praised, the source will eventu- ally "rise to the occasion" and in an attempt to solicit more laundatory comments from the interrogator, reveal pertinent information.
Effective targets for a successful pride and ego up approach are usually the socially accepted reasons for flattery: appearance, good military bearing, and so forth. The interrogator should closely watch the source's demeanor for indications that the approach is getting through to him. Such indications include, but are not limited to, a raising of the head, a look of pride in the eyes, a swelling of the chest, or a stiffening of the back.
PRIDE AND EGO DOWN
APPROACH

The pride and ego down approach is based on the interrogator attacking the source's sense of personal worth. Any source who shows any real or imagined inferiority or weakness about himself, his loyalty to his organization, or his capture in embarrassing circumstances can be easily broken with this approach technique. The objective is for the interrogator to pounce on the source's sense of pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness. This will usually goad the source into becoming defensive, and he will try to convince the interrogator that he is wrong. In his attempt to redeem his pride, the source will usually involuntarily provide pertinent information in attempting to vindicate himself. The source who is susceptible to this approach is also prone to make excuses and give reasons why he did or did not do a certain thing, often shifting the blame to others. Possible targets for the pride and ego down approach are the source's loyalty, technical competence, leadership abilities, soldierly qualities, or appearance. If the interrogator uses a sarcastic, caustic tone of voice with appro- priate expressions of distaste or disgust, the source will readily believe him.
One word of caution, the pride and ego down approach is also a dead end in that, if it is unsuccessful, it is very difficult for the interrogator to recover and move to another approach and reestablish a different type of rapport without losing all credibility.
FUTILITY TECHNIQUE
APPROACH

The futility approach is used to make the source believe that it is useless to resist and to persuade him to cooperate with the interrogator. The futility approach is most effective when the interrogator can play on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. There are really many different variations of the futility approach. There is the futility of the personal situation "you are not finished here until you answer the questions," futility in that "everyone talks sooner or later," futility of the battlefield situation, and futility in the sense that if the source does not mind talking about history, why should he mind talking about his missions, they are also history.
If the source's unit had run out of supplies (ammunition, food, fuel, and so forth), it would be relatively easy to convince him that all of his forces are having the same logistical problems. A soldier who has been ambushed may have doubts as to how he was attacked so suddenly and the interrogator should be able to easily talk him into believing that the NATO forces knew where he was all the time.
The interrogator might describe the source's frightening recollections of seeing death on the battlefield as an everyday occurrence for his forces all up and down the lines. Factual or seemingly factual information must be presented by the interrogator in a persuasive, logical manner and in a matter-of-fact tone of voice.
Making the situation appear hopeless allows the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating with the interrogator. When employing this technique, the interrogator must not only be fortified with factual information, but he should also be aware of, and be able to exploit, the source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses.
Another way of using the futility approach is to blow things out of propor- tion. If the source's unit was low on, or had exhausted, all food supplies, he can be easily led to believe that all of his forces had run out of food. If the source is hinging on cooperating, it may aid the interrogation effort if he is told that all the other source's have already cooperated. A source who may want to help save his comrades' lives may need to be convinced that the situation on the battlefield is hopeless, and that they all will die without his assistance. The futility approach is used to paint a black picture for the prisoner, but it is not effective in and of itself in gaining the source's cooperation. The futility approach must be orchestrated with other approach techniques.
"WE KNOW ALL" APPROACH
The "we know all" approach convinces the source that we already know every- thing. It is a very successful approach for sources who are naive, in a state of shock, or in a state of fear. The interrogator must organize all available data on the source including background information, knowl- edge about the source's immediate tactical situation, and all available OB information on the source's unit. Upon initial contact with the source, the interrogator asks ques- tions, pertinent and nonpertinent, from his specially prepared list. When the source hesitates, refuses to answer, provides an incomplete response, or an incorrect response, the interrogator himself supplies the detailed answer. Through the careful use of the limited number of known details, the interrogator must convince the source that all information is already known; therefore, his answers are of no conse- quence. It is by repeating this procedure that the interrogator convinces the source that resistance is useless as everything is already known. When the source begins to give accurate and complete information to the questions to which the interrogator has the answers, the interrogator begins inter- jecting questions for which he does not have the answers. After gaining the source's cooperation, the interrogator still tests the extent of that cooperation by peri-, odically using questions for which he has the answers. This is very necessary; if the interrogator does not challenge the source when he is lying, the source will then know that everything is not known, and that he has been tricked. He may then provide incorrect answers to the interrogator's questions.
There are some inherent problems with the use of the "we know all" approach. The interrogator is required to prepare everything in detail which is very time consuming. He must commit much of the information to memory as working from notes may show the limits of the information actually known.
"ESTABLISH YOUR IDENTITY" APPROACH
The "establish your identity" approach was very effective in Viet Nam with the Viet Cong, and it can be used at tactical echelons. The interrogator must be aware, however, that if used in conjunction with the file and dossier approach, it may exceed the tactical interrogator's preparation resources. In this technique, the inter- rogator insists that the source has been identified as an infamous criminal wanted by higher authorities on very serious charges, and he has finally been caught posing as someone else. In order to clear himself of these allegations, the source will usually have to supply detailed information on his unit to establish or substantiate his true identity. The interrogator should initially refuse to believe the source and insist that he is the criminal wanted by the ambiguous "higher authorities." This will force the source to give even more detailed information about his unit in order to convince the interrogator that he is indeed who he says he is. This approach works well when combined with the futility or "we know all" approach.
REPETITION APPROACH
Repetition is used to induce cooperation from a hostile source. In one variation of this technique the interrogator listens carefully to a source's answer to a question, and then repeats both the question and answer several times. He does this with each succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored with the procedure that he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the interrogator and to gain relief from the monotony of his method of questioning. The repetition technique must be used carefully, as it will generally not work when employed against introverted sources or those having great self-control. In fact, it may provide an opportunity for a source to regain his composure and delay the interrogation. In employing this technique, the use of more than one interrogator or a tape recorder has proven to be effective.
FILE AND DOSSIER
APPROACH

The file and dossier approach is when the interrogator prepares a dossier containing all available information obtained from records and documents concerning the source or his organization. Careful ar- rangement of the material within the file may give the illusion that it contains more data than what is actually there. The file may be padded with extra paper, if neces- sary. Index tabs with titles such as educa- tion, employment, criminal record, military service, and others are particularly effec- tive. The interrogator confronts the source with the dossiers at the beginning of the interrogation and explains to him that intelligence has provided a complete record of every significant happening in the source's life; therefore, it would be useless to resist interrogation. The interrogator may read a few selected bits of known data to further impress the source. If the technique is successful, the source will be impressed with the voluminous file, conclude that everything is known, and resign himself to complete cooperation during the interro- gation. The success of this technique is largely dependent on the naivete of the source, the volume of data on the subject, and the skill of the interrogator in convincing the source.
"MUTTAND JEFF" ("FRIEND AND FOE") APPROACH
The "Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe") approach involves a psychological ploy which takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and guilt which a source has as a result of being detained and questioned. Use of this technique necessitates the employment of two experienced interrogators who are convincing actors. Basically, the two interrogators will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward the source. For example, the first interrogator is very formal and displays an unsympathetic attitude toward the source. He might be strict and order the source to follow all military courtesies during questioning. The goal of the technique is to make the source feel cut off from his friends.
At the time the source acts hopeless and alone, the second interrogator appears (having received his cue by a hidden signal or by listening and observing out of view of the source), scolds the first interrogator for his harsh behavior, and orders him from the room. He then apologizes to soothe the source, perhaps offering him coffee and a cigarette. He explains that the actions of the first interrogator were largely the result of an inferior intellect and lack of human sensitivity. The inference is created that the second interrogator and the source have, in common, a high degree of intelligence and an awareness of human sensitivity above and beyond that of the first interrogator.
The source is normally inclined to have a feeling of gratitude toward the second interrogator, who continues to show a sympathetic attitude toward the source in an effort to increase the rapport and control the questioning which will follow. Should the source's cooperation begin to fade, the second interrogator can hint that since he is of high rank, having many other duties, he cannot afford to waste time on an uncooperative source. He may broadly infer that the first interrogator might return to continue his questioning. When used against the proper source, this trick will normally gain the source's complete cooperation.
RAPID FIRE APPROACH
The rapid fire approach involves a psychological ploy based upon the principles that everyone likes to be heard when he speaks, and it is confusing to be interrupted in midsentence with an un- related question. This technique may be used by an individual interrogator or simultaneously by two or more interro- gators in questioning the same source. In employing this technique the interrogator asks a series of questions in such a manner that the source does not have time to answer a question completely before the next question is asked. This tends to confuse the source, and he is apt to contradict himself, as he has little time to prepare his answers. The interrogator then confronts the source with the inconsis- tencies, causing further contradictions. In many instances, the source will begin to talk freely in an attempt to explain himself and deny the inconsistencies pointed out by the interrogator. In attempting to explain his answers, the source is likely to reveal more than he intends, thus creating additional leads for further interrogation.
The interrogator must have all his ques- tions prepared before approaching the source, because long pauses between ques- tions allow the source to complete his answers and render this approach ineffec- tive. Besides extensive preparation, this technique requires an experienced, compe- tent interrogator, who has comprehensive knowledge of ,his case, and fluency in the language of the source. This technique is most effective immediately after capture, because of the confused state of the source.
SILENCE APPROACH
The silence approach may be successful when employed against either the nervous or the confident-type source. When employ- ing this technique, the interrogator says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the source, but force him to break eye contact first. The source will become nervous, begin to shift around in his chair, cross and recross his legs, and look away. He may ask questions, but the interrogator should not answer until he is ready to break the silence. The source may blurt out questions such as, "Come on now, what do you want with me?" When the interrogator is ready to break the silence, he may do so with some nonchalant question such as, "You planned this operation a long time, didn't you? Was it your idea?" The interrogator must be patient when employ- ing this technique. It may appear for a while that the technique is not succeeding, but it usually will when given a reasonable chance.
Appendix I
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix I - cont.
Appendix J
EXPLOITATION PROCESS
21. CED will be exploited through the following process but, whenever feasible, in order to expedite the handling, the processing stages may be combined.
a.
Preliminary screening and reporting of information of immediate tacti- cal value by capturing unit.

b.
Complementary examination, translation, categorization (see para 181, reporting, reproduction and dissemination by or for intelligence staffs.

c.
Detailed exploitation and further reporting, reproduction and dis-


semination by CDU or other special elements. MARKING OF CED
22. The capturing unit will tag or otherwise mark the CED as follows: National identifying letters as prescribed in STANAG 1059. Designation of capturing unit including service. Serial number of the CED. This will consist of a number allocated sequentially by the capturing unit.
Date-time of captur-
Place of capture (UTM co-ordinates).
Summary of circumstances~under which the CED was obtained.
Interrogation serial number of any associated PW, if appropriate or
known.

25. Reproduction and dissemination of CED and translation as necessary will be carried out at the earliest possible stage of the exploitation process. Copies of CED considered of interest or translations thereof and lists of exploited documents, whether disseminated or not, will be submitted to appropriat-e NATO and national staffs.
APPENDIX B
Sample Detainee Personnel Record
DETAINEE PERSONNEL RECORD
wywlm of Mtdl~l
31. REMARKS 37. PnOTO
PHOTO (Ront V1.u) PHOTO IRUht R0lD.l
3m. PREPARED BV llndividvol and unit1 30. SIGNATURE
40. DATE PREPARED 41. PLACE
DA FORM 4237-R, Aug 85 EDITION OF MAV 81 18 OMOLLTL
.-

APPENDIX C
Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card
I
DATE ISSUE0
I I
EPW IDENTITY CARD
I For uaa of th~a form. uAR 190-8; 1
thm proponant aoancv la OC SPER.

LAST NAME
FIRST NAME IGRAOE SERVICE NUMBER 'POWER SERTEO
I 1
I
PLACE OF BIRTH
SIGNATURE OF BEARER
APPENDIX E

Sample JINTACCS SALUTE Report Format and Report

SALUTE REPORT FORMAT
TO: DTG:
FROM: REPORT NO:

1.
SIZE/WHO:

2.
ACTIVITY/WHAT:

3.
LOCATION/WHERE :

4.
UNIT/WHO:

5.
TIMEINHEN:

6.
EQUIPMENT/HOW :

7.
REMARKS


a.
SOURCE:

b.
MAP DATA:


APPENDIX F
Sample Screening Report Format and Report
REPORT FORMAT
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SCREENING REPORT
Report Number: ~ate/~ime:
PART I. INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE

A. PREVIOUS SCPEENING/INTERROGATION REPORTS (~nit/Report No.)
B. CAPTURE DATA
1.
Captive Tag Number:

2.
Capturing Unit:

3.
~ate/~ime Capture:


of
4.
Place of Capture:

5.
Documents Captured isp position):

6.
Equipment Captured/ Disposition:


I
I 7. Circumstances of Capture:
C. BIOGRAPHIC' INFORMATION
I
1 1. Full Name / Rank / Service Number: I
I
2. Date / Place of Birth: ~ 3. Sex / Marital Status / Religion: 4. Full Unit Designation / Unit Code:
~
1 5. Duty Position:
Sample Screening Report F-2
APPENDIX G

Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report

TACTICAL INTERROGATION
REPORT FORMAT

(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
TACT IC AL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NAME OF PRISONER: INTERROGATOR:
CATEGORY: A B C D UNIT/FORMATION TO WHICH
INTERROGATOR ATTACHED:
INTG SERIAL NO:. MAPS USED
DTG OF INTG: LANGUAGE USED:
INTG REPORT NO: INTERPRETER: PART I -INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR
A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:
1.
Rank, full name, service number, and position:

2.
Date and place of birth:

3.
Nationality: Ethnic: Religion:

4.
Knowledge of languages and proficiency:

5.
Unit formation or organization:

6.
Date, time, place (grid references), capturing unit, and circumstances of capture:


B. CAREER:
1.
Premilitary:

2.
Military:


C. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE: (CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
(3)
Past:

c.
hit: (full unit designation):

(1)
Present:

(2)
Future:

(3)
Past:


2. COMPOSI'rTON (Level of knowledgeability) and (unidentified, full unit designation unknown if applicable):
a.
(tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (~2, directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation):

b.
(tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had (c2, directly subordinate Attached--full unit designation, detached--full unit designation) :


3. STRENGTH: (level of knowledgeahility):
a. Personnel: (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1)
(Tie-in to level of knowledgeahility) had. ..(number x total personnel, number X officers/enlisted, duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of attachedldetached personnel :

(2)
(Tie-in to level of knowledgeability) had...(numher x total personnel, nurnher X off icerslenlisted ,duty positions, as appropriate, full unit designation of at tachedldetached personnel:


(NOTE: Duty Positions: Only obtained for headquarters elemnts, squads, sections, teams, and record duty positions of officers/senior enlisted member for platoons if there is no platoon headquarters).
h. Weapons and eqriipment (level of knowledgeahili ty) :
(1)
Individual weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahili ty):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):

(h)
Number x f'ull military nomenclature, distribution):

(2)
Crew-served weapons (tie-in to level of knowledgeahilitv):

(a)
Number x full military nomenclature, distribution):


(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
4. DISPOSITIONS:
a.
Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, 6-digit grid coordinate--physical description, security measures, date of informat'ion. (HIS):

b.
Activity, full unit designation, located vicinity, collocated activities, 6-digit grid coordinate -physical description, security measures, DOI. (HIS):


5. TACTICS (level of knowledgeability) :
a.
Offensive:

b.
Defensive:

c.
Special operations:


6. TRAINING (level of knowledgeability) :
a.
Individual:

b.
Unit:

c.
Special:


7. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (level of knowledgeabili ty) :
a. Losses (tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :
(1)
Personnel:

(2)
Equipment:

b.
Replacements and Reinforcements (tie-in to level of
knowledgeability) :


(1)
Personnel:

(2)
Equipment:

c.
Combat experience ( tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :

d.
Morale ( tie-in to level of knowledgeability) :


8. LOGISTICS (level of kn~wled~eability):
a. Weapons and ammunition (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):
(1) Weapons:
(CLASSIFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)

(CLASSIFLCATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
b. Code names/numbers (tie-in to level of knowledgeabili ty) :
(1)
Code name:

(2)
Code number:

c.
Radio frequencies/call signs (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1)
Radio frequency:

(2)
Call sign:

d.
Passwords (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

e.
Obstacles (tie-in to level of knowledgeability):

(1)
Enemy:

(2)
NATO;

f.
PSYOP (tie-in to level of knowledgeability).

(1)
Enemy:

(2)
NATO:


(CLASS IFICATION) WORKING PAPERS (DATE)
-

C. ( ASSESSMENT 01- INTELLIGENCE VALUE:
1.
( ) Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: Source was
of average intelligence; experience is rated good; source was cooperative,
answering all questions; reliability is rated good as no discrepancies were
noted by use of repeat and control questions.


2.
( ) Special knowledge: None

3.
( ) Discussion of approach technique: Source cooperated on the direct approach.


D. ( DOCUMENTS CARRILD AT TIME OF CAPTURE:
1.
( ) List of documents: 1 x Enemy ID card (1634921) (returned to source).

2.
( ) Details of money and valuables: None


E. ( ) EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE.
1.
( ) Personal equipment: 1 x ShM protective mask (returned to source).

2.
( ) Weapons: 1 x 7.62mm AKM, 3 x empty magazines (evacuated through supply channels)


PART I1 -INFORMATION OBTAINED
A. ( ) DO1 is 221800ZAug 85 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this report.
B. ( ) TEXT:
1. ( ) MISSIONS:
a. ( EPW:
(1)
( ) Time of capture: Taking part in the defense of Hill 456.

(2)
( ) Future: Continue to defend Hill 456.

(3)
( Past: Participate in the assault against NATO forces on Hill 456.

b.
( ) Unit: MRD).


(2~~~/3/,3/44/32 b* ( Weapons and equipment: (3bEC).
(1)
( ) Individual weapons: (1 MRS/2/3 MRC).

(a) ( ) 1 x 9mm PM, carried by BMP driver.

(b)
( ) 1 x 7.b2mrn AKM, 1 x ea EM except BMP driver,
sniper, and PKM gunners.


(c) ( ) 1 x 7.62mm SVD, carried by sniper.

(2)
( ) Crew-served weapons: MRC)


(IEIRS/~/~ .
(a)
( ) 2 x 7.62mm PKM, 1 x ea PKM gunner.

(b)
( ) 1 x 85mm RPG-7 ATGL, carried by RPG-7 gunner.


(3)
(.) Other weapons: (lMRs/2/3 MRC) Approx 50 x F-1 hand grenades, 5 x ea member, 1 MRS.

(4)
( ) Armored vehicles: (2~~~13 3 x BMP, ea armed with


MRC) 1 x 73mm smoothbore gun, 1 x 7.62mm PKT, and 1 x AT-3 launcher, 1 x ea MRS/~MRP.
(5)
( ) Other vehicles: Notie.

~MKP/~MRC)

(6)
( ) Ccmmunications equipment: 3 x R-123


(~MRP/~MRC) transceivers, 1 x ea BMP/~MRP.
(7)
( ) NBC equipment: (3MRC).

(a)
( ) Individual: Ea mbr had 1 x ShM protective mask, 1 x set U/I protective clothi.ng, and 1 individual decon kit.

(b)
( ) Vehicular: Ea vehicle had 1 x air filtration sys tem.

(8)
( Specialized equipment: Unk.


4. ( ) DISPOSITIONS:
a. ( ) CP, 3 MRc/3/44/32M~~ location vicinity NB660495, in the last house on light sllrface road at SW edge of BAUHAUS (~~6649).security measures and collocated units: UNK. (HIS Plt Sgt, 2~1~~/3/3/44/32 220800ZAug
MRD DOI: 85.)
b.
( ) U/I deployment of 6 x 122mm howitzers from NB651491 approx 500 meters N along a light surface road to 14B654494. Guns were pointing west. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 220930ZAug85.

c.
,( ) U/I convoy of 10 x T-72 Tanks from NB659495 to NB654496,


traveling W along secondary road. Security measures and collocated units: UNK. DOI: 221600ZAu~ 85.
c. ( Food and water (3MRC).
(1)
( ) Food: Since 17 Aug 85 all personnel have been eating canned rations. There were no shortages of food. Last resupply of food was at 2120~0ZAug 85.

(2)
( ) Water: Water was available from water trucks of an U/I unit which arrived at the CP, 3MRC each evening at 2030 hours. No shortages of water.

d.
( (~MRP/~MRC) transceivers wdre


) Cunrnunicatioils equipment. All
in good working order.

e. ( Other: (~MRC).
(1)
( ) Medical: Each mbr had 1 x individual first aid kit.

(2)
( NBC: All individual and vehicular NBC gear was in excellent condition, since it had been inspected in early Aug 85.


9.
( ) ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA: None.

10.
( ) NISCELLANEOUS: (3~~~/3/44/32~1~~).


a. ( Personalities: (~MRC). LAST NAME FIRST NAME HN/I RANK POSN F K HOFBAUEK FNU MNU C~ t CO 3MRC
t
KAEMPERT PNU MNU SrSgt 1 SG 3MRC BECK Co slno s MNU JrLt PltLdr ~MRP/~MRL GUCIiENKO Franz MNU SrS,t PltMr ~MRP/~MRC
b.
( 1 Code narne./code number: Unk.

c.
( ) Radio Erequencies/call signs: ( MRC).


(1)
( ) Radio frequencies for 22 Aug 85 were as follows: Primary, 16.90 MHz; Alternate, 18.75 MHz. Frequencies are changed daily at 2400 hours by unit SOI.

(2)
( ) Call signs: (~MRP/~MRC) for 22 Aug 85


Call signs were as follows: AFCS'~~; AFCS 22, AFCS 19.
~MRS/~MRP, ~MRS/~MRP, ~MRS/~MW, Call signs are changed at 2400 ho~rs daily by unit SOI.
APPENDIX H
Approaches
DIRECT APPROACH
The direct approach is the questioning of a source without having to use any type of approach. The direct approach is often called no approach at all, but it is the most effective of all the approaches. Statistics tell us that in World War 11, it was 85 percent to 95 percent effective. In Vietnam, it was 90 percent to 95 percent effective. The direct approach works best on lower enlisted per- sonnel as they have little or no resistance training and have had minimal security training. Due to its effectiveness, the direct approach is always to be tried first. The direct approach usually achieves the maxi- mum cooperation in the minimum amount of time and enables the interrogator to quickly and completely exploit the source for the information he possesses. The advantages of this technique are its sim-plicity and the fact that it takes little time. For this reason, it is frequently used at the tactical echelons where time is limited.
INCENTIVE APPROACH
The incentive approach is a method of rewarding the source for his cooperation, but it must reinforce ~ositive behavior. This is done by satisfying the source's needs. Granting incentives to an uncooperative source leads him to believe that rewards can be gained whether he cooperates or not. Interrogators may not withhold a source's rights under the Geneva Conventions, but they can withhold a source's privileges. The granting of incentives must not infringe on the Geneva Conventions, but they can be things to which the source is already entitled to. This can be effective onlv if the
"
source is unaware of his rights or privileges.
Incentives must seem to be logical and possible. An interrogator must not promise anything that cannot be delivered. Interro- gators do not make promises, but usually infer them while still sidestepping guaran- tees. If an interrogator made a promise that he could not keep and he or another inter- rogator had to talk with the source again, the source would not have any trust and would most probably not cooperate. Instead of promising unequivocably that a source will receive a certain thing, such as political asylum, an interrogator will offer to do what he can to help achieve the source's desired goal; as long as the source cooperates.
The incentive approach can be broken down into the incentive short term (recej immediately) and incentive long term (received within a period of time). The determination rests on when the source expects to receive the incentive offered.
EMOTIONAL APPROACH
The emotional approach overrides the source's rationale for resisting by using and manipulating his emotions against him. The main emotions of any source at the time of capture might be either love or fear. Love or fear for one person may be ex- ploited or turned into hate for someone else. For example, the person who caused the source to be in the position in which he now finds himself. The source's fear can be built upon, or increased so as to override his rational side. If the situation demands it and the source's fear is so great that he cannot communicate with the interrogator, the interrogator may find that he has to decrease the source's fear in order to effec- tively collect information from him. There are two variations of the emotional approaches: Emotional love, emotional hate.
EMOTIONAL LOVE APPROACH
For the emotional love approach to be successful, the interrogator must focus on the anxiety felt by the source about the cir- cumstances in which he finds himself. The interrogator must direct the love the source feels toward the appropriate object: family, homeland, comrades, and so forth. If the interrogator can show the source what the source himself can do to alter or improve his situation, the approach has a chance of The fear can be directed toward reprisals by international tribunals, the government of the host country, or the source's own forces. Shouting can be very effective in this varia- tion of the fear up approach.
FEAR UP (MILD)
The fear up (mild) approach is better suited to the strong, confident type of inter- rogator as there is generally no need to raise the voice or resort to heavy-handed, table banging violence. It is a more correct form of blackmail when the circumstances indicate that the source does indeed have something to fear. It may be a result of coincidence; the soldier was ca.ught on the wrong side of the border before hostilities actually commenced (he was armed, he could be a terrorist), or a result of his actions (he surrendered contrary to his mili- tary oath and is now a traitor to his coun- try, and his own forces will take care of the disciplinary action). The fear up (mild) approach must be a credible distortion of the truth. A distortion that the source will believe. It usually involves some incentive; the interrogator can intimate that he might be willing to alter the circumstances of the source's capture, as long as the source coop- erates and answers the questions.
In most cases, shouting is not necessary. The actual fear is increased by helping the source to realize the unpleasant conse- quences that the facts may cause and then presenting an alternative, which of course can be effected by answering some simple questions. The fear up approach is dead- end, and a wise interrogator may want to keep it in reserve as a trump card. After working to increase the source's fear, it would be difficult to convince him that everything will be all right if the approach is not successful.
DECREASED FEAR DOWN
APPROACH

The decreased fear down approach is used primarily on a source who is already in a state of fear due to the horrible circum- stances of his capture, or on a source who is in fear for his life. This technique is really nothing more than calming the source and convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated, or that for him the war is mercifully over and he need not go into combat again. When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rap- port and usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate. While calming the source, it is a good idea to stay initially with nonpertinent conversation and to care- fully avoid the subject which has caused the source's fear. This works quickly in develop- ing rapport and communication as the source will readily respond to kindness.
When using this approach, it is important that the interrogator meets the source at the source's perspective level and not expect the source to come up to the interrogator's per- spective level. If a prisoner is so frightened that he has withdrawn into a shell or regressed back to a less threatening state of mind, the interrogator must break through to him. This may be effected by the interro- gator putting himself on the same physical level as the source and may require some physical contact. As the source relaxes somewhat and begins to respond to the interrogator's kindness, the interrogator can then begin asking pertinent questions.
This approach technique may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing the source that he has nothing to fear, he may cease to be afraid and may feel secure enough to resist the interrogator's pertinent questions. If this occurs, reverting to a harsher approach technique usually will rapidly bring the desired result to the interrogator.
PRIDE AND EGO APPROACH
The pride and ego approach concentrates on tricking the source into revealing perti- nent information by using flattery or abuse. It is effective with a source who has dis- played weaknesses or feelings of inferiority which can be effectively exploited by the interrogator. There are two techniques in this approach: the pride and ego up approach and the pride and ego down approach.
FUTILITY TECHNIQUE
APPROACH

The futility approach is used to make the source believe that it is useless to resist and to persuade him to cooperate with the interrogator. The futility approach is most effective when the interrogator can play on doubts that already exist in the source's mind. There are really many different variations of the futility approach. There is the futility of the personal situation "you are not finished here until you answer the questions," futility in that "everyone talks sooner or later," futility of the battlefield situation, and futility in the sense that if the source does not mind talking about history, why should he mind talking about his missions, they are also history.
If the source's unit had run out of supplies (ammunition, food, fuel, and so forth), it would be relatively easy to convince him that all of his forces are having the same logistical problems. A soldier who has been ambushed may have doubts as to how he was attacked so suddenly and the interrogator should be able to easily talk him into believing that the NATO forces knew where he was all the time.
The interrogator might describe the source's frightening recollections of seeing death on the battlefield as an everyday occurrence for his forces all up and down the lines. Factual or seemingly factual information must be presented by the interrogator in a persuasive, logical manner and in a matter-of-fact tone of voice.
Making the situation appear hopeless allows the source to rationalize his actions, especially if that action is cooperating with the interrogator. When employing this technique, the interrogator must not only be fortified with factual information, but he should also be aware of, and be able to exploit, the source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses.
Another way of using the futility approach is to blow things out of propor- tion. If the source's unit was low on, or had exhausted, all food supplies, he can be easily led to believe that all of his forces had run out of food. If the source is hinging on cooperating, it may aid the interrogation effort if he is told that all the other source's have already cooperated. A source who may want to help save his comrades' lives may need to be convinced that the situation on the battlefield is hopeless, and that they all will die without his assistance. The futility approach is used to paint a black picture for the prisoner, but it is not effective in and of itself in gaining the source's cooperation. The futility approach must be orchestrated with other approach techniques.
"WE KNOW ALL" APPROACH
The "we know all" approach convinces the source that we already know every- thing. It is a very successful approach for sources who are naive, in a state of shock, or in a state of fear. The interrogator must organize all available data on the source including background information, knowl- edge about the source's immediate tactical situation, and all available OB information on the source's unit. Upon initial contact with the source, the interrogator asks ques- tions, pertinent and nonpertinent, from his specially prepared list. When the source hesitates, refuses to answer, provides an incomplete response, or an incorrect response, the interrogator himself supplies the detailed answer. Through the careful use of the limited number of known details, the interrogator must convince the source that all information is already known; therefore, his answers are of no conse- quence. It is by repeating this procedure that the interrogator convinces the source that resistance is useless as everything is already known. When the source begins to give accurate and complete information to the questions to which the interrogator has the answers, the interrogator begins inter- jecting questions for which he does not have the answers. After gaining the source's cooperation, the interrogator still tests the extent of that cooperation by peri-, odically using questions for which he has the answers. This is very necessary; if the interrogator does not challenge the source when he is lying, the source will then know that everything is not known, and that he has been tricked. He may then provide incorrect answers to the interrogator's questions.
"MUTTAND JEFF" ("FRIEND AND FOE") APPROACH
The "Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe") approach involves a psychological ploy which takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and guilt which a source has as a result of being detained and questioned. Use of this technique necessitates the employment of two experienced interrogators who are convincing actors. Basically, the two interrogators will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward the source. For example, the first interrogator is very formal and displays an unsympathetic attitude toward the source. He might be strict and order the source to follow all military courtesies during questioning. The goal of the technique is to make the source feel cut off from his friends.
At the time the source acts hopeless and alone, the second interrogator appears (having received his cue by a hidden signal or by listening and observing out of view of the source), scolds the first interrogator for his harsh behavior, and orders him from the room. He then apologizes to soothe the source, perhaps offering him coffee and a cigarette. He explains that the actions of the first interrogator were largely the result of an inferior intellect and lack of human sensitivity. The inference is created that the second interrogator and the source have, in common, a high degree of intelligence and an awareness of human sensitivity above and beyond that of the first interrogator.
The source is normally inclined to have a feeling of gratitude toward the second interrogator, who continues to show a sympathetic attitude toward the source in an effort to increase the rapport and control the questioning which will follow. Should the source's cooperation begin to fade, the second interrogator can hint that since he is of high rank, having many other duties, he cannot afford to waste time on an uncooperative source. He may broadly infer that the first interrogator might return to continue his questioning. When used against the proper source, this trick will normally gain the source's complete cooperation.
RAPID FIRE APPROACH
The rapid fire approach involves a psychological ploy based upon the principles that everyone likes to be heard when he speaks, and it is confusing to be interrupted in midsentence with an un- related question. This technique may be used by an individual interrogator or simultaneously by two or more interro- gators in questioning the same source. In employing this technique the interrogator asks a series of questions in such a manner that the source does not have time to answer a question completely before the next question is asked. This tends to confuse the source, and he is apt to contradict himself, as he has little time to prepare his answers. The interrogator then confronts the source with the inconsis- tencies, causing further contradictions. In many instances, the source will begin to talk freely in an attempt to explain himself and deny the inconsistencies pointed out by the interrogator. In attempting to explain his answers, the source is likely to reveal more than he intends, thus creating additional leads for further interrogation.
The interrogator must have all his ques- tions prepared before approaching the source, because long pauses between ques- tions allow the source to complete his answers and render this approach ineffec- tive. Besides extensive preparation, this technique requires an experienced, compe- tent interrogator, who has comprehensive knowledge of ,his case, and fluency in the language of the source. This technique is most effective immediately after capture, because of the confused state of the source.
SILENCE APPROACH
The silence approach may be successful when employed against either the nervous or the confident-type source. When employ- ing this technique, the interrogator says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the source, but force him to break eye contact first. The source will become nervous, begin to shift around in his chair, cross and recross his legs, and
Interrogation Guides
Interrogation Guides - cont.
Interrogation Guides - cont.
Interrogation Guides - cont.
Interrogation Guides - cont.
1949 Geneva Conventions
1949 Geneva Conventions - cont.
1949 Geneva Conventions - cont.
1949 Geneva Conventions - cont.
1949 Geneva Conventions - cont.
H Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
H The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.
(GC, Art. 31)PROHIBITION OF COERCION
H No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain inforrrstion from them or from third parties.
GLOSSARY

abn ACR AF AG AKM amph amt AOE approx armd at ATGL Aug
BEST MAPS
BICC
BMP
bn

C C3 C3CM C A C-E CED CEE CEWI CINCAFMED CI CIC CINCENT CINCHAN CINCNORTH CINCSOUTH CM&D CMEC CMO
co
COMMZ
CONUS
COSCOM
CP
CPR
CSS

Glossary-0 airborne
armored cavalry regiment
Air Force
Adjutant General
designation of a type of Soviet rifle
amphibious
amount
Army of Excellence
approximately
armored antitank antitank grenade launcher
August
B -biographic intelligence
E -economic intelligence S -sociological intelligence
T -transportation and telecommunications intelligence M -military geographic intelligence
A -armed forces intelligence P -political intelligence S -scientific and technical intelligence battlefield information control center
designation of a type of Soviet armored personnel carrier
battalion
command and control command, control, and communications command, control, communications countermeasures civil affairs Communication-Electronics captured enemy document captured enemy equipment combat electronic warfare and intelligence Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Mediterranean counterintelligence combined interrogation center Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe Allied Commander in Chief Channel Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe collection management and dissemination captured material exploitation center civil-military operations
company
communications zone
continental United States
corps support command
command post
common point of reference
combat service support

DCPR decon det DI AM DISCOM DISUM div DO1 DS
dsgDTG
E
ea EAC EM EPW
evac EW
FID fl FM FNU FRG FUD
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 GDR GS
H/S HPT HQ
HUMINT
IAW ID ICPR
i.e. I&E IEW IMINT intel intg INTREP INTSUM destination common ~oint of reference decontamination detachment Defense Intelligence Agency Manual division support command daily intelligence summary division date of information direct support designated date-time group
east each echelons above corps enlisted man enemy prisoner of war evacuation electronic warfare
foreign internal defense fluent field manual first name unknown Federal Republic of Germany full unit designation
Assistant Chief of Staff, GI, Personnel Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Logistics Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil Affairs German Democratic Republic general support
hearsay high-payoff target headquarters human intelligence
in accordance with identification initial common point of reference that is interrogation and exploitation intelligence and electronic warfare imagery intelligence intelligence interrogation intelligence report intelligence summary IPB IPW IR
JIF Jr Lt JrSgt
KB KIA
ldr LIC
MARSTA mbr MHz MI MIT MN/I MOSC MR MRB MRC MRD MRP MRR MRS
N
NATO
NBC
no

OB
OCONUS
off
OPORD
OPSEC

PERINTREP pers PIR PKM PKT
~lt
PO intelligence preparation of the battlefield prisoner of war interrogation information requirements
Intelligence Directorate joint interrogation facilities junior lieutenant junior sergeant
knowledgeability briefs killed in action
leader low-intensity conflict
martial status member megahertz military intelligence mobile interrogation teams middle name/initial military occupational specialty code motorized rifle motorized rifle battalion motorized rifle company motorized rifle division motorized rifle platoon motorized rifle regiment motorized rifle squad
north/no
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nuclear, biological, chemical
number

order of battle
outside continental United States
officer
operation order
operations security

periodic intelligence report personnel priority intelligence requirements designation of a type of Soviet weapon designation of a type of Soviet weapon
platoon
political officer
POC POL POS
PSYOP
REC recon regt RPG-7 RSTA
S S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 SACEUR SACLANT SAEDA
SALUTE SFC SIGINT SIR SITMAP SO1 SOP ssd
sqdrn SrSgt STANAG SUPINTREP svc SVD SW
TCAE TECHDOC TOC TOE
UCMJ UIC UkSSR
unk
us
USA USACGSC USSR
point of capture petroleum, oil, and lubricants position
psychological operations
radio electronic combat reconnaissance regiment designation of a type of Soviet antitank grenade launcher reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
south Adjutant (US Army) Intelligence Officer (US Army) Operations and Training Officer (US Army) Supply Officer (US Army) Civil Affairs Officer (US Army) Supreme Allied Commander Europe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment sergeant first class signals intelligence specific information requirements situation map signal operating instructions standing operating procedure squad squadron senior sergeant standardization agreement supplemental intelligence report service designation of a type of Soviet rifle southwest
technical control and analysis element
technical document
tactical operations center
table of organization and equipment
Uniform Code of Military Justice unit identification code Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic unidentified unknown United States United States Army United States Army Command and General Staff College Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UTM Universal Transverse Mercator (grid)
W west
WNA would not answer

REFERENCES
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with this publication.
Army Regulations (ARs)
The Modern Army Recordkeeping System Army Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons Department of the Army Information Security Program
Field Manuals (FMs)
Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons Map Reading The Law of Land Warfare Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations Counterintelligence Counterintelligence Operations (U) The Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment Operations Low Intensity Conflict
Department of Army Pamphlets (DA Pams)
27-161-1 International Law Vol 1
Defense Intelligence Agency Manuals (DIAMs)
58-13 (S) ' Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Procedures (U)
Miscellaneous Publications
The Hague and Geneva Conventions Uniform Code of Military Justice
Department of Army Forms (DA Forms)
Prisoners Personal Property List-Personal Deposit Funds
COMMAND

Command publications cannot be obtained through Armywide resupply channels. Deter- mine availability by contacting the address shown. Field circulars expire three years from the date of publication unless sooner rescinded.
Field Circulars (FCs)
Medical Intelligence in the Airland Battle, 31 Mar 86. Academy of Health Sciences, US Army, Fort Houston, Texas 78234-1600 MI Bn/Co Interrogation and Exploitation (EAC), Oct 85 United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000
PROJECTED PUBLICATIONS
Projected publications are sources of additional information that are scheduled for printing but are not yet available. Upon print, they will be distributed automatically via pinpoint dis- tribution. They may not be obtained from the USA AG Publications Center until indexed in DA Pamphlet 310-1.
Field Manuals (FMs)
34-5 (S) Human Intelligence Operations (U) 34-25 Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.
Field Manuals (FMs)
Health Service Support in Theater of Operations Psychological Operations Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
air-land battle, 2-0, 2-5, 2-6

area of interest, 2-0
area of operations, 2-0
initiative, 2-0
doctrine, 2-0

analysis, 2-2

approach, 3-0, 3-3, 7-0

approaches, 3-4, 3-7, H-0
decreased fear down, H-2
direct, H-0
emotional, H-0
emotional hate, H-0
emotional love, H-0
"establish your identity", H-5
fear up (mild), H-2
fear up (harsh), H-1
file and dossier, H-5
futility technique, H-4
incentive, H-0
increased fear up, H-1
"Mutt and Jeff" ("friend and foe"), H-6
pride and ego, H-2
pride and ego down, H-3
pride and ego up, H-3
rapid fire, H-6
repetition, H-5
silence, H-6
"we know all", H-4
assess the source, 3-5
breaking point, 3-6
commander's information requirements,
3-6
commander's priority intelligence
requirements, 3-6
contact, 7-0
establish and develop rapport, 3-5
establish and maintain control, 3-4, 3-5
establish and maintain rapport, 3-4
Geneva and Hague Conventions, 3-5
initial contact, 7-0
interview, 7-0
manipulate the source's emotions and
weaknesses, 3-4
phase, 3-4
planning and preparation, 3-3
selecting, 3-3
sincere and convincing, 3-6
smooth transitions, 3-6
techniques, 3-4, 3-6
UCMJ, 3-5

INDEX
battlefield information control center,
6-4

contact, 6-4
DISUM, 6-4
intelligence dissemination, 6-4
INTREP, 6-4
INTSUM, 6-4
PERINTREP, 6-4
SUPINTREP, 6-4

captured enemy documents, 1-1, 1-2, 4-0,
4-1, 4-4, 4-6, 4-9, A-11

accountability, 4-1, 4-13
Air Force-related documents, 4-5
captured material exploitation center, 4-9
captured with a source, 4-11
categories, 4-4
category A, 4-4
category B, 4-4
category C, 4-5
category D, 4-5
communications and cryptographic
documents, 4-4
confiscation, 4-12
date-time group, 4-0
detainee personnel record
disposal, 4-1 1
electronic warfare, 4-9
evacuation, 4-1, 4-12
exploitation, 4-4, 8-0
handling, 4-0
impounded, 4-12
inventory, 4-2
log, 4-2, 4-3
maps and charts of enemy forces, 4-5
Navy-related documents, 4-5
recognition, 4-12
recording documents category, 4-5
returned, 4-12
SALUTE report, 4-4, 4-8
screening, 4-4
SIGINT, 4-9
STANAG 1059,4-0
STANAG 2084,4-0
tag, 4-1
technical control and analysis element,
4-4, 4-9
technical documents, 4-4, 4-5, 4-9
trace actions, 4-2
translation reports, 4-6, 4-8
translating, 4-5
transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10

categories
document, 3-2, 4-4, A-11
source, 3-1, 3-2, 8-0, A-4, A-5, A-6
combined interrogation center, 8-0
STANAG 2033,8-0

collection management and
dissemination, 6-4

contact, 6-4
DISUM, 6-4
intelligence dissemination, 6-4
INTREP, 6-4
INTSUM, 6-4
PERINTREP, 6-4
SUPINTREP, 6-4

command, control, and
communications, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6

countermeasures, 2-4

programs
counterintelligence, 2-2, 2-4

agents, 3-1
agent or friendly civilian, 9-9
air-land battle, 2-5
black list, 2-5
command, control, and communications
programs, 2-2, 3-4
deception, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5
element, 3-1
enemy agents, 2-5
gray list, 2-5
informant technique, 9-10
insurgent captive, 9-9
interrogation operations, 9-9
local leader, 9-9
operations security, 2-2, 2-4
priority intelligence requirements of
counterintelligence interest, 3-1
radio electronic combat, 2-5
rear operations, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition, 2-5
saboteurs, 2-5
screening techniques, 9-9
sympathizers, 2-5
special purpose forces, 2-5
terrorists, 2-5
white list, 2-5

echelons above corps, 1-2, 4-5

electronic warfare, 2-2, 2-6

capabilities and limitations, 2-6

combat effectiveness, 2-6

command, control, and communications,
2-6

compositions, 2-6
counterintelligence, 2-2
dispositions, 2-6
electronic technical data, 2-7
IR, 2-6
logistics, 2-7
miscellaneous data, 2-7
PSYOP, 2-7
missions, 2-6
OB elements, 2-7
PIR, 2-6
strength, 2-6
tactics, 2-6
training, 2-6

high-intensity conflict, P, 9-1

human intelligence, 2-7

cooperative and friendly, 1-2
hostile and antagonistic, 1-2
human sources, 1-1
neutral and nonpartisan, 1-2

information
all-source intelligence, 2-2
analyze information, 2-3
area of operations, 2-1
collection assets, 2-1
collection missions, 2-1
collection requirements, 2-1
combat, 2-2, 2-3
components of strategic debriefing, 7-1
armed forces intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
biographic intelligence, 7-1
economic intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
military geographical intelligence, 7-1,
7-2
political intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
scientific and technical intelligence, 7-1,
7-3
sociological intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
transportation and telecommunications
intelligence, 7-1, 7-2
direct targeting data, 2-2
electronic technical data, 2-7
imagery intelligence, 6-4
interrogation operations, 2-0
military intelligence, 2-0, 2-4
miscellaneous data, 2-7
PSYOP, 2-7
OB elements, 2-7
OB data base, 3-3
signals intelligence, 6-4

situation map, 3-3
strategic debriefing, 7-0
duties and responsibilities, 7-0
notification, 7-0
planning and preparation, 7-0
targeting data, 2-3
terrain features, 2-1
weather conditions, 2-1

information requirements, 2-3, 2-6, 3-0,
3-1, 3-4, 3-6, 3-8

intelligence and electronic warfare,
2-0, 2-2, 2-4, 2-7, 3-3

all-source intelligence, 2-2
CED, 2-7
collection, 2-2
combat information, 2-2
command, control, and communications
programs, 2-2
counterintelligence, 2-2
deception, 2-2
direct targeting data, 2-2
electronic warfare, 2-2
operations security, 2-2
processing, 2-2
rear operations, 2-2
reporting, 2-2
sources, 2-7
situation development, 2-2
target development, 2-2

intelligence annex, 5-0

deployment site, 5-0

intelligence preparation of the
battlefield, 2-0, 2-2

battlefield information control center, 6-4
collection management and
dissemination, 6-4
collection missions, 6-4
intelligence process, 2-1, 2-2
military intelligence, 2-0
weather and terrain, 2-2, 2-3

interpreter, 3-14, 3-15

interrogation, 3-14
methods, 3-14
preparation, 3-14
reports, 3-15

interrogation, 1-0, 3-0, 3-3, 6-0, 8-0

accuracy, 1-0
advisor operations, 9-5
agent or friendly civilian, 9-9
and the interrogator, 1-0

approach, 3-0
area cordon. 9-9
battlefield information control center, 6-4
CEDS. 4-0

, -
collection management and
dissemination, 6-4
collection mission, 6-4
collection priority, 6-0
command relations, 6-0
contacts, 6-4, 7-0
counterintelligence, 2-2, 2-4
defectors, 9-8
deployment site, 6-3
detainee personnel record, 3-0
EPW captive tag, 3-0
examine documents, 3-0
foreign internal defense, 9-1
illiterates, 9-10
information requirements, 3-0, 3-1, 6-4
informant technique, 9-10
initiative, 1-0
prisoner of war, 1-0
insurgent captive, 9-9
insurgent vulnerability to interrogation,
9-6
intelligence, 1-0
intelligence and electronic warfare, 2-0,
2-2 I
intelligence preparation of the battlefield,
2-0
joint interrogation facilities, 8-0
legal status of insurgents, 9-6
local leader, 9-9
low-intensity conflict, 9-1, 9-3
main and local forces, 9-8
military police, 3-0
militia, 9-8
mission, 8-0
national agency, 8-2
objective, 1-0
order of battle, 1-0, 2-3
interrogation, 1-0
interrogator, 1-0
OB elements, 2-7
observe the source, 3-0
operational environment
operations, 2-0, 9-1, 9-9
peacekeeping operations
peacetime contingency operations, 9-1
plan, 3-4
planning and preparation, 3-0,3-4
political cadre, 9-8
population, 9-6
prescreening, 3-0
priority intelligence requirements, 3-0, 3-1,
6-4

principles of, 1-0
process, 3-0
question guards, 3-0
questioning, 3-7
reports, 3-15
screeners, 3-0, 3-1
screening, 3-0, 9-9
security, 1-1
site, 3-14, 6-3
situation map, 3-3
source, 3-0
support relationships, 6-4
additional, 6-6
chaplain, 6-7
communications, 6-6
health service, 6-6
inspector general, 6-7
NBC protection, 6-6
staff judge advocate, 6-6
civil-military operations (G5 and S5),
6-6
intelligence (G2 and S2), 6-5
operations (G3 and S3), 6-5
personnel (GI and Sl), 6-4
supply (G4 and S4), 6-5
sympathizer, 9-8
termination, 3-12
terrorism counteraction, 9-1
with an interpreter, 3-14

interrogator, 1-0, 3-14

accessible information overtime, 6-2
adaptability, 1-3
advisor operations, 9-5
advisor qualifications, 9-4
advisor relationships, 9-4
alertness, 1-2
and the interrogation, 1-0
approach techniques, 1-4
capabilities and limitations, 2-6
combat effectiveness, 2-6
common characteristics of sources, 9-8
compositions, 2-6
counterintelligence, 2-4
counterpart relationship, 9-5
credibility, 1-3
dispositions, 2-6
enemy material and equipment, 1-5
entry-level training, 1-4
electronic technical data, 2-6
foreign language, 1-4
hot and cold leads, 3-9
information requirements, 2-6
intelligence assets, 2-0

intelligence and electronic warfare
operations, 2-2
international agreements, 1-5, 1-6
knowledgeability of sources, 9-8
law of land warfare, 1-5
logistics, 2-7
1o.ng-term memory, 6-1
map reading, 1-5
map tracking, 1-5, 3-10
miscellaneous data, 2-7
missions, 2-6
motivation, 1-2
neurolinguistics, 1-5
objectivity, 1-3
order of battle, 1-4
OB data base, 3-3
patience and tact, 1-3
perseverence, 1-3
personal appearance and demeanor, 1-3
personal qualities, 1-2
population, 9-6
priority intelligence requirements, 2-6
role, 2-0
security, 1-5
self-control, 1-3
short-term memory, 6-1
situation map, 5-3
SALUTE, 3-9
specialized skills and knowledge, 1-4
strength, 2-6
tactics, 2-6
target country, 1-4
tasking relationships, 6-3
The Hague and Geneva Conventions, 1-5
training, 2-6
writing and speaking skills, 1-4

joint interrogation facility (JIF),8-0, 8-2

CA units, 8-2
category A sources, 8-0
communications, 8-2
coordination, 8-2
debriefing, 8-2
division and corps interrogation and CI
elements, 8-2
EPW camp, 8-2
exploitation of documents, 8-0
formation, 8-0
Geneva Conventions, 8-2
HUMINT collection, 8-2
interrogation, 8-2
division and corps interrogation and CI
elements, 8-2
interrogation reports, 8-1
knowledgeability briefs, 8-1

mission, 8-0
mobile interrogation teams, 8-1
national agency, 8-2
operation, 8-1
organization, 8-0
PSYOP, 8-2
requirement, 8-0
responsibilities, 8-0
SALdUTE, 8-1
screening, 8-2

division and corps interrogation and CI
elements, 8-2
use, 8-1

low-intensity conflict, P, 1-6, 9-1

advisor and interrogator relationships,
9-4
advisor operations, 9-5
advisor qualifications, 9-4
area cordon, 9-9
cease fire supervision, 9-2
common characteristics of sources, 9-8
counterpart relationship, 9-5
defectors, 9-8
foreign internal defense, 9-1, 9-2
Geneva Conventions, 9-7
handling of insurgent captives and

suspects, 9-7
humane treatment, 9-7
illiterates, 9-10
informant technique, 9-10
insurgent captive, 9-9
insurgent methods of resistance, 9-7
insurgent vulnerability to interrogation,

9-6
interrogation operations, 9-9
interrogator skills and abilities, 9-4
interrogation support to, 9-3
knowledgeability of sources, 9-8
law and order maintenance, 9-2
limitations to US assistance, 9-4

local leader, 9-9
main and local forces, 9-8
militia, 9-8
peacekeeping operations, 9-1, 9-2
peacetime contingency operations, 9-1, 9-3
political cadre, 9-8
population, 9-6
screening techniques, 9-9
source, 9-6
sympathizer, 9-8
terminology, 9-1
terrorism counteraction, 9-1, 9-3

mid-intensity conflict, 9-1

modern Army recordkeeping system,
5-3

operations security, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 7-1

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition, 2-5

order of battle, 1-0, 1-4,2-3, 2-7

data base, 3-2
elements, 2-7

planning and preparation, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4

documents captured with a source, 4-11
EPW captive tag, 3-0
evaluation of documents, 4-12
examine documents, 3-0
guards, 5-1
interpreter preparation phase, 3-14
interrogation, 3-14
observe the source, 3-0
preparation, 3-14
questioning guards, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4
SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0

priority intelligence requirements, 2-3,
2-6,3-0, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-8, 3-13

commander's, 3-6
of counterintelligence interest
supported commander's, 3-1

procedures
accountability, 4-1, 4-13
administrative tasks, 5-2
area cordon, 9-9
assign category, 3-1
captured document log, 4-2, 4-3
captured document tag, 4-1
captured enemy documents, 4-1, 4-9, A-11
captured material exploitation center, 4-9
categories of PW, A-4
chaplain, 3-7
collection mission update, 5-3
collection priority, 6-0
commander's information requirements,
3-0, 3-1
commander's priority intelligence
requirements, 3-0, 3-1
communications, 5-1
communications and cryptographic
documents, 4-4
confiscation of documents, 4-12
counterintelligence operations, P
date-time group, 4-0
detainee personnel record, 3-0
disposal of documents, 4-11

documents captured with a source, 4-11
document evacuation, 4-1, 4-8, 4-9, 4-12
document inventory 4-2
electronic warfare, P, 4-9
evaluation of documents, 4-12
examine documents, 3-0
guards, 5-1
high-intensity conflict, P
humane treatment, 9-7
impounded documents, 4-12
intelligence and electronic warfare
operations, 5-0
intelligence annex, 5-0
intelligence cycle, 7-3
interpreter, 3-15
interpreter preparation phase, 3-14
interrogating, 3-8, 3-15
interrogation guides, I-0,143
armored troops, 1-4
artillerymen, 1-4
drivers, 1-2
engineer troops, 1-6
guerrilla personnel, 1-8
liaison officers, 1-3
local civilians, 1-7
medical corpsmen, 1-6
members of machine-gun and motor
units, 1-7
messengers, 1-0
patrol leaders and patrol members, 1-2
political and propaganda personnel, 1-8
prisoner of war captive tag, D-1
prisoner of war identity card, C-0
reconnaissance troops, 1-7
radio and telephone operators, 1-1
riflemen, 1-0
squad and platoon leaders and
company commanders, 1-1
interrogation site, 3-14, 5-1
liaison, 7-1
low-intensity conflict, P
medic, 3-7
medical support, 5-1
methods of interpretation, 3-14
military police, 3-0
modern Army recordkeeping system, 5-3
movement, 5-1
neurolinguistics, 1-5
nuclear, biological, and chemical, P
planning and preparation, 3-3
prepare and move to deployment site,
3-14, 5-0, 5-1
priority, 4-8, 4-9
prisoners of war, 2-7
question guards, 3-0

question guide for NBC operations, 1-8
humane treatment, 5-4
insurgency, J-1
1949 Geneva Conventions, J-0
prisoners of war, 5-2
prohibition of coercion, 5-5
questioning of prisoners, 5-4
recognition of documents, 4-12
recordkeeping, 3-12
Red Cross, 3-7
returned documents, 4-12
S2, 5-0

S3, 5-0
SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0
sample detainee personnel record, B-0
screeners, 3-0, 3-1, 4-5, 5-1
screening report format, F-1, F-2
senior interrogator, 5-2
signals intelligence, 4-9
source evacuation, 5-1
STANAG extracts, A-1
STANAG 1059, 4-0, A-2
STANAG 2033, 8-0, A-2
STANAG 2044, A-6
STANAG 2084, 4-0, A-10
tactical interrogation report, G-0, G-7
technical control and analysis element,
4-4, 4-9
technical documents, 4-4, 4-9
termination, 3-13
trace actions, 4-2
translation report, 4-8
transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10

prockssing, 2-2

approach, 3-0
cycle, 5-2
EPW captive tag, 3-0
intelligence and electronic warfare, 2-7
intelligence process, 2-1, 2-2
interrogation, 3-0, 5-2
observe the source, 3-0
planning and preparation, 3-0
prescreening, 3-0
questioning, 3-0
reporting, 3-0
screeners, 3-0
screening, 3-0, 5-2
documents, 4-4
source, 9-9
termination, 3-0

prohibition against use of force, 1-1

international law, 1-1,1-5

law of land warfare, 1-5

legal status of insurgents, 9-6
question guide for NBC operations, 1-8
humane treatment, 5-4
insurgency, J-1
prisoners of war, 5-2
prohibition of coercion, 5-5
questioning of prisoners, 5-4
The Hague and Geneva Conventions, P,
1-5, 2-7, 3-5, 3-7, 8-2, 9-6, 9-7, J-1
Uniform Code of Military Justice, P, 2-7,
3-5

questioning, 3-0, 3-7, 7-0

collection mission, 6-4
collection priority, 6-0
guards, 3-3
hearsay information, 3-9
hot and cold leads, 3-9
information requirements, 3-9
interrogation, 5-1
interrogation guides, I-0,I-8
armored troops, 1-4
artillerymen, 1-4
drivers, 1-2
engineer troops, 1-6
guerrilla personnel, 1-8
liaison officers, 1-3
local civilians, 1-7
medical corpsmen, 1-6
members of machine-gun and motor
units, 1-7
messengers, 1-0
patrol leaders and patrol members, 1-2
political and propaganda personnel, 1-8
prisoner of war captive tag, D-1
prisoner of war identity card, C-0
reconnaissance troops, 1-7
radio and telephone operators, 1-1
riflemen, 1-0
squad and platoon leaders and
company commanders, 1-1
map reading, 1-5
map tracking, 1-5, 3-10
destination common point of reference,
3-10
exploit dispositions, 3-11
initial common point of reference, 3-10
point of capture, 3-10
segment and exploit the route
segments, 3-1 1
missions, 2-6
modify sequences of, 3-3
OB elements, 2-7
PIR, 2-6, 3-9
question guide for NBC operations, 1-8

questioning of prisoners, 5-4
questioning techniques, 3-7
compound and negative, 3-9
control, 3-8
direct, 3-7
f0110~-~p,

3-8
leading, 3-8
nonpertinent, 3-8
prepared, 3-8
repeated, 3-8
vague, 3-8
recognition of documents, 4-12
recording information, 3-12
SALUTE, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8
sequence, 3-9
strength, 2-6
tactics, 2-6
training, 2-6

reporting, 2-2, 3-0, 3-13, 7-0

DISUM, 6-4
documents captured with a source, 4-11
information requirements, 3-9, 3-13
intelligence annex, 5-0
intelligence dissemination, 6-4
INTREP. 6-4
INTSUM, 6-4
interrogation reports, 8-1
PERINTREP, 6-4
preparation of. 3-15
priority intelligence requirements, 3-9,
3-13
questioning, 3-0
record information. 3-1
recording documents category, 4-5
S2. 5-0
~3;

5-0
SALUTE report, 8-1, E-0, E-1
sample translation report, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10
screeners, 3-1
screening code, 3-1
screening report, 3-1, F-0, F-2
situation map, 5-3
SALUTE, 3-1, 4-6
SUPINTREP, 6-4
tactical interrogation report, G-0, G-7
translation, 4-6
transmittal documents, 4-9, 4-10
writing and speaking skills, 1-4

screening, 3-0, 4-4, 5-1, 5-2, 8-2, 9-9

assign category, 3-1
categories of PW, A-4
CEDS, 4-0
CEDs captured with a source, 4-11

code, 3-1
EPW captive tag, 3-0
evaluation of documents, 4-12
examine documents, 3-0
guards, 5-1
observe the source, 3-0
prescreening, 3-0
priority intelligence requirements of
counterintelligence interest, 3-1
question guards, 3-0, 3-3, 3-4
recognition of documents, 4-12
report, 3-1, F-0, F-1, F-2
SALUTE report, 3-9, 4-4, 4-8, E-0
screeners, 3-0, 3-1, 4-5, 5-1
sources, 2-7
techniques, 9-9

senior interrogator, 3-3,3-4
administrative tasks, 5-2
advice and assistance, 5-0
CED processing cycle, 5-2
collection mission update, 5-3
communications, 5-1
establish site, 5-1
interrogation, 5-1
screening, 5-1
evacuation, 5-1
guards, 5-1
intelligence annex, 5-0
interrogation operations, 5-0
interrogation process, 5-1
medical support, 5-1
movement, 5-1
planning and preparation, 3-3
prepare and move to deloyment site, 5-0,
5-1
recordkeeping, 5-3
reporting, 5-2
S2,5-0
S3, 5-0
screening, 5-2
situation map, 5-3

situation development, 2-2

terrain, 2-2
weather, 2-2

sources,P, 1-1, 1-4, 2-7, 3-0, 9-6, 9-8

accessible information overtime, 6-2
anent or friendlv civilian. 9-9

, -
captive tag, 3-0 "
captured enemy documents, 1-1, 4-1 1,4-12,
4-13
category A, 8-0
cooperative and friendly, 1-2

corps or echelons above corps, 1-2
defectors, 9-8
hostile and antagonistic, 1-2
human intelligence, 2-7
human sources, 1-1
illiterates, 9-10
imagery intelligence, 6-4
informant technique, 9-10
insurgent captive, 9-9
interrogation operations, 9-9
knowledgeability briefs, 8-1
local leader, 9-9
long-term memory, 6-1
main and local forces, 9-8
militia, 9-8
neutral and nonpartisan, 1-2
political cadre, 9-8
prisoner of war, 1-0, C-0, D-1
sample detainee personnel record, B-0
screening, 9-9
short-term memory, 6-1
signals intelligence, 6-4
sources of information, 1-1
sympathizer, 9-8

target development, 2-2

combat information, 2-3
combat operations, 2-4
command and control, 2-4
command, control, and communications,
2-3, 2-4
command, control, and communications
countermeasures, 2-4
counterintelligence, 2-4
high-payoff targets, 2-3. 2-4
high value targets, 2-2
information requirements, 2-2
intelligence officer, 2-3
operations security, 2-3, 2-4
order of battle, 2-3
priority intelligence requirements, 2-2, 2-3
radio electronic combat, 2-3
specific information requirements, 2-2,
2-3. 2-4
battalion, 2-3
brigade, 2-3
targeting data, 2-3
weather and terrain, 2-3

termination, 3-0, 3-12, 3-13, 3-15, 7-1

phase, 3-12
questioning, 3-0
returned documents. 4-12
source evacuation, 5-1

training, 1-4, 2-6

enemy material and equipment, 1-5
entry-level training, 1-4
foreign language, 1-4
international agreements, 1-5
interrogator, 6-7
language, 6-7, 7-1
map reading, 1-5

map tracking, 1-5
neurolinguistics, 1-5
order of battle, 1-4
scientific and technical enhancement, 7-1
security, 1-5
specialized skills and knowledge, 1-4
target country, 1-4

translating, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7

FM 34-52 8 MAY 1987
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
General, United States Army Chief of Staff
Official:
R. L. DILWORTH
Brigadier General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, USAR, andARNG:To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11A, Require-ments for Intelligence Interrogation (Qty rqr block no. 278).
* U.S. GOVERWENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1987 726-041/41055